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ABSTRACT
METASCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF TOPOI OF SPACES
C.E.B.Melville August 1990
This thesis presents a study of the importance of topoi for 
Science. It is argued that whenever the concept of space enters the 
practice of Science then formal (mathematical) theories should be 
interpreted in a topos of spaces. It is claimed that these topoi 
encode knowledge of space arising directly out of the needs of 
Science, in that the constitutive questions of the Sciences can be 
traced back to their leading knowledge interests and these 
determine the role of mathematics as a methodical device. In the 
Natural Sciences the constitutive questions involve the study of 
non-intentional objects, in terms of a causal nexus to be explained 
geometrically, and this facilitates the introduction of geometric 
objects as the methodical device for posing questions to Nature. 
Although the study of intentional subjects in the Human Sciences 
requires ordinary language, not mathematics, to pose questions to 
each other, secondary methodological objectifications permit a 
conception of geometric objects analogous to that of the Natural 
Sciences. Lawvere*s axioms for the gros and petit topoi illustrate 
attempts to formalise the idea of topoi of spaces, as a rational 
reconstruction of categories in which geometric objects satisfying 
the formal theories of Science can be found. The catalysing 
function of this knowledge of topoi of spaces can lead to a 
diagnosis of mathematical difficulties caused by a failure to 
align mathematical conceptions with these topoi. This is 
illustrated through Varela's use of self-reference in Biology and 
Atkin's use of algebraic topology in Social Studies.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION ; METASCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF 
TOPOI OF SPACES
One of the most remarkable developments in modern 
mathematics during recent decades has been the creation and 
elaboration of the theory of elementary topoi. If a mathematical 
category is a 'universe of (mathematical) discourse', then any 
category which is an elementary topos may be regarded as such a 
universe "... within which we can carry out constructions in much 
the same way as we do within the category of sets, and with much 
the same results" ([JT1] p.47). By well-established abuse, topos 
theorists usually treat objects in a topos almost as if they were 
sets. Thus a topos is a set-like category; and just as the familiar 
category of sets and functions corresponds to classical set theory, 
so elementary topoi may be said to correspond to intuitionist set 
theory. Because of the intimate connection between topos theory and 
set theory (and its logic), there is an obvious danger that topos 
theory may be dismissed as being of interest only to logicians. 
Indeed Wraith was to urge that topos theory "... is such a pretty 
subject that it would be most disappointing if it were not good for 
anything; all my instincts tell me it will be useful, and not just 
for applications in logic" ([WR] p.115). If this remark is viewed 
as prophetic, then it has surely been amply fulfilled in the work 
of Lawvere and those who have followed him in demonstrating how 
geometric ideas can be applied through the medium of topos theory 
in contexts where earlier generations would never have suspected 
their utility.
Observing that "... some physicists and engineers seem in
‘r
effect to have the insight that geometrical and; physical 
constructions can be performed, with almost as ^ puch freedom as sets 
can be defined in naive set theory, without ever leaving the realm 
of smooth objects and smooth maps" ([LWD] p.3)» Lawvere has argued 
that there are some topoi which are not just set-like but also 
space-like, in the sense that objects in these topoi are actually 
spaces. He has sought to establish the conceptual basis of these 
topoi of spaces within a class of topoi known as variable sets. 
Traditionally, set theory has emphasised the constancy of sets in 
which all variation is frozen. However, variable sets are construed 
as sets varying with stages of definition. In the first instance, a 
topos of spaces may be regarded as a category of variable sets, in 
which the stages of definition are parameterised by some geometric 
object (such as a 'point' or 'path'). Furthermore, there are 
certain properties a topos of spaces often has, and a wise 
selection of these should serve to distinguish them axiomatically 
from other classes of topoi. Although Lawvere regards his own 
attempts to axiomatise what he calls gros topoi of spaces as 
failing to capture the determinate abstract general relation 
underpinning such topoi, it is true to say that his axioms list 
important properties underlying the idea of topoi of spaces. As 
such they serve a catalysing function in guiding the learning, 
development, and use of these topoi within mathematics.
The ideas underpinning topoi of spaces have a wider 
metascientific significance than their presentation as abstract 
mathematical concepts might lead us to suspect. This should not be 
too surprising as a primary source for geometry has always been the 
physics of continuous bodies and fields. I argue that the axioms of
topoi of spaces are not simply axioms of an arbitrary^
(mathematical) character, a mathematical game as it were; rather 
they distill the essence of our historical land scientific 
experience of matter moving in space. The extra-mathematical 
character of the notions of topoi of spaces can best be summarised 
in the following dictum : whenever the concept of space enters the 
practice of Science in a fundamental way, then an appropriate 
'universe of discourse' for interpreting formalised fragments of 
the theories of Science should be a topos of spaces rather than an 
arbitrary topos or other category. If axioms formalising topoi of 
spaces encode our scientific experience, then the salient extra- 
mathematical features of these axioms can best be exhibited by 
locating their normative function in advising on the character of 
mathematics required for Science. I claim that the axioms of topoi 
of spaces can contribute to the growth of knowledge, in that they 
can serve a catalysing function (summarised in the dictum) by 
guiding the learning, development, and application of mathematics 
in the Sciences (see Note 1, p.224). Thus the object of this thesis 
is to elucidate the metascientific aspects of our knowledge of 
topoi of spaces by showing that
1) knowledge of topoi of spaces encodes knowledge of space which 
arises directly out of the needs of Science, and
2) the catalysing function of this knowledge can lead to rapid 
diagnosis of certain mathematical difficulties in scientific 
research practice.
My use of the term 'space' will be very general. On the one 
hand, I shall think of it as one of the highest universels under 
which the experience of objects may be grasped. On the other hand.
I shall think of 'space* as just as qxactly what it says it is: a 
continuous extension viewed with or without reference to the
existence of objects within it (see Oxford English Dictionary).
j
Thus the animating idea of 'space' is that it has, at least, 
'points' and 'paths' to reference the location and movements of the 
objects of experience. However, my use of the term 'space' is not 
to be identified with any particular mathematical representation of 
the term. Rather my concern is with the categories in which such 
representations may be found. Similarly my use of the term 
'science' is also very general. For me, the Sciences are concerned 
with an adequate understanding (episteme) of the object of enquiry, 
whether that quest is concerned with 'the' external world (=
Natural Sciences) or 'our' social-life world (= Human Sciences). 
Thus the Sciences are concerned with a rational organisation of 
knowledge and are instituted as a practice which alters its form in 
the light of new knowledge.
In his answer to the question 'What is Metascience ?', 
Radnitzky argues that there are many ways of looking at Science as 
research about research ([RA] pp.x-xiv). He describes a sequence of 
widening perspectives leading from studies of the logical, 
semantical, information-theoretical, and epistemological aspects of
Science to studies of what Science means for man, all of which
/
might be described as 'Metascience'. The underlying disciplines of 
such studies range from Formal Logic through Sociology and History 
to the Philosophy of Science. He argues that although these 
perspectives complement and mediate each other, there is always a 
danger of totalising any of them, and he suggests that 
metascientific knowledge is best developed in a process of tacking 
between these perspectives. Accordingly he proposes a case for a
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new type of study : Metascience ^ as systems-theoretically oriented 
research into Science conceived with practical intent. In a sense, 
this conception of Metascience is only a means (in modern dress) of 
tackling the ancient problem of relating theoretical knowledge 
(episteme) to practical intelligence (phronesis).
Radnitzky views Science as a knowledge producing and 
distributing enterprise, and describes it as a system. Component 
parts of this system are : the producers (researchers), the process 
of research, the products, the supply of intellectual resources, 
and Metascience as a feedback mechanism which recycles knowledge 
about research strategies for improved steering of the research 
enterprise ([RA] I, pp.1-2). The research enterprise is considered 
as an adaptive innovative system - "the most innovative system 
there is" ([RA] p.xiv). For such a system, the key metascientific 
question is 'How can the research process be facilitated ?'. Thus, 
one is interested in how research is done, and how it is evaluated. 
For a Metascience conceived with practical intent, another key 
question is 'How can the research strategy be improved ?'. Here, 
the focus is on knowledge, which can be evaluated in terms of its 
relevance for improved steering of the scientific enterprise. Thus, 
the normative function of Metascience lies largely in catalysing^
and advising scientific research. "Ideally, it would supply maps
/
... or theoretical models to those engaged in the study of a given 
science or some aspects of the knowledge-producing industries"
([RA] p.xii). In a striking (but perhaps trite) metaphor, Radnitzky 
likens the metascientist to a management consultant concerned to 
improve the scientific enterprise. From this perspective 
Metascience is feedback-controlled knowledge for the improved
steering of Science
The Metascientific character of this thesis is reflected in 
its Objectives. The dictum, that whenever notions of space enter 
the theories of Science then interpretation should be in a topos of 
spaces, is knowledge designed to improve the performance of the 
scientific enterprise. Essentially this thesis studies a subsystem 
of Science as indicated in Figure 1 .
Subsystem of Science
demand
Mathematics
Research Group
supply
Figure 1
Here, a research group of scientists demand intellectual resources 
from Mathematics as a component of its products, to which 
Mathematics attempts to supply appropriate models. A more detailed 
view of the cycle of interaction is summarised in Figure 2.
Formal and Conceptual Subsystems
supply
models
formalise
theories
Formal Conceptual
Research Group
Mathematics
Interpret
Figure 2
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\ Here, the research group registers its demand for intellectual 
resources by formalising fragments of its discourse as formal
1
1 theories expressed in some mathematical/logical language. The 
Mathematical subsystem is now disaggregated into the Formal and the 
Conceptual. On the one hand, mathematicians are concerned with the 
mathematics that can be conceived. On the other hand, their concern 
with lucidity and precision in expression is reflected in their 
practice of formalising their conceptions in formal languages. The 
relation between the Formal and the Conceptual is one in which 
mathematical concepts are exhibited as models of formal theories in 
an act of interpretation ([LVJA]). Sometimes a variety of models may 
be exposed, and the supply of these concepts to a research group 
closes the cycle of interaction. For scientific theories embodying 
conceptions of space, the knowledge in the dictum is designed to 
improve the act of interpretation. By delimiting the Conceptual to 
the class of topoi of spaces, a finer regulation is exerted over 
the supply of models to a research group. By an understanding of 
the notions inherent in topoi of spaces, and by feeding this 
knowledge back into the cycle of interaction indicated in Figure 2 
it is possible to improve the performance of the scientific 
enterprise.
I shall not attempt to make a detailed genetic study of this 
cycle of interaction. To support my first objective, I shall tack 
between the Philosophy of Science and Mathematics in a study of 
more limited scope and warrant. From the perspective of the 
Philosophy of Science, I use the basic distinctions introduced by 
Habermas and Apel that the leading knowledge interest in the 
Natural Sciences is technical, whereas the leading interest in the 
Human Sciences is practical ([HA1,AP2]). I argue that our
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experience in the control and manipulation of moving bodies in 
space forms the basis of a technical cognitive interest. The 
schematization of space, time, substance, and causality, where non- 
intentional objects in which processes are understood in terms of a 
causal nexus, requires the introduction of a geometric framework 
where time and space parameterise objectified processes. Thus the 
Natural Sciences require 'geometric objects' as the essential 
medium in which to pose questions to Nature. On the other hand, the 
Human Sciences have a leading knowledge interest in improving 
communication and understanding between human subjects. Ordinary 
language, not mathematics, is the essential medium in which to 
resolve our questions. However, secondary methodological 
objectifications in the Human Sciences permit the possible 
introduction of mathematics in two ways. On the one hand, there are 
circumstances in which quasi-causal Sciences proceed, for one 
reason or another, as if their research guiding interests were 
those of the Natural Sciences. On the other hand, there are those 
Human Sciences which, in the course of their theorising, require 
precise and formal conceptions of a spatial character expressed in 
mathematics. This need for (what I shall call for want of a better 
term) a structural mathematics derives from a sense of structure as 
the organisation of connected parts. Metaphoric redescription of 
social cohesion in terms of spatial connectivity underwrites a 
demand for 'geometric objects'.
From the perspective of Mathematics, I refer to an 
adjunction between type theory and elementary topoi which enables 
us to treat the relationship between the Formal and the Conceptual 
as one of interpreting type theory in an elementary topos ([LS]).
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Science needs the formalism of type theory as it is the most 
powerful representation of the Formal known to us, and is most 
suitable for the expression of scientific theories. If the theories 
of Science need to be interpreted in a topos, then the 'geometric 
objects' required by the Sciences can be found as objects (= 
spaces) in a topos of spaces. By a 'topos of spaces', I mean a 
topos in which spaces are objects in which 'geometric elements'
(such as 'points' and 'paths') cohere. The crucial moment in my 
argument, that the ideas underpinning topoi of spaces stem directly 
from Science's engagement with Nature, lie in the axioms for a gros 
topos (of spaces), which involve a covariant approach to 'geometric 
objects' ([LVJB]). The observed covariation of space-time events is 
facilitated by indexing these events with geometric elements in 
such 'geometric objects'. Furthermore, all attempts to generate 
other formal systems of topoi of spaces (such as the petit topoi) 
involve choosing an object (= space) from a gros topos to 
parameterise the topos. Thus, in some sense, the gros topoi are 
primary in our attempts to encode knowledge of space arising out of 
the needs of the Sciences.
To support my second objective, I shall present some limited 
and partial evidence. My own interests and knowledge were the 
dominant factor in the selection of the material. I offer some 
thumbnail sketches of interactions between Research Groups and 
Mathematics, in which mathematical aspects of the research products 
have not been cast in terms of topoi of spaces. I argue that 
attempts to improve mathematical aspects of the research products 
have been processes of realigning the mathematics in terms of some 
topos of spaces. I claim, that in the situations I describe, there 
are already plausible reasons for locating the knowledge of topoi
13
of spaces in terms of a catalysing function in improving research 
practice.
Although this thesis is not a work of Mathematics, it is a 
work about Mathematics. I assume that the reader has served a basic 
mathematical apprenticeship, and although I have attempted to 
reduce the mathematical prerequisites to a minimum I assume some 
knowledge of the elements of category theory. Thus, the ideal 
reader is either a mathematician interested in the significance of 
mathematics for Science, or a scientist (with wide mathematical 
experience) interested in the relevance of mathematics to his 
research products. The historically-minded reader will be aware 
that many mathematicians have contributed to the theory of topoi.
If I emphasise the work of Lawvere in this thesis, it is not simply 
due to his leading role in the development of the theory. Lawvere, 
unlike many other mathematicians, seems always to have theorised 
with an eye on their wider scientific implications. It is these 
wider aspects which are highlighted in a work of this nature.
This thesis is divided broadly into three parts, 
corresponding to the philosophical and mathematical tacking 
together with empirical studies.
1) Philosophical Tack
Chapter 2 describes the basic distinctions introduced by Habermas 
and Apel in the theory of leading knowledge interests. I argue that 
the technical cognitive interest, in which the logic of explanation 
is reduced to that of prognosis, enables us to understand the 
introduction of mathematics as a methodical device into the Natural 
Sciences. The latter is illustrated with the simple example of
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Galileo's experiments with falling stones. Chapter 3 establishes 
that the differences in the constitutive questions can be traced to 
differing schematizations of space, time, substance, and causality. 
In particular, I argue that the complete objectification of Nature 
rests on a metaphorical redescription of natural processes in terms 
of 'mechanical corpuscular motions'. A technical cognitive interest 
presupposes that substance and time can be objectified as spaces to 
explain causality geometrically. Chapter 4 describes a simplified 
version of Apel's ideal typification of the Human Sciences. This 
adumbrates two major 'dimensions' of concern :
1) the distinction between quasi-causal sciences and those 
purveying good-reason-assays, and
ii) the contrast between those Human Sciences which evaluate human 
action in the light of constitutive norms and those which 
evaluate the norms themselves.
The differing ways in which these ideal typifications can generate 
a demand for 'geometric objects' is explored, and it is argued that 
the conceptions of space needed are essentially the same as the
Natural Sciences.
2) Mathematical Tack
Chapter 5 outlines the category theory needed to read this thesis. 
Expert mathematicians need read this only to check any differences 
with their own use of notation. Of essential importance in much of 
what follows are the descriptions of various categories of graphs. 
Chapter 6 describes a simplified version of type theory as our best 
representation of the Formal. The importance of the internal 
language of sets and functions is stressed. However, already with 
Galileo's simple experiments it is argued that Science can benefit 
from non-classical type theory whenever geometric explanations of 
motion are required, and taking this seriously rules out the
15
category of sets as a suitable version of the Conceptual. Chapter 7 
describes the set-like categories known as elementary topoi and 
shows how, through Kripke-Joyal semantics, theories may be i
interpreted in variable sets. The topological ideas inherent in
/
Grothendieck topoi are outlined. Chapter 8 is the crucial Chapter 
in the thesis. It is argued that Lawvere*s axioms for a gros topos 
encode our most general notions of space for describing motion, and 
that the gros topoi include the familiar examples of spaces known 
to Science. It is argued that attempts to formalise the notion of 
topoi of spaces have their starting point in the gros topoi. This 
is illustrated through the petit topoi.
3) Empirical Studies
The idea that one should be in a topos of spaces whenever notions - 
of space enter the theory can be put to a test. I illustrate the 
struggle to realign mathematical conceptions in terms of topoi of 
spaces through two studies :
i) In Chapter 9» I examine Varela's attempt to import notions of 
self-reference into Biological Systems ([VG]), and conclude 
that his revised conceptions are objects in a gros topos.
ii) In Chapter 10, I examine Atkin's attempts to introduce notions 
of algebraic topology and cohomology into Social Studies 
([AT3]). I note that various attempts to amend his mathematics 
involve realignment with both the gros and petit topoi.
However, I argue that one cannot understand Atkin's ideas 
without interpreting the cocycle law in a gros topos of spaces.
Finally, in Chapter 11, I close this thesis with some concluding 
comments. Notes are at the end of the thesis, together with the 
Bibliography and an Index of Symbols used in the text.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MATHEMATICS 
IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES
It is a common-place that mathematics is useful to us in 
understanding the world. For example, Wigner has observed that 
mathematical concepts "... often permit an unexpectedly close and 
accurate description of the phenomena ..." in the Natural Sciences 
([WI2] p.2). In offering us operations (such as collecting, 
ordering, and measuring) the concepts of mathematics (and 
particularly geometry) describe entities "... which are directly 
suggested by the actual world" ([WI2] p.2). Through the symbolic 
abridgments of mathematics, we may come to understand what the 
world will let us do to it. "True, in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century it was still possible to express and communicate 
discoveries concerning the 'natural* relations of objects in 
nonmathematical terms, yet even then - or, rather, particularly 
then, it was precisely the mathematical form, the mos geometricus, 
which secured their dependability and trustworthiness" ([KL] p.3). 
It is no longer possible to conceive of a Natural Science in which 
the laws of nature must not "... already be formulated in the 
language of mathematics to be an object for the use of applied 
mathematics" ([WI2] p.6). Thus, mathematics has come to play a 
pivotal role in the Natural Sciences.
Why should mathematics be so successful in the Natural 
Sciences ? Although "... only a fraction of all mathematical 
concepts are used in physics" ([WI2] p.7), Wigner argues that "...
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the enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences is
something bordering on the mysterious and there is no rational
explanation for it" ([WI2] p.2). Now good answers to this sensible
question ought not to make it an unfathomable mystery. In response
to Wigner, Rescher argues that ([RE] pp.122-3) :
"... there is good reason to dismiss all this sort of thing as
quite improper and unnecessary mystery-mongering. For man's 
capacity to discover the laws of nature has a perfectly natural and 
straightforward evolutionary explanation. There is a good rational 
basis to support our hope of finding natural laws ... The rationale
for this is fundamentally Darwinian: rational guidance is necessary
for successful action; successful action is crucial for the 
survival of creatures ... our survival is indicative of cognitive 
competence".
To be sure, good reasons can be given from the perspective of 
Philosophical Anthropology as to the significance of the Natural 
Sciences for the survival of our species. But there is a sense in 
which explaining the great utility of mathematics for the Natural 
Sciences, in terms of species survival, may miss Wigner's point. 
Wigner was concerned with the effectiveness of mathematics in the 
Natural Sciences. Although these arguments from Philosophical 
Anthropology may provide a reasoned account of the significance of 
the Natural Sciences, they fail to illuminate the effectiveness of 
mathematics in the nexus between mathematical reasoning and 
instrumental action. We are left with the impression that 
mathematics is useful because it is useful.
There is a rational basis for understanding the 
effectiveness of mathematics in the Natural Sciences in the theory 
of human cognitive interests (or leading knowledge interests), as 
developed by Habermas and Apel ([HA1,HA2,AP2,AP3l). Basically this 
theory postulates three fundamental relations between knowledge and 
human interests presupposed in any systematic account of the
18
constitution of meaningful objects of human experience. These are :
a) the interest in controlling an objectified external environment ' 
(technical cognitive interest), i
b) the interest in communicative understanding (practical or 
hermeneutic cognitive interest), and '
c) the interest in critically-emancipatory self-reflection 
(emancipatory cognitive interest).
The main advantage of this theory lies in its power in explaining 
how corroborated knowledge can be released from scientific 
discourse only for specific pragmatic uses. Thus, although "... all 
conceivable internal, meaning-constitutive knowledge-interests may 
be derived ... from the three fundamental knowledge-interests or 
from possible typical combinations of them ... (and although) ... 
all three leading internal interests are presupposed in all 
methodological forms or types of scientific inquiries ...", Apel 
argues that "... certain types of science (in their constitutive 
questions and methodical devices) are paradigmatically determined 
by just one of the three fundamental interests" ([AP2] p.8). Both 
Habermas and Apel claim that the constitutive questions of the 
Natural Sciences are paradigmatically determined by a leading 
knowledge-interest in instrumental action on 'the* external world.
i
Starting from this viewpoint, it is possible to construct an
/
argument along the following lines.
Firstly, if the relation between knowledge and action (in the 
Natural Sciences) is limited to that of instrumental action on the 
external world, then the concepts required (such as space, time, 
substance, and causality) in the empirical description of that 
world must already be schematized in such a way as to suit the 
constitutive questions.
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Secondly, this schematization facilitates the introduction of l 
mathematics as a methodical device by which those questions may be 
posed to Nature. The effectiveness of mathematics is only too I 
reasonable when viewed in this light. It is the device by which we 
may oblige Nature to answer our questions.
Thirdly, the deployment of mathematics as a methodical device 
illuminates the demands that Natural Science makes on Mathematics.
On the one hand, it explains why only a fraction of all 
mathematical concepts are required. On the other hand, it explains 
why Mathematics can only satisfy those demands in terms of the more 
fundamental ideas of space.
Finally, the concepts that Mathematics can supply can be found as 
objects in some topos of spaces.
If the above argument is sound, then the first objective of 
this thesis - topoi of spaces encode notions of space which arise 
directly out of the needs of Science - can be satisfied, at least 
for the Natural Sciences. I will develop this argument in Chapter 
3 . However, as a start on implementing this argument, the remainder 
of this Chapter will
a) introduce the theory of leading knowledge interests as a basis 
for this work, and i
b) show what it means for mathematics to be introduced as a
I
methodical device in terms of a simple example drawn from 
Galileo's and Newton's observations on falling bodies.
The satisfaction of my first objective vis-a-vis the Human Sciences 
is somewhat more delicate, and I will defer discussion of this to 
Chapter 4.
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The theory of human leading knowledge-interests is an 
attempt to unearth the roots of knowledge in the life of the human 
species ([MC] p.55) : 1
"It is his (Habermas) central thesis that 'the specific view points 
from which we apprehend reality', the 'general cognitive 
strategies' that guide systematic inquiry, have their 'basis in the 
natural history of the human species'. They are tied to 
'imperatives of the socio-cultural form of life'."
A profound consideration of these imperatives results in a
distinction between two very basic general cognitive stategies. On
the one hand ([MC] p.55) :
"The reproduction of human life is irrevocably bound to the 
reproduction of the material basis of life. From the most 
elementary forms of wresting an existence from nature, through ... 
to the development of ... industry, the material 'exchange process 
with nature' has transpired in structures of social labour that 
depends on knowledge that makes a claim to truth. The history of 
this confrontation with nature ... has the form of a 'learning 
process'. Habermas's thesis is that the 'general orientation' 
guiding the sciences of nature is rooted in an 'anthropologically 
deep-seated interest' in predicting and controlling events in the 
natural environment, which he calls the technical interest ".
On the other hand ([MC] pp.55-6) :
"The reproduction of human life is just as irrevocably based on 
reliable intersubjectivity in ordinary language communication. The 
transformation of the helpless newborn into a social individual 
capable of participating in the life of the community marks his 
entrance into a network of communicative relations from which he is 
not released until death. Disturbances to communication in the form 
of the non-agreement of reciprocal expectations is no less a threat 
to the reproduction of social life than the failure of purposive- 
rational action on nature. The development of the historical and 
cultural sciences from professions in which practical knowledge was 
organized, transmitted, and applied, brought with it a systematic 
refinement and extension of the forms of understanding through 
which intersubjectivity can be maintained. Habermas's thesis is 
that a general orientation guiding the 'historical-hermeneutic' 
sciences is rooted in an anthropologically deep-seated interest in 
securing and expanding possibilities of mutual and self- 
understanding in the conduct of life. He calls this the practical 
interest"
Although these arguments are cast in terms of Philosophical 
Anthropology, they are much better focussed than those of Rescher. 
The distinction between 'our' social-life world of 
intersubjectively-valid communication and 'the' external world
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based on our experience of moving bodies has its basis in
. i '
cognition. As Searle puts itj([SE] p.16) :
"... what is the difference between regarding an object as an 
instance of linguistic communication and not so regarding it ? One 
crucial difference is this. When I take a noise or a mark on a 
piece of paper to be an instance of linguistic communication, as a 
message, one of the things I must assume is that the noise or mark 
was produced by a being or beings more or less like myself and 
produced with certain kinds of intentions. If I regard the noise or 
mark as a natural phenomenon like the wind in the trees or a stain 
on the paper, I exclude it from the class of linguistic 
communication ..."
This cognitive distinction between linguistic communication and 
natural phenomena lies at the heart of this theory, and forms the 
basis for our understanding of the differences between the Natural 
and the Human Sciences. The constitutive questions of the Natural 
Sciences incorporate a technical interest in instrumental 
intervention in natural phenomena. The constitutive questions of 
the Human Sciences incorporate a practical interest in improving 
human understanding.
Habermas and Apel also argue that there is a third 
derivative mode of inquiry of critical reflection, which they call 
an emancipatory cognitive interest. The general orientation here is 
in knowledge which emancipates the human subject from pseudo­
natural constraints whose power rests in their non-transparency. 
Some of their critics argue that this particular interest should be 
merged with that of the practical. This dispute is somewhat 
tangential to my concerns so I shall not enter this time-honoured 
suit here, but simply record my belief that "... interest in this 
kind of understanding is not simply interest in understanding pure 
and simple, but the more fundamental form of interest in 
emancipation from the conditions of coercion, which are experienced 
as failure and alienation and can be criticized as historically
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superfluous" ([WE] pp.50-1).
; ^
I
The argument that the constitutive questions of the Sciences 
derive from leading knowledge interests can be illustrated by the 
following prototypical examples, which may be taken as 
paradigmatic :
a) Mechanics or Continuum Physics representing the Natural Sciences 
and illustrating a technical interest, and
b) Philology representing the Human Sciences and illustrating a 
practical or hermeneutic interest.
A) Technical Interest
The general orientation of the technical interest lies in
controlling the objectified external world. But this cannot mean
that, as an interest in knowledge, it should assimilate the
methodological structure of Science to that simply of technique.
What it does mean is that the very possibility of an experimental
and empirical-analytical Science is mediated by the methodical
device of posing questions to Nature which can receive answers
capable of being transformed into if-then rules. In principle, the
latter have the potential to supply instrumental schemes for goal-
directed action. The paradigm case of Natural Science is that of
Mechanics or Continuum Physics, which attempt to rationally
reconstruct our experience of moving and deforming bodies through
the prediction of space-time events. Here ([HA1] p.308) :
"... theories comprise hypethetico-deductive connections of 
propositions, which permit the deduction of law-like hypotheses 
with empirical content. The latter can be interpreted as statements 
about the covariance of observable events; given a set of initial 
conditions, they make predictions possible. Empirical-analytical 
knowledge is thus possible predictive knowledge. However, .the 
meaning of such predictions, that is their technical 
exploitability, is established only by the rules according to which 
we apply theories to reality."
Thus Habermas identifies the link between explanation and control
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central to the technical interest and lays the basis for knowledge 
as the technical exploitation of Nature. He argues bhat ([HA4] 
p.137) : ’ I
"Out of the very procedure with which the validity of law-like 
hypotheses is checked against experience, there arises the specific 
achievement of empirical scientific theories : they permit limited 
predictions of objective or objectified processes. Since we test a 
theory by comparing the events predicted with those actually 
observed, a theory which has been sufficiently tested empirically 
allows us —  on the basis of its general statements, that is its 
laws, and, with the aid of limiting conditions which determine a 
case under consideration —  to subsume this case under the law and 
to set up a prognosis for the given situation. One usually calls 
the situation defined by the limiting conditions the cause, and the 
predicted event the effect. If we use a theory in this way to 
forecast an event, then it is said we can 'explain* this event. 
Limited prognosis and causal explanation are different expressions 
for the same achievement of the theoretical sciences."
In this argument (that an explanation is only adequate if it is, at
least potentially, also a prediction) the ultimate aim of Natural
Science becomes clear; for the meaning of a prediction is its
technical application. Our ability to predict the consequences of
an intervention into a natural process is a prerequisite for the
successful manipulation of it, or, as Comte put it : "From Science
comes Prevision, from Prevision comes Control" (quoted in [FA]
p.37). Scientific knowledge makes it possible (for those who
possess it) to control the objects of the external world. However,
the interest in controlling an objectified external world may be
sublimated beyond its paradigm of manipulating things and applied
to 'realities' such as 'our' social-life world. Clearly there are
dangers in knowledge of 'our' social-life world being reduced to
that of the manipulation of human subjects.
B) Practical Interest
These dangers can be avoided if we think of the investigation of 
'our' social-life world in terms of a practical cognitive interest. 
It may be called 'practical' to recall the sense of the
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Aristotelian term * praxis*; for ([HAS] pp.8-9) :
; ^ - 
”In interactions ... we encounter objects of the type of speaking
and acting subjects; here we experience persons, utterances, and
conditions which are in principle Structured and to be understood
symbolically.** 1
The understanding of *our* social—life world has its counterpart to 
the verification of law-like hypotheses in the understanding of 
meaning. Here, the paradigm example is that of Philology, which 
attempts to interpret texts (written utterances) through 
understanding the * rules* governing the text. An interpretation 
recognises that conceivable meaning is not necessarily intended 
meaning, and that the *real* meaning of actions is not necessarily 
identical with subjectively intended meaning. It strives for the 
meaning or a range of possible meanings of a text. Ideally it 
strives for *the* meaning of a text in terms of * rules* with which 
we may understand it. It strives for the * consensual reading*. In 
this sense interpretation passes beyond Philology to the striving 
for a consensus with other people in human interaction.
The wide scope of this interest may be explained in terms of 
the (Wittgensteinian) insight that children could not learn the 
meanings of words if they did not learn to use them at the same 
time as coming to agreement with other members of their speech- 
community about the paradigmatical evidences of experience and 
rules of behaviour. Understanding *our* social-life world is partly 
understanding the language in which we speak about our world and 
partly the understanding of the social constraints which limit our 
actions. The crucial importance for the Human Sciences to 
incorporate a practical cognitive interest is summed up by Habermas 
([HA1] p.176) ;
**In its very structure hermeneutic understanding is designed to 
guarantee, within cultural traditions, the possible action-
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orienting self-understanding of individuals an^ groups as well as 
reciprocal understanding between different individuals and groups. 
It makes possible the form of unconstrained consensus and the type 
of open intersubjectivity on which communicative action depends. It 
bans the danger of communication breakdown in both dimensions : the 
vertical one of one*s own individual life history and the 
collective tradition to which one belongs, and the horizontal one 
of mediating between the traditions of different individuals, 
groups and cultures. When these communication flows break off and 
the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding is either rigidified 
or falls apart, a condition of survival is disturbed, one that is 
as elementary as the complementary condition of the success of 
instrumental action : namely the possibility of unconstrained 
agreement and non-violent recognition. Because this is the 
presupposition of practice, we call the knowledge-constitutive 
interest of the cultural sciences ’practical*."
The danger of thinking of the Human Sciences in terms of the
empirical-analytical traditions of the Natural Sciences runs the
obvious risk of misunderstandings which may easily lead to those
’communication breakdowns* referred to above.
Some words of warning about possible misunderstandings are 
necessary when considering the theory of cognitive interests. In 
the first place, if leading knowledge interests constitute the 
meaningful objects of experience, then they may not be reduced to 
or simply equated with individual or institutional motivations 
which may promote (or hinder) the scientific enterprise. It is not 
to be assumed that the theory relates to the intentions of any 
individual or group of scientists. Whereas the latter may be 
considered as causes of the actual performance of a scientific 
enterprise, leading knowledge-interests only elucidate reasons for 
the differences in constitutive questions of the Sciences. Although 
Apel also argues "... it ... may easily be admitted that, in the 
long run, they fullfil also a causal or energetic function in the 
evolution of human knowledge in being the force behind at least 
part of the external motivation of the scientific enterprise"
([AP2] p.4). This latter remark is of considerable metascientific
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interest; for it conceives of the normative aspects of the theory 
as knowledge contributing to the steering of Science. From a
metascierltific point of view, leading knowledge interests may be
I
construed as the research guiding interests of the Sciences. From
the vantage point of the theory, cognitive interests are not
concious interests. Since they determine the meaning of different
forms of knowledge prior to intentions, these intentions cannot
simply alter that meaning. A part of that meaning is an idea of a
relationship between theory and practice, for the conditions of
possibility of each form of knowledge determines its pragmatic use.
In the second place, these cognitive interests are not to be
thought of as exclusive but complementary. There is always a danger
that a contrasting correlation of technical / Natural Science and
practical / Human Science may lead to an oversimplified view of the
matters under consideration. Instead we must conceive of these
interests as leading knowledge interests within their respective
spheres, in which the contrasting interest forms a complement to
it. The reasons for this are not hard to find ([AP2] p.11) ;
"Even physicists cannot explain regularities of nature 
nomologically without presupposing at the same time another type of 
knowledge, viz. communicative understanding. This other type of 
knowledge might be considered prescientific from the point of view 
of the actual knowledge-interest of the physicist ... This 
phenomenon (of complementarity) obviously shows the genuine origin 
and function of hermeneutic understanding and interpretation as it 
is, in principle, not to be replaced by or reduced to nomological 
explanation, because it is ... presupposed by all kinds of 
explanation. On the other hand, the fact that all communicative 
understanding presupposes some knowledge about the objective 
matters in question, only illustrates the impossibility of 
conceiving communicative understanding in terms of an objectifying 
knowledge ... For as understanding is ... about some objective 
matter in the world, it cannot be replaced and 'scientized* by just 
describing and eventually explaining certain objective processes to 
be observed in our communication partners ..."
From these considerations, the understanding of meaning and the
explanation of objectified processes form complementary forms of
knowledge. They support each other in terms of possible human
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knowledge. They only exclude each other as different cognitive
...
interests in terms of the questions they can ask. They simply 
cannot be reduced to each other.
The thesis, that the Natural Sciences incorporate a leading 
knowledge interest concerned with the description, prediction, and 
control of objectified processes, can be illuminated by the 
following simple example, which has the advantages of not only 
being familiar but also illustrating what it means to introduce 
mathematics as a methodical device. The example, I have in mind, is 
Galileo's observations on freely falling bodies. Wigner notes that 
Galileo discovered ([WI2] pp.4-5) :
”... that two rocks, dropped at the same time from the same height, 
reach the ground at the same time. The laws of nature are concerned 
with such regularities. Galileo's regularity is a prototype of a 
large class of regularities. It is a surprising regularity for 
three reasons. The first reason ... is that it is true on Earth, 
was always true, and always will be true. This property of the 
regularity is a recognized invariance property and ... without 
invariance principles similar to those implied in ... Galileo s 
observation, physics would not be possible. The second surprising 
feature is that the regularity ... is independent of so many 
conditions which could have an effect on it ... The irrelevancy of 
so many circumstances which could play a role in the phenomenon 
observed has also been called an invariance. However this 
invariance is of a different character than the preceding one since 
it cannot be formulated as a general principle ... The preceding 
two points, though highly significant from the viewpoint of the
philosopher, are not the ones which surprised Galileo most, nor do
they contain a specific law of nature. The law of nature is
contained in the statement that the length of time which it takes
for a heavy object to fall from a given height is independent of
the size, material and shape of the body which drops. In the
framework of Newton's second 'law', this amounts to a statement 
that the gravitational force which acts on the falling body is 
proportional to its mass but independent of the size, material, and 
shape of the body which falls.”
Now the first two points are of obvious interest to the Philosophy
of Science. Perhaps Wigner's second surprising feature - the 
irrelevance of so many matters not connected to the understanding 
of natural phenomena in terms of causal processes - is, when viewed
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in the context that natural laws are statements of natural 
invariances, no more than an anticipation that Natural Science 
incorporates a technical cognitive interest. Far from being an 
'unformulated general principle', the disconnection of irrelevant 
matters is what makes Natural Science the study of natural 
phenomena. The limitation of constitutive questions then enables 
the introduction of mathematics as a methodical device, and it 
seems to me that this is the third feature which surprised Galileo 
so much.
Galileo found that universally quantified statements about 
the 'behaviour' of falling bodies could be interpreted by means of 
simple geometrical diagrams. By using simple observational 
equipment, the motion of falling bodies, as observed by Galileo, 
can be described by the sort of data in Table 1. A stone is dropped 
from a height of 400 feet, and the following observations are 
recorded :
Observations of a Falling Stone
Time Distance fallen
(in seconds) (in feet)
0 0
1 16
2 64
3 144
4 256
5 400
Table 1
Now Greenspan shows ([GR] pp.1-2) that the relation between time
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and distance fallen can be described by a mathematical equation s = 
I6t , where s denotes the distance travelled (in feet) by a falling 
stone from the place where it was dropped, and t denotes the 
elapsed time (in seconds). Thus, a stone dropped from a height of 
400 feet will hit the ground in 5 seconds. As a natural invariance, 
the relation between time and distance can be construed as a 
universally quantified statement of functional dependence,
q:[0,co]-------->R,
given by
a
s =, I6t (1).
But the effectiveness of mathematics does not rest merely in a 
description of the relation between distance travelled and elapsed 
time. Greenspan also shows by simple arithmetical manipulation, how 
we can describe the velocity of any falling stone by the equation
V = 32t (2),
where v denotes the velocity in terms of distance travelled per 
second. This indicates that the velocity of a body increases at a 
constant rate as it falls. We arrive at a regularity, when by 
further manipulation, we discover that
a = 32 (3),
where the acceleration in velocity, denoted by a, is a constant 32 
feet per second per second. Galileo's discovery of this regularity 
states a law of nature, in which all bodies falling to the Earth 
fall with the constant acceleration in velocity as described in 
(3). Yet these descriptions (useful though they are) are only a 
part of the story. By a chain of mathematical argument (the details 
of which need not detain us here), we may arrive at the following : 
Proposition 1 For any interval [a,b] and for any function
f:[a,b]---- >R, there is a unique differentiable function
g:[a,b]---- >R with a derivative, denoted by g', equivalent to f
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with g(a) = 0.
Proof : ([KK2] Th.13.2).
It was Newton's genius to see that (3) was the derivative of (2), 
and (2) was the derivative of (1). Starting from the regularity in 
(3), we can predict velocity by integrating (3) over infinitesimal
amounts of elapsed time :
a.dt = v(t) - v(0) (4).
o
By integrating velocity (2) over elapsed time
t
v.dt = q(t) - q(0) (5)>
0
we can predict the distance fallen by the body. Furthermore, the 
body's motion is described in terms of causal processes. The 
application of (gravitational) force causes the body to fall. 
Newton's famous law, force = mass times acceleration, can, as 
Greenspan shows ([GR] p.4), be given, with the aid of the above 
proposition, a more concise mathematical formulation. If the force 
required to move the body is denoted by W, then the work done by 
gravity in the time interval [0,t] is defined by
W = m (6);
0
where m denotes the (constant) mass of the body. Routine 
manipulation ([GR] pp.4-5) of (6) shows that the classical formulae
for kinetic energy
K = ^  mv (7)*
and potential energy
V = 32 ms (8),
are essentially the same in that
VJ = ■£ mv^(t) - lî mv (0) (9)
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and ' W = 32ms(t) - 32ms(0) (10).
Conservation of energy follows immediately from equating W in (9) 
and (10). If we use the knowledge that the force is gravity, then 
by (10) gravity is equated with the mass-potential of the body. 
However, by (9) that is also the energy required to move the body.
Of course, the above remarks do not exhaust the content of 
Galileo's and Newton's observations in connection with the laws of 
freely falling bodies. However, in essence they form the basis of a 
Science of the dynamics of moving (rigid) bodies. Not only are 
space—time events to be predicted on the basis of natural laws, but 
an understanding of the causal effect of forces required to 
manipulate events is the point of any theory. It is well-known that 
Newton went on to show how to obtain the motions of bodies from a 
knowledge of the forces acting on them. He demonstrated the 
possibility of dealing with gravitational systems in a unified way 
through the methodical device of the mathematics. Newton wished 
(quoted in [KI] p.513) :
'»... we could derive the rest of the phenomena of Nature by the 
same kind of reasoning from mechanical principles, for I am induced 
by many reasons to suspect that they may all depend upon certain 
forces by which the particles of bodies, by some causes hitherto 
unknown, are either mutually impelled towards one another, and 
cohere in regular figures, or are repelled and recede from one 
another."
Thus, Newton's programme forms the historical basis of our 
reflections on the Natural Sciences, in which the understanding of 
'forces' leading to a particular configuration of events requires 
mathematical and geometrical knowledge. If we could isolate a few 
basic laws, akin to the law of universal gravitation, then by 
application of these basic laws to the specification of the 
ultimate parts of bodies, all of the phenomena of nature could be 
derived. To be sure, this requires that natural phenomena be
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metaphorically redescribed in terms of our experience of 
manipulating moving bodies.
Already in this prototypical example of Galileo's and 
Newton's observations on falling bodies, we can discern all the 
essential ingredients which bear on the effectiveness of 
mathematics in the Natural Sciences. Firstly, invariant 
regularities of nature must be derived as laws of nature. Secondly, 
the observed covariation of natural phenomena can be described in 
terms of mathematical relationships. Thirdly, the laws of nature 
must be postulated as nomological (or law-like) hypotheses to be 
confirmed in the observed covariation of natural phenomena. 
Fourthly, mathematical reasoning can be used to investigate the 
geometrical or mathematical commitments of current theory to 
produce further hypotheses about predictable events for empirical 
testing. The effectiveness of mathematics in the Natural Sciences 
rests partly in its potential to describe laws of nature 
nomologically and partly, through the logic of mathematical 
reasoning, the opportunities it yields for potential hypotheses 
which (if confirmed empirically) could extend the theory. Indeed 
Wigner remarks that : "It is now natural for us to derive the laws 
of nature and to test their validity by means of the laws of 
invariance, rather than to derive the laws of invariance from what 
we believe to be the laws of nature" ([WI1] p.523). But all this 
seems to depend on the laws of nature falling under the rubric of a 
cluster of concepts; namely space (distance travelled), time 
(interval of time), substance (falling body), and causality 
(gravitational force), and it is to this I now turn.
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CHAPTER THREE
SCHEMATIZATIONS OF SPACE
TIME, SUBSTANCE. AND CAUSALITY
"'Space* and 'time' as the Trans­
cendental Aesthetic lays them out, 
are, in spite of all assurances to 
the contrary, concepts, or in 
Kant's expression representations 
of a representation. They are not 
intuitive, but rather the highest 
universels under which the 'given' 
may be grasped. The fact ... that a 
given independent of these concepts 
is not indeed possible, turns give- 
ness itself into something 
mediated."
T.W Adorno
In the previous Chapter, I outlined a theory of human 
cognitive interests as a basis for understanding the introduction 
of mathematics as a methodical device into the Natural Sciences, 
and presented some circumstantial evidence as to the relevance of 
the concepts of space, time, substance, and causality. In this 
Chapter, I shall take up the first three aspects of the argument 
outlined in the previous Chapter. My aim is to establish that 
differences in the constitutive questions of the Sciences can be
traced to differing schematizations of the concepts of space, time,
/
substance, and causality. I argue that a technical cognitive 
interest accords a certain priority to the concept of space, and 
the conceptualisation of space in terms of geometric figures arises 
directly out of the (constitutive) questions of this interest.
Successful reference to the objects of the world requires
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the deictic expressions which involve notions of time and space, as 
well as articles and demonstrative pronouns. These form a reference
system of possible denotations, as they link the levels of
1
intersubjectivity on which human subjects converse and interact
reciprocally with the levels of objects about which the subjects
make propositions. Habermas puts it in this way ([HA2] p.173) :
"When we identify objects about which we state something (on the 
basis of experience we have had), we do so either ostensively or by 
means of names and characterizations. It is true, predicative 
determinations are not used predicatively in the context of 
denotative expressions. But a proper functioning system of 
reference has to have a certain prepositional content. This minimum 
content of properties which objects as such have is the categorial 
framework for objectivating experienceable happenings as happenings 
... The basic notions of substance, space, time, and causality are 
the minimum conditions for determining a system of reference for 
objects of possible experience."
However, although this reference system functions both for the 
domains of objectified processes and intersubjective communication, 
it is schematized differently for the two domains in question. The 
underlying rules for identifying things and events are different 
but complementary with those for identifying subjects and their 
utterances. Habermas argues ([MC] p.297) :
"The sense of substance and causality, of space and time, is 
differentiated according to whether these categories are applied to 
objects within a world or to the linguistically constituted world 
of speaking subjects itself. The interpretive schema 'substance* 
has a different meaning for the identity of objects that can 
clearly be categorized analytically than it does for speaking and 
acting subjects whose ego-identity cannot be grasped with clear-cut 
analytical operations. The interpretive schema 'causality', when 
applied to observable events leads to the concept of 'cause'; when 
applied to a nexus of intentional actions, it leads to the concept 
of 'motive'. Analogously, space and/time are schematized 
differently in regard to the physically measurable properties of 
objects and events than they are in regard to the intersubjective 
experience of contexts of symbolically mediated interactions. In 
the first case the categories serve as a coordinate system for 
observation controlled by the success of instrumental action; in 
the latter case they serve as a frame of reference for the 
subjective experience of social space and historical time.,"
In the one case we have a reference system for empirical
descriptions, and in the other a reference system for narratives.
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Habermas* schematizations are summarised in Table 2
Habermas* Schema
Schema Technical
Interest
Practical
Interest
Substance
Causality
Time
Space
object
cause/
explanation
{geometric
frame
of
reference}
ego-identity
motive/
understanding
historical
time
social space
Table 2
To be sure, the category of causality has a different status than 
the others, for "... the linguistic representatives of the causal 
relation do not belong to the class of deictic expressions" ([MC] 
p.429). Nevertheless, for the purposes of my argument, this is not 
of great importance. What is important is that these two 
schematizations can be used to contrast the constitutive questions 
of both the technical and practical interests. These different 
schematizations are possible because the cognitive content of 
deictic expressions is ambiguous. We relate articles and 
demonstrative pronouns to persons as well as things, and these 
ambiguities need to be explored.
A) Substance
Now Apel argues ([AP2] p.15) :
"A fundamental precondition of the constitution of nature as an 
object of experimental explanatory physics in the modern sense is 
... defined by the possibility of a complete objectification of 
nature ... whereas all social sciences, even those that provide the 
basis for social technology, are only allowed to perform secondary 
methodological objectifications but should not totally objectify
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their human subject-objects, lest they are lost as intentional 
objects of knowledge." (emphasis added). ^
Essentially, the Human Sciences can never lose sight of the fact
that their fundamental questioris are concerned with 'our* social-
life world of intersubjective communication. Human subjects are
conceptualised as ego-identities with intentions. The situation
with the Natural Sciences is radically different ([AP2] p.15) :
"For modern physics it was a precondition of its definitive 
constitution as science at the beginning of the seventeenth century 
that all kinds of sympathetic-communicative and teleological 
understanding of nature were definitely renounced (or dispensed 
with). Only this renunciation of understanding could release nature 
as a world of mechanical corpuscular motions, and that is to say, 
as an object of explanation according to causal laws."
This renunciation of understanding can never completely banish the
intentional subject of the Human Sciences. However, it is essential
(in the Natural Sciences) if the objectification of Nature is to be
achieved. Indeed, Wigner*s point, concerning the irrelevance of so
many matters not connected to the understanding of Nature, the
dispensation of any form of teleological understanding of Nature.
The constitutive questions of the Natural Sciences rest on
schematizing substance as non-intentional objects.
However, the complete objectification of Nature would also 
seem to rest on metaphorically redescribing natural processes as a 
'world of mechanical corpuscular motions*. For example, sound as an 
entity or quality is not normally construed as a 'corpuscular 
object*. Nevertheless, the scientific study of acoustics involves 
studying the propagation of sound in terms of varying quantities of 
pitch, volume, and timbre. Essentially, sound is objectified in 
terms of motion through a 'sound space* of various states of sound. 
The reader should try whistling a closed sound curve ([NE] p.15).
37
Metaphor is, as Ricoeur puts it, "... the rhetorical process
by which discourse unleashes the jpower that certain fictions have
to describe reality" ([RI] p.7).'lMost normal conceptual systems are
metaphorically structured, in that most concepts are partially
understood in terms of other concepts ([LJ] p.56). Essentially we
understand our fictions (or narratives) in terms of other fictions.
The unfamiliar is redescribed in terms of the familiar.
Unfortunately it is still ([HE3] p.158) "... necessary to argue
that metaphor is more than a decorative literary device and that it
has cognitive implications whose nature is ..." to redescribe the
domain of the explanandum in terms of an explanans transferred from
a secondary system. For example, consider the metaphor ARGUMENT IS
WAR ([LJ] p.4). The primary system, ARGUMENT, is explained in terms
of notions drawn from the secondary system, WAR. Lakoff and Johnson
characterise this redescription as follows ([LJ] p.4) :
"... we don't just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can 
actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing 
with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. 
We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a 
position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of 
attack. Many of the things we ^  in arguing are partially 
structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical 
battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument 
- attack, defense, counterattack, etc. - reflects this. It is in 
this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by 
in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing 
... The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one 
kind of thing in terms of another."
The cognitive implications of this for a deductive theory of 
explanation are considerable. Now, Hesse has given a detailed 
account of the explanatory function of metaphor ([HE3]). I cannot 
go fully into this here. But basically her argument is that if 
metaphor introduces a new language (or way of looking at things) 
then redescription may amount to an explanation. According to 
strict deductivist criteria, it must be possible to deduce the 
explanandum from the explanans. However, recourse to metaphorical
38
redescription is a consequence of the^difficulty of obtaining such 
a strict deductive relation between explanandum and explanans. This 
throws into question our categorisation of rationality along 
deductivist lines. To counter this, Hesse argues that ([HE3] 
pp.176-7) "... rationality consists just in the continuous 
adaptation of our language to our continually expanding world, and 
metaphor is one of the chief means by which this is accomplished". 
So for example, on the one hand, the meaning of an objectified 
process lies precisely in the renunciation of an intentional 
subject; on the other hand, the metaphor, NATURAL PHENOMENON IS 
MOVING BODY, redescribes the natural phenomenon (explanandum) in 
terms of an explanans grounded in the "world of mechanical 
corpuscular motions'.
B) Causality
The sense of a complete renunciation of understanding of 
natural phenomenon in terms of teleological understanding is also 
illustrated by the schema of 'causation'. Natural Science explains 
natural invariances not as rules that must be followed by Nature as 
a subject of teleological action ('the apple falls because it loves 
the Earth'), but as natural laws determining the 'behaviour' of 
natural phenomena in terms of causal necessity or probability ('the
apple falls because of the application of gravitational force').
/
Apel argues that methodological consequences flowing from this 
posture can be formulated as the following theses ([AP2] p.16) :
a) the Natural Sciences postulate nomological (or law-like) 
hypotheses as explanations of Nature, and test these by 
communication-free observations;
b) observed deviations of events postulated in hypothetical laws
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must be considered, as falsifications of theory;
r
c) the signs constituting the 'data* of communication-free
observations can only be experienced as causal connections of 
natural processes, and can never be regarded as the 
communicative experiences of symbols expressing the intentions 
of Nature.
In contrast to this situation, the Human Sciences cannot 
restrict themselves to imposing hypothetical regularities (regarded 
as 'rules') onto their objects from outside and to testing these 
hypotheses by communication-free observation; for we cannot infer 
from an observed correspondence between a regularity imposed from 
outside and observed behaviour that the regularity is a 'rule' 
followed by the objects as subjects of actions. The 'rules' that 
operate in a society have to be understood (in the first instance) 
in terms of what it is like to be subject to such 'rules'. Also it 
is not possible to infer from observed deviations of human 
behaviour from supposed regularities, that these regularities 
express a valid rule (usually followed), or even a valid norm 
(although it is often followed). Clearly from this perspective the 
theses of the Human Sciences are not to be 'tested' in terms of the 
explanation of causal necessity in the manner of the Natural 
Sciences. Rather the focus of interest is on the reasons that can 
be postulated for understanding the meanings of intentions, 
motives, and actions of human subjects.
0) Time
If "... limited prognosis and causal explanation are 
different expressions for the same achievement ..." of the Natural 
Sciences ([HA4] p.137), then the reduction of the logic of
40
explanation to that of prognosis highlights the importance of the
i ‘
concept of 'time*. For the human subject, 'time' is a one-way arrow 
and is construed in terms of irreversible individual biography or
social history. However as Apel puts it ([AP2] p.420) , the Natural
/
Sciences (i.e. physics)
"... need not deal with the world as history in a proper sense. By 
this I do not mean that there is no dimension of irreversibility, 
and hence of a history of nature, to be dealt with by physics. It 
is true, I think, that physics has to deal with irreversibility in 
the sense of the second principle of thermodynamics, i.e. in the 
sense of the increase of entropy. But, in this very sense of 
irreversibility, physics may suppose nature's being definitely 
determined concerning its future and thus having no history in a 
sense that would resist nomological objectification." (emphasis 
added).
In contrast, the Human Sciences cannot evade presupposing history 
"... in a structural sense that resists nomological 
objectification" (p.20). For the Human Sciences "... must not only 
suppose irreversibility - in the sense of a statistically 
determined process - but irreversibility, in the sense of advance 
of human knowledge influencing the process of history in an 
irreversible manner" ([AP2] p.20 emphasis added).
Merton's famous discussion about self-fulfilling (and 
destroying) prophecies ([MT] pp.421-36) indicates that conditional
predictions are not possible with respect to history. For the point
1
of Merton's 'theorem' "... seems to lie in systematically 
precluding or preventing system isolation - in the very fundamental 
sense of a separation of the object-system and the subject-system 
of knowledge - by the understanding and reactive self-application 
of conditional predictions by the human subject-objects of those 
predictions" ([AP2] p.21). The destruction or fulfilment of 
conditional predictions (or prophecies) by human subjects might 
usefully be called 'Merton-effects'. Although communication-free
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^observation might- influence natural phenomena when observation is 
also instrumental action, there are no Merton-effects in the study
i
|of natural phenomena. The complete elimination of the 'cognitive 
realisation and reactive self-application' of conditional 
predictions by human subjects (i.e. Merton-effects) in the Human 
Sciences would require the system isolation of expérimentons and 
experimented (manipulators/manipulated) to ensure the reliability 
of conditional predictions. The difficulties involved in conceiving 
of such studies along the lines of communication-free Natural 
Science would' seem to emphasise the differences in constitutive 
questions raised by the differing leading knowledge interests. On 
the one hand, the Human Sciences require a notion of historical 
time in which to understand intentions and motives of human 
subjects. On the other hand, the Natural Sciences require time to 
parameterise changes in natural phenomena.
D) Space
There could not be an experience that is not in time, and 
time is made real to us through the organisation of experience in 
terms of ordering of those changes called events. Similarly, 
nothing can appear to us as an independent object without being 
experienced as 'outside' and spatially related. Space, like time, 
forms part of the organisation of our sensibilities. Our sense- 
impressions bear the form of space, as is evidenced in the 
phenomena in the 'visual field'. Objects are referenced in every­
day life by location iji that field.
Our sense of that 'visual field' (or even geographical 
space), in which we move and have our being, can form a secondary
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domain to ground an explanandum in terms of the metaphor, SPACE IS 
A CONTAINER. For example, in the context of a practical interest, a 
notion of 'social space' as a heirarchically-ordered social 
structure gains its meaning from a simple conception of society as 
a spatial entity containing class strata varying from regions of 
the 'upper' to regions of the 'lower'. On the other hand, the same 
metaphor is used in the context of a technical interest to ground 
causal explanations of the 'world of mechanical corpuscular 
motions'. The motion of a body takes place in space, for space lays 
down the foundations for the empirical description of motion. 
However, there is a crucial difference in the deployment of the 
metaphor with respect to the practical and technical interests. On 
the one hand, the technical interest of a Natural Science must give 
a certain priority to the schema 'space' if it is to use 
mathematics as a methodical device; for in order to describe the 
laws of Nature in terms of a causal connection, it is necessary t_o 
conceive 'substance' (moving body) and 'time' as spaces. On the 
other hand, the practical interest of the Human Sciences involves 
no such subsumption of its schema to that of 'space'.
The argument that the mathematical description of natural 
phenomena requires a notion of space as a container can be 
illustrated as below. In what follows the mathematical reader may 
assume the representation of space-time that suits him best. My 
illustration does not depend on any particular representation; the 
simplest Newtonian description is quite adequate. Let B denote a 
moving body, such a a system of 0-dimensional particles, a 1- 
dimensional cord, a 2—dimensional flexible shell, or a 3— 
dimensional solid or fluid body ([LWP] p.379)» Let T denote time. 
Then T becomes a 1-dimensional space the moment it is conceived as
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a continuum of points (such as R say) to reference instants of
time. The body B also becomes a space, the moment we parameterise
3
its particles by points of a space X (say the Euclidean Space R ),
and refer to its position space by an embedding B------ >X. A
motion of the body space is empirically described as a morphism
q:B X T ------> X,
which can be thought of as assigning to each particle in the body
at each time instant its corresponding point in X. If the set of
morphisms T >X is conceived as the set of paths in X, then
space-time, denoted by X ' , can be regarded as the set of paths
endowed with an appropriate topology identifying the cohesion of
space-time. A morphism q:B >X might be thought of as
assigning a path in space-time to a body B. All of these objects,
1~
denoted by X, T, B, and X are spaces in so far as the 
mathematical physicist is concerned. The laws of Nature are 
described in terms of functional dependence of elements of these 
spaces, in which the space X is naturally thought of in terms of 
the explanans CONTAINER. Thus the gist of the Newtonian 
description, of a "world of mechanical corpuscular motion", is that 
motion is change of location in space. Space is the container in 
which we can make sense of the motions of bodies in it. To 
determine the motions of bodies is to determine how they move in 
space.
Fine notes ([FI] p.449) that Newton's Scholium
"... ends with the words 'But how we are to obtain the true motions 
... shall be explained more at large in the following treatise. For 
this end it was that I composed it'. And surely the implication is 
that space is just what physics says it is. The idea, I take it, is 
that a comprehensive physics is written in the language of space 
and time. There is a metric space-time geometry that underwrites 
physics in a way that inseparably entwines the two. Questions about 
space, then, become questions about this geometry and these
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questions ultimately turn on what we take to be the true physical 
theory." (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, not everyone was to agree with Newton. To view space 
as a container is not necessarily mysterious, but the move is 
somewhat delicate. As Gadamer puts it "... space only becomes an 
object of thought by mentally removing the objects that are related 
to one another in it ..." ([GA1] p.392). Leibniz was not prepared 
to make this move. For him, space was not an unobservable container 
in which we make sense of our observations. Our experience of space 
is mediated as a concomitant of our experience of objects. He 
argued that space was a system (perhaps a lattice or network) of 
spatial relations. Fine notes that this relational view ([FI] 
p.448)
"... takes for granted the existence of bodies that bear to one 
another certain qualitative 'spatial* relations. Some bodies are 
shorter or longer than others, some are nearer or more distant than 
others, some are straighter or more bent than others. The 
difficulty for the relational view is to quantify this network of 
qualitative relations, for Newton (= Clarke) puts it to Leibniz, 
'space and time are quantities; which situation and order are not'. 
Leibniz's response is to say that order also has its quantity and 
his effort to implement this remark constitutes a first rudimentary 
theory of measurement, of the sort associated with Helmholtz, 
Campbell, and their more recent descendents. The basic idea is to 
take some physical body as a standard for the relation in question 
and to specify a regimen for deploying this standard so as to 
construct a quantitative scale the ordering of which coincides with 
that of the given qualitative relation. In the case of spatial 
relations the various scales are forged together to form a metric 
geometry. Questions about space, then, become questions about this 
geometry and these questions ultimately turn on the deployment of 
physical standards." (emphasis added).
What do these differences between Newtonians and Leibnizians 
regarding the relation between geometry and physics mean for the 
Natural Sciences ? Does the Leibnizian rejection of the concept of 
space have a serious role to play in the Natural Sciences ?
Over the centuries, the controversy between Newtonians and 
Leibnizians has been somewhat ill-tempered and bitter. "Each side
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has accused the other of being incoherent and, therefore, 
incomprehensible. And these charges have been looked upon by each 
side as a knock-out blow to the other" ([FI] p.478). Traditionally, 
the controversy has been conducted in terms of fundamental 
ontology. 'What is space ?'. 'Is it something or nothing ?'. 'If it 
is something, what sort of thing is it Now Fine argues that 
this controversy lacks fundamental ontic bite, in that the 
ontological commitments of both viewpoints do not seem to cut 
deeply enough. Instead, he adopts a metascientific viewpoint and 
argues that the real differences between the camps revolve around 
contrasting research programs for approaching questions of space
and time.
On the one hand ([FI] p.450),
"The Leibnizian program suggests that within the range of 
legitimate questions about the physical universe, there is an 
automonous sphere of inquiry that has to do with Questions ^out 
space and time. These questions assume a quantitative form and the 
research required to answer these questions concerns the possible 
deployment of physical bodies as standards of measurement. To carry 
on this research one may certainly employ auxiliary physical law , 
but the import of the investigation is geometric (i.e. has to do 
with space and time). Ideally, the geometric results should.J e 
niesniv separable from the auxiliary research aids, (emphasis
added).
On the other hand,
"... the Newtonian program is founded on a more holistic conception 
of the realm of legitimate inquiry ... that realm is relative 
and completely circumscribed by physics itself. The research 
required to answer questions about space and time is research i
=%r':h:%::i:=:\:l:L:i:'=^ ^
theory. The results of this research are part and parcel of 
physics. There is no clean separation between physics and 
geometry". (emphasis added).
Thus, Fine's attempt at conflict resolution reveals that, whatever 
merits both programs may have, the real differences revolve around 
the question of the separability of geometry and the laws of 
physics.
1(6 *
The historical merits of the two programs are brought out in 
the following ([FI] p.450) :
"Most notable among those who have carried on the program set by 
Newton are surely Poincare^and Einstein. Indeed the general theory 
of relativity certainly marks a high point in the historical 
development of the Newtonian scheme. Those who have followed the 
program set by Leibniz include important members of the school of 
Logical Positivism; notably, Schlick, Reichenbach and Carnap."
The Newtonian program seems to have been the one actually used by
the Natural Sciences, whereas the Leibnizian program has mainly
been the vehicle of philosophical research.
Whatever the merits of Leibniz's program for research into 
physical standards, the reasons why natural scientists have mainly 
worked with Newton's program are not difficult to find. Any serious 
attempt to use mathematics as a methodical device involves 
representing 'substance' and 'time' as spaces, and space-time as a 
container in which natural objects are embedded (or contained). It 
is unlikely that we could extricate our sense of space as geometry 
from the laws of physics as empirical descriptions of Nature. Fine 
argues that Einstein objected to the separability thesis ([FI] 
p.475), for
"... in order to carry out an empirical procedure for determining 
geometry it is necessary to correct our measuring instruments (rods 
etc.) for deforming influences. These corrections are made by means 
of physical laws, like the law of thermal expansion. These laws, 
however, are stated in quantitative geometric terms. They thus 
suppose the applicability of geometry. It follows that the most our 
empirical procedure could yield would be a conclusion of the form, 
'If such-and-such geometry is assumed together with so-and-so 
physical laws, then such-and-so geometry is found to obtain'. It 
appears that the geometrical conclusion could never be detached."
Basically, this argument seems to say that the laws of nature (when
formalised as natural invariances) contain statements of an
intrinsic geometric character, which when suitably interpreted in
the Conceptual yield the desired geometry. This follows from the
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necessity of conceiving bodies (i.e. measuring rods) in geometric l 
terms. The functional dependence of natural laws are only described 
in terms of geometric elements. From this perspective, the !
separability thesis looks untenable.
From the Newtonian viewpoint, space as a coordinatised 
framework parameterises space-time events. It is well-known that 
abstract sets can parameterise (or index) sets of 'things’.
However, the subsets of a set are not quite like the parts of a 
space. True, the set of points of a space is a set. But there is 
more to a space than its set of points. Objects are referenced in 
space by spatial position, and in terms of distance and direction 
across paths and intervals. The points only serve their location- 
indexing function when they are regarded as the (end) points of a 
path across which the points are at a distance. Points and paths 
are particulars and their ability to spatially parameterise objects 
comes from the sort of cohesion (or topology) that a space has 
(NER] pp.16-28). Sets lack this cohesion. Thus it is the remarkable 
cohesive character of spaces (and not their set-like qualities) 
that is put to use in empirical descriptions of natural phenomena.
This brings me to my donnee. The constitutive questions of a
technical cognitive interest stem from a schematization of the
/
concepts of space, time, substance, and causality, in which natural 
phenomena are construed as non-intentional objects whose processes 
are to be explained in terms of a causal nexus. But the reduction 
of the logic of explanation to that of prediction requires the 
introduction of a geometric framework in which time and space 
coordinatise objectified processes. But this, in turn, requires
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that natural invariances be described geometrically in terms of 
elements of spaces. From this, it follows that what is required 
from Mathematics, in terms of the efficiency of geômetry as a 
methodical device, is a supply of 'spaces' appropriate to the 
research questions in hand. These 'spaces' might be thought of 
simply as 'objects' with 'geometric figures' in them. By the term 
'geometric figure', I mean such geometric entities as 'points', 
'paths', and 'infinitesimals', which cohere (by means of their 
topological organisation) into the object called a 'space'. What 
has yet to be established is that these objects live in topoi of 
spaces. Furthermore, the argument so far has been conducted 
entirely in terms of mathematics as a methodical device well-suited 
to the constitutive questions of the Natural Sciences. What has to 
be assessed now is the demands made on Mathematics by the Human 
Sciences. Do they need any mathematical conception of 'space' ?
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CHAPTER FOUR
QUASI-CAUSAL AND STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SPACE 
GENERATED BY THE HUMAN SCIENCES
I claim that the requirements for a supply of those objects 
called spaces from Mathematics arise directly out of the needs of 
Science. In the case of the Natural Sciences, the constitutive 
questions are primarily determined by a leading knowledge interest 
in instrumental action on Nature. The significance of mathematics 
as a methodical device is based on an approach to Nature, in which 
law-like hypotheses are framed in the spatio-temporally schematized 
imagination as a technical intervention which obliges Nature to 
answer our questions regarding a causal nexus ([AP3] p.47). Our 
inability to separate the laws of Nature from their geometrical 
expression serves to underline the significance of mathematics for 
the Natural Sciences. It is now hardly possible to conceive of a 
Natural Science in which natural events are not already imagined in 
terms of geometrical configurations. The requirements for a 
mathematical conception of space are obvious.
But what of the Human Sciences ? Do they need any 
conceptions of space from Mathematics ? There are certain obvious 
difficulties in answering this question. In the first place, if the 
leading knowledge interest of the Human Sciences is in the 
practical matter of understanding meaning and improving human 
communication, then the constitutive questions of the Human 
Sciences would preclude the involvement of Mathematics in anything 
like the same way as the Natural Sciences. From the perspective of
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the theory of human cognitive interests, it would, in the language
I
of Ryle ([RI] p.197), be tantamount to a category mistake to j 
correlate the leading knowledge interest of these Sciences with a 
technical cognitive interest. This rules out an argument for a 
demand for spaces by the Human Sciences, as was constructed for the 
case of the Natural Sciences, by schematizing the concepts of 
space, time, substance, and causality in a manner conducive to the 
constitutive questions of a technical cognitive interest. In the 
second place, the wide scope of a practical cognitive interest 
means that the Human Sciences are both
a) more ambitious and less efficient as explanatory knowledge than 
the Natural Sciences, in which the interest in knowledge is 
limited to that of instrumental action; and
b) more amorphous and less homogeneous than the Natural Sciences, 
so that the intimate relationship existing between the Natural 
Sciences and Mathematics is unlikely to arise with the Human 
Sciences.
Attempts to portray as *prescientific' those areas of the Human 
Sciences which resist colonization by Mathematics would be regarded 
by many of those working in the Human Sciences as a category 
mistake.
i
Nevertheless, I claim that the Human Sciences can generate a 
requirement for spaces from Mathematics. Furthermore, I claim that 
the conceptions of space required by the Human Sciences are 
essentially no different from those required by the Natural 
Sciences, in that spaces are conceived as objects in which 
geometric figures cohere. I base these claims on the possible 
second-order methodological objectifications which arise from the
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complementarity of human knowledge interests. Although! the
:
practical interest is concerned with understanding meaning, that 
understanding is about some objective matter in the world. In so
I
far as possible objectifications of the questions faced by the 
Human Sciences are amenable to metaphorical redescription in terms 
of a geometrical explanans, then these objectifications can ground 
the deployment of spatial concepts in the Human Sciences. However, 
one must proceed carefully here. If ”... it is tempting to say that 
metaphor is a planned category mistake” ([RI] p.197)» then some 
care is required in the controlled use of metaphor to plan that 
mistake, if we are to avoid an actual mistake. Accordingly, my 
objective in this Chapter is to show that, in the light of the 
complementarity thesis, a controlled use of metaphor (as a planned 
category mistake) can promote the demand for geometric objects in 
two possible ways :
A) Just as the metaphor NATURAL PHENOMENON IS MOVING BODY permits 
the complete objectification of Nature for Sciences 
incorporating a technical cognitive interest, so the homology 
SOCIAL PHENOMENON IS TO NATURAL PHENOMENON AS SOCIAL PROCESS IS 
TO NATURAL PROCESS can metaphorically restructure some of the 
questions of the Human Sciences. I shall dub those Human
Sciences, operating as if they incorporated a technical
i
cognitive interest (as a planned category mistake), as quasi- 
causal (or quasi-nomological) Sciences. An example of a quasi- 
causal Human Science with a substantial mathematical content 
might be Econometrics.
B) Even those Human Sciences which reject a quasi-causal approach 
to their subject matter may find it necessary to theorise about 
their questions in terms of structure. The homology STRUCTURE IS 
TO SPACE AS ORGANISATION IS TO COHESION can metaphorically
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redescribe a sense of[structure às an organised whole of
; j
connected parts in terms of an explanans drawn from the cohesive 
qualities of space. A |concrete example might be theorising about 
social structure in terms of networks of social relationships 
conceptualised as a graph. Here the space is a graph in which 
the elements (nodes and edges) may cohere to form a whole of 
connected subgraphs. Now I have argued that space lays down the 
basis of the study of motion. But for those Human Sciences which 
do not proceed in a quasi-causal fashion, what is required is 
not so much a conception of space as a theatre of action, but as 
a cohesive object with differing regions in which to organise 
our experience of the objects under discussion. I shall call 
this a demand, for want of a better term, for a structural 
mathematics.
However, the metaphorical redescription of natural processes 
as objectified processes was disciplined within a framework which 
renounced any teleological understanding of Nature. If metaphor is 
planned category mistake, then the care involved in the planning 
rests on the renunciation of an intentional object. The demand for 
space from a Science incorporating a technical cognitive interest 
is made within the discipline of this framework. Now Apel argues 
that the complimentarity of knowledge interests yield criteria of 
methodological differences between the various types of Human 
Science in spite of the apparent unity of the intentional subject 
studied by such Sciences ([AP2] pp.25-36). Broadly speaking, these 
methodological differences can be explored along two 'dimensions* :
1) QC/GRA dimension
The contrast between quasi-causal Sciences (QC) and the central
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task of a practical cognitive interest, namely that of
r
providing a good reason assay (GRA) for understanding the 
motives of the intentional subjects.
2) CN/NE dimension
The contrast between those Human Sciences which
a) evaluate human actions and institutions in the light of 
those rules or norms that are constitutive for the actions 
or institutions as describable facts of the socio-historical 
world (CN-Sciences), and
b) evaluate the very norms or rules by which the actions or 
institutions are constituted (NE-Sciences).
The distinctions made by Apel can be used to provide a 
simple framework of ideal types of Human Science. This framework 
can serve as a background against which to evaluate the demands for 
space generated by the Human Sciences. The sort of framework I have 
in mind is illustrated in Figure 3»
Apel's Ideal Types
ON NE
GRA « «
QC * *
/
Figure 3
The purpose of this framework is to clarify the elements giving 
rise to methodological differences in the Human Sciences and to set 
these out as ideal types so that when we approach a particular case 
of Human Science we shall know what features are especially worthy 
of consideration. In the remainder of this Chapter, I shall
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1)^putline some aspects of Apel*s ideal types of Human Science, in 
so far as they form a useful backcloth to demands for space; and
2) show how Apel's framework may help us to assess the demands for 
spaces as objects in which geometric figures cohere.
1) Ideal Types of Human Science
The GRA/QC dimension marks a structural difference between 
those Human Sciences, such as the economic analysis, which proceed 
in a quasi-causal fashion, and those, such as History or Sociology, 
which try to understand the good reasons for socio-historical 
events. Now the interpretation of the presuppositions of people's 
mentality can never be taken for granted, as the history of the 
failure of economic projects in developing countries only too 
clearly demonstrates. Nevertheless, the results of the analysis of 
consumer behaviour may sometimes look like the results of Natural 
Science. Explanations and conditional predictions of consumer 
behaviour under certain situations are based on regularities 
'observed' over a limited historical period. It is as if the 
analysis of consumer behaviour were based on a technical cognitive 
interest. Measured masses of goods are produced and consumed, and 
the movement of these measures through economic-space is the 
subject of limited predictions.
The famous ceteris paribus assumptions of economic analysis 
acknowledge the difficulties of making such predictions in the face 
of possible Merton effects, and point to the fact that such 
Sciences can never truly possess a technical cognitive interest.
The regularities observed are not necessarily norms to be followed. 
However, these regularities are certainly the result of people
55
either conforming with or transgressing norms. These Sciences are 
dubbed quasi-causal with good reason; the as-if operator imports 
only a secondary methodological objectification. In the case of the 
Natural Sciences, the objectification of natural processes is 
disciplined within a schematization of substance as a non- 
intentional object. The causal nexus can be made the basis of if- 
then rules for successful instrumental action on Nature. However, 
metaphorical redescription of social processes (such as consumer 
behaviour) as objectified processes means that the application of 
derived if-then rules can only proceed quasi-causally by 
influencing a person's attitude or motives.
The concept of cause is clearly defined within a technical 
cognitive interest. However, the concept has its wider uses because 
we can continue to function with limited success when it is lifted 
from its natural situation in the technical cognitive interest into 
other areas through metaphorical redescription. For example, in 
'Harry raised our morale by telling jokes', Harry moves our morale 
through morale—space by the input of telling jokes ([LJ] p.72). 
Certainly it seems sensible to use the term 'quasi-cause' in these 
instances when the application of a rule (whistle joyfully)
'causes' an effect (feeling cheerful) through the influencing of 
the intentional subject's attitude. The importance of quasi-causal 
Sciences lies in the application of the concept of quasi-cause to 
ever new domains of human activity. Universally quantified 
statements of if-then rules based on regularities described in 
quasi-causal terms can provide the basis for predictions under 
strong assumptions, such as ceteris paribus and the acknowledgement 
of Merton effects.
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However, there are Human Sciences, such as History and
Sociology, which cannot proceed in a quasi-causal fashion.
Historians (or sociologists) attempt to offer explanations or good
reason assays "... by which the actions of people can be understood
and even justified as reasonable with respect to their aims and
maxims, given the situational circumstances as they were understood
by the actors themselves" ([AP2] p.26). These actions cannot be
cast in in terms of quasi-causal if-then rules. Apel adduces the
following reasons for this state of affairs ([AP2] pp.25~6) .
"... * Because'-sentences of historical explanation, in 
contradistinction to 'because'-sentences of the quasi-nomological 
behavioural sciences cannot be reduced to nomological sentences of 
the form 'always if...then'. The reason for this impossibility is 
that historians, in contradistinction to behavioural scientists, 
are not allowed to refer their explanations by 'because'-sentences 
to quasi—laws and antecedent conditions of habitual social 
behaviour within the context of a social system that is itself 
still to be understood as relative to a certain period or region of 
history. Instead of presupposing such methodological abstractions, 
historians must explain historical events in the light of the whole 
of history to be considered as open to the future in principle."
If historians tried to proceed quasi-causally and offer nomological
explanations of events, that is with universally quantified
statements with respect to all possible historical events and all
possible human reactions to events, then ([AP2] p.26) .
"... they would have to face the following dilemma : Either they 
would have to cautiously restrict their nomological premisses to 
propositions that would be so general and hence trivial that they 
would not be falsifiable and hence would not present relevant 
explanatory hypotheses; qr^  they would have to provide nomological 
premisses that would contain definite descriptions and even proper 
names for all historical subjects (individual and collective) and 
for all.their particular circumstances in life. In this case they 
would not have achieved a nomological explanation either, but at 
best they would have postulated the historical necessity, in 
principle, of the historical events, as in the proposition : 'In 
all cases where a ruler acts in the same way as Louis XIV did, and 
does so under the same conditions as the French king, he would 
necessarily lose his popularity at the end of his life, as Louis 
XIV in fact did'."
The difficulties faced by historians, in attempting quasi-causal 
explanations enable us to make a sharp distinction between quasi-
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causal Sciences and those aiming at the provision of good reasons.
To proceed quasi-causally (in relevant situations) is to demand 
more. It is to "... insist on ascertaining which intelligible (good 
or bad) reasons might be considered causally effective reasons ... 
as quasi-causes in the case of behaviour to be controlled by 
explanation and conditional prediction" ([AP2] p.27).
The CN/NE dimension is intended to structurally 
differentiate attitudes to value-laden descriptions in the Human 
Sciences. Now it is generally conceded that there can be no such 
thing as a value-free study of human institutions ([GO]). However, 
([HA2] p.167) :
"... there can be different, yet coextensive, descriptions of the 
same event which are not synonomous, e.g. 'the death of Caesar' and 
'the murder of Caesar'. However, the fact that Caesar was 
assassinated can only be rendered by one and the same statement. 
Coextensive but nonsynonomous propositions cannot express the same 
fact."
The meaning of murder is something that is defined by men. Whether
or not Caesar was murdered is something to be intersubjectively
agreed as a fact. Essentially, 'facts' are not happenings in the
world ([HA2] p.169). For this reason the truth of propositions is
not corroborated by objectified processes happening in the world,
but through the intersubjective agreement achieved through
argumentative reason. For as Habermas points out ([HA2] p.168) :
"When we say that facts are states of affairs which exist, we mean 
not the existence of objects, but the truth of propositional 
contents. In doing so we presuppose ... the existence of 
identifiable objects of which we state that they have such and such 
propositional content. Facts are derived from states of affairs, 
and states of affairs are the propositional content of statements, 
the truth claim of which is radically questioned. A state of 
affairs is the content of a proposition which is stated 
hypothetically rather than apodictically, i.e. the propositional 
content of a statement whose truth claim is held in abeyance. If a 
state of affairs is the content of a statement to the extent that 
it is problematic and gives rise to discourse, then what we call a 
fact is the content of a statement after it has been subjected to a
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affairs* cannot be clarified without reference to 'discourses |
examining the suspended truth claims of statements." j
Now it seems to me that the basis of CN-Sciences lies in discourses
which only evaluate what can be regarded as 'facts' in the light of
norms or rules which are constitutive of those describable 'facts'
of the social life-world. Although what it means for a proposition
to be true is something established by human conventions, and even
though (it is possible that) these conventions could have been
otherwise, and again it may well indeed be true that these
conventions are tainted with ideological components, it does not
follow that a proposition cannot be objectively true. Thus we may
decide what it means for a state of affairs to exist, but whether
it is the case that a state of affairs is a 'fact' is something
that can only be corroborated with the support of the objectivity
of experience.
However, the suspension of validity-claims is double-edged, 
for it also seems that the basis of NE-Sciences lies in discourses 
which render problematic the norms or rules which constitute what a 
CN-Science would regard as a describable fact. For example, the 
hermeneutic clarification of Biblical texts within the context of
Christian doctrine could be characterised as a GRA-CN Philological
/
Science. On the other hand, as is well known, research into the 
historical Jesus by 19th Century Protestant theologians and pastors 
resulted in a Biblical Philology of a GRA-NE type in which almost 
all the elements of Christian doctrine were radically questioned. 
Now there is a case for the importance of both CN and NE type 
Sciences. In the case of a Philology of CN type, it may be
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understood as a requirement for objectifying and presenting ■ 
meanings that are to be grasped before judgements are made on the 
truth-claims of the text. But the significance of a Philology of NE 
type appears in situations in which progress in understanding 
meanings is not so much dependent on objective abstraction but on 
the competence of the investigators to arrive at a justification of 
the truth-claims of difficult texts. For example, Apel argues that 
the internal reconstruction of the History of Science as conceived 
by Lakotos would be impossible unless Science itself was placed on 
the basis of a continuing questioning of existing norms ([AP2] 
p.28). In a telling example ([AP2] p.32), Apel suggests that the 
Humanist philologians could not understand Archimedes* teachings on 
hydrostatics, until they critically reconstructed these teachings 
by separating out the justifiable modes of Archimedes* reasoning.
To be sure, within the context of a GRA-Science, both CN and NE 
modes of procedure can coexist. Klein's reconstruction of the 
origins of Greek Mathematics involve both a CN approach, which 
improves our understanding of Mathematics in terms in which the 
Greeks understood it themselves, and an NE approach which 
reconstructs the history of Rennaissance Mathematics in terms of a 
rupture with Greek Mathematics following a critical judgement 
regarding the wheat and chaff in Greek thinking ([KL]).
But what are the implications of the CN/NE dimension for QC- 
Sciences ? Since the QC-Sciences can never truly operate within the 
context of a technical cognitive interest, then this dimension can 
be used to characterise the relationship of QC-Sciences to possible 
Merton effects in the human domain of unrestricted communication.
On the one hand, there could be "... a steady fulfillment of
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reciprocal expectations of behaviour by the 'process of Jiuman - 
interaction" ([AP2] p.23). This case could be characterised as one 
of undisturbed cooperation by the human subjects, who are 
interested in the elimination of Merton effects by establishing the 
reciprocal fulfillment of behavioural expectations in accordance 
with predictions of the quasi-causal theory. The hope of 
undisturbed cooperation underlies the deployment of QC-Sciences as 
social technology, whether for market research or bureaucratic 
planning.
On the other hand, there could be "... a process of self- 
destroying prophecy, based on a constant thwarting and thereby 
frustrating of expectations" ([AP2] p.24). This case could be 
characterised as one of disturbed cooperation by the human subjects 
who capitalise on the unwanted predicted effects of quasi-causal 
theories as a situation to be avoided. The case for investment in 
QC-Sciences as the basis for thwarting self-fulfilling prophecies 
has been put by Apel ([API] p.57) :
"... these objectifications of certain aspects of human behaviour 
which cannot (yet) be articulated into the language of self- 
understanding nevertheless are serving to further this self- 
understanding. These attempts to let 'objectification* serve 
'disobjectification', i.e. that condition in which man is freed by 
knowledge to act responsibly, have to be judged according to 
whether the 'objects' of the theory can(become 'subjects' who can 
incorporate that theory into their own language and self- 
understanding" .
This gives a first hint on how we may relate the CN/NE dimension to 
questions of cooperation with Merton effects, for the reactive 
self-application of the knowledge provided by QC-Sciences for 
disturbed cooperation by intentional subjects necessarily involves 
criticising the 'regularities' of quasi-causal laws as presupposing 
norms to be radically questioned.
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I believe that we can understand this 'linkage' between 
regularities and norms, if we postulate the following equations .
i) undisturbed cooperation = QC-CN itype Science, and
ii) disturbed cooperation = QC-NE type Science.
In the first case ([AP2] p.30),
"... it is fairly clear that abstention from evaluating rules as 
norms is required because the 'rules' here are interesting not as 
possible confirmations or alternatives to those rules we have to 
accept ourselves as obligatory norms for our life but only as 
supposed regularities or quasi-laws of a behaviour to be accounted 
for by quasi-nomological explanations. Hence abstention from value 
judgements is in this case a normative condition of the possibility 
of the object-constitution, precisely as in the case of the 
explanatory natural sciences."
Essentially the treatment of interesting regularities as quasi-laws 
involves suspending validity-claims as to the rightness of norms. 
Nevertheless these regularities are 'observed' in the context of 
norms which constitute the facts as facts. The undisturbed 
cooperation of human subjects with reciprocal expectations as to 
behaviour frozen in such quasi—laws must assume an expectation as 
to the continuation of norms and rules presupposed in such quasi­
laws. But by the same token, a QC-NE type Science can treat the 
unwanted effects of a prediction based on these quasi-laws as 
components of an argument criticising the norms presupposed in such 
quasi-causal theories.
For those who reject Habermas' and Apel's propositions 
regarding an emancipatory cognitive interest (with a leading 
interest in knowledge which emancipates the human subject from 
coercion), an attractive possibility is to typify Sciences with 
such an emancipatory interest as QC-NE type Sciences. My own view 
is that the complimentarity thesis rests on an idealisation which 
is necessary but not sufficient for an understanding of the full
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scope of possible cognitive interests involved in studying the 
human subject. Actual social relations differ widely from the
assumption of pure co-subjects debating academically the validity
1
of rightness-claims in the esoteric realms of argumentative 
discourse. The compensation of the effects of manipulation by 
social technology requires a critical social science, which views 
itself as theory conceived as a practical-critical countervailing 
force. Nevertheless, the location of such critical social sciences 
in the QC-NE quadrant is sufficient for my purposes.
2) Space for the Human Sciences
The primary function of Apel's typification is to settle in 
our own minds where a particular Human Science should be located. 
But when we do this, it may be noticed that mathematics need not 
enter the Human Sciences. For example, in Table 3 I have indicated 
some examples of mathematical and non-mathematical types of Human 
Science.
Examples of Human Sciences 
Type Mathematical Non-Mathematical
GRA-CN Network Sociology History/Sociology
GRA-NE Network Sociology? History/Sociology
1
QC-CN Consumer Behaviour Behavioural
Psychology
/
QC-NE Critique of Freudian Analysis
Political Economy
Table 3
It is unsurprising that mathematics need not enter the Human 
Sciences, for the theory of cognitive interests claims that the 
leading interest of such Sciences is in the practical questions of
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rimproving human understanding; and whereas mathematics is a 
(methodical device intimately bound up with the technical cognitive 
(interest, mathematics only complements the practical interest as a 
secondary methodological abstraction when matters of objective 
description arise. I shall now restrict my discussion to those 
Human Sciences which import mathematics as secondary methodical 
device.
The 'dimensions' of Apel's typification can be used to 
clarify the demands made on Mathematics for conceptions of space.
In the first place, the sharp distinction between QC- and GRA- 
Sciences can be used to show that the demand for space generated by 
the QC-Sciences is derived from that of the Natural Sciences, 
whereas the demand for a structural mathematics is only generated 
by a GRA-Science. In the second place, the CN/NE dimension can 
clarify the possible studies of processes parameterised by a 
spatial object. I shall deal with these in turn.
A) QC-Sciences
The point of Apel's typification of QC-Sciences is that in 
many respects they look like the Natural Sciences. The as-if 
operator enables us to import mathematics as a secondary methodical 
device in ways which are similar to the Natural Sciences. 
Metaphorical redescription of social processes as objectified 
processes means that social phenomena are viewed as objects moving 
through a space. For example, an economic system may be viewed as a 
vehicle with a trajectory through an economic space, in which the 
coordinates (or points) are parameterised by quantities such as 
prices, wages, profit rates, time discount rates, and rates of
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interest. But already in this example, we see that the demand for 
space is really no different from that of the Natural Sciences.
Space is required to support the interest in 'motion*, and this 
lays down a demand for objects with such geometric figures as 
'points' to mark the position of the social system, and 'paths' or 
'trajectories' along which a system may 'move'. The demand for 
space is essentially derived from that of the Natural Sciences, 
where the derivation is justified by grounding the description of 
social processes in the concept of (quasi-)cause.
B) GRA-Sciences
Although the GRA-Sciences deliberately eschew quasi-causal 
methods, they cannot avoid reference to objective matters such as 
social structure. For example in Chapter 2, I referred to Habermas' 
discussion of the practical cognitive interest. There, Habermas 
found it necessary to characterise the transformation of the 
neonate into a social individual as one of "... entrance into a 
network of communicative relations ..." ([MG] p.56, emphasis 
added). But what is social structure that it can be referenced by 
'networks' ? A useful approach to answering this question is 
provided by Gould et al. ([GJC] pp.S5-S6) :
"It would be our contention that ... such knowledge [of structure] 
consists of how different things are connected together, and what 
these collections of things mean to us. In essence, then, much of 
our knowledge must be structural, precisely because structures 
consist of things connected together in certain ways ... it is 
hardly inappropriate to search for an effective way of describing 
the structures of the human world ... Now if we are going to talk 
about structure in well-defined and operational ways, and so to 
make it a concept that can be genuinely useful in creating agreed- 
upon and verifiable knowledge ... then we must try to think through 
what sort of 'language' is actually appropriate for theoretical 
expression and empirical description. And during the course of our 
thinking, one of the things we must try to avoid is the uncritical 
borrowing of mathematical languages that have been developed ... 
[for] ... the physical world ... So we are going to focus upon the 
question of structure ... the way things are connected and hang 
together ... this means we have to talk about set^ and relations."
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Now it seems to me that there are three important cross-currents in 
the above discussion
i) the idea that structure has meaning and can be discussed in a
precise and lucid fashion;
ii) the idea that structure is a connected something-or-other; and
iii) the idea that structure can be referred to in a precise way- 
through a mathematical language of sets and relations.
If we take up these hints, I suggest that we think of
structure in terms of the 'sum*,
STRUCTURE = LOGIC + COHESION.
Firstly, the idea of connectivity is essentially a 'spatial' idea. 
Connectivity is but an element in our sense of cohesion. The most 
primitive idea of 'space' is a 'network'. Here nodes may act as 
coordinates to model social location or position in 'social space , 
and arcs might describe social relations which connect the nodes to 
provide a picture of social structure. In fact "... the language of 
graphs can be used to model many notions that were current long 
before graph theory was born" ([BH] p.236). For the mathematician, 
a graph is the simplest form of space, in which geometric figures 
of vertices (nodes) and edges (arcs) cohere (are connected) to form 
a whole or collection of wholes. Secondly, it is natural for a 
mathematician to generalise our notions of sets and relations to 
objects.and inclusions. Just as a binary relation on a set A can be 
described as a subset R contained in the set A X A, so any n-ary 
predicate can be described as an 'inclusion' of an object R in an 
object in a set-like category ([GB] pp.239-48). For a. precise 
description of structure, a mathematician will require a formal 
quantified statement expressed as an n-ary predicate in some formal
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mathematical language, for which the cohesive object (i.e space / 
graph) is a model. For example, Seidman and Foster discuss how 
Monger's Theorem might facilitate an analysis of generalised 
cliques in the study of closely-knit human groups ([SF1]). A 
generalised clique is a model of some theory stated in precise 
axiomatic form capturing precise relationships between the elements 
of a graph. The quest is for precise descriptions of social 
structure. Thus the discussion of structure revolves around the two 
components of the 'sum'. On the one hand, the structure must demand 
an object (such as a graph) in which geometric figures (such as 
vertices and edges) cohere. On the other hand, the precise 
clarification of structure, as an expression of relations existing 
between geometric figures, requires a logical mathematical 
language.
Within the context of GRA type Sciences, there is a demand 
for a structural mathematics to describe in precise terms just 
exactly what structures are being referred to. Mathematics is but 
an ingredient in the good reason assay provided for understanding a 
given social situation. Mathematics does not provide the meaning of 
the situation, but it helps, in terms of a precise definition of a 
referenced structure, to support any meanings we may arrive at. Now 
I have argued that space supports the idea of 'motion'. What is 
required in a description of structure is not so much a support for 
'motion', but rather support for a cohesive structure to 
'coordinatise' the meaningful reference to human subjects. This is 
what is required for an idea of 'social space' - the identification 
of subregions to be roughly correlated with identifiable human 
behaviour or socio-historical events. To be sure, even in a simple 
space such as a graph, the possibilities of 'motion' are seen in
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the support a graph can provide for 'paths* through it. And surely 
these geometric figures known as 'paths' in a space reference 
possibilities of communication between subregions. But the moment 
we reference communication in objectified terms as transmission of 
an 'object' along a path, then we are moving in the direction of a 
QC-Science. For this reason, I emphasise that it is the cohesive 
qualities of space that is required by a GRA-Science in its search 
for appropriate ways of talking about structure.
C) CN/NE Dimension
Whereas the QC/GRA dimension leads to sharp distinction 
enabling us to grasp that a GRA type Science requires only a 
structural mathematics, the CN/NE dimension only introduces the 
possibility of differing approaches to the study of processes. In 
the case of studies of morphogenesis, a Natural Science may need a 
space X in which to parameterise all possible configurations to 
express the state of a body B. What may be needed is a study of all 
the processes by which a space X may continuously index other 
spaces A, B, C etc. In my view because CN-Sciences only envisage 
undisturbed cooperation, there is an analogy with the Natural 
Sciences in that they may also require a study of X-parameterised 
processes, containing all the geometry compatible with the 
continuation of presupposed constitutive norms. However in 
contrast, the NE-Sciences, precisely because they envisage 
disturbed cooperation, may need to study all the ways in which a 
structure may be continuously transformed from X—indexed objects to 
Y-indexed objects. To be sure, from a mathematical perspective the 
study of X to Y parameterised processes may not be intrinsically 
different from the study of X- or Y-parameterised processes, if the
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processes from X to Y can be referenced by a space Y . Even so, 
what may be required for Science is a mathematical 
conceptualisation of spatial processes which permits this leap to 
the study of higher-order processes.
Thus I claim that the variation in demand for space by the 
Human Sciences can be adequately accounted for by the theory of 
cognitive interests. The complimentarity of knowledge interests 
permits a simple idealised typology, in which the demand for space 
can be viewed in terms of either the quasi-causal support for 
objectified processes, or the expression of the reference to social 
structure or social space. Similarly the possibility of typing 
Human Sciences in terms of differences in questions of value-laden 
description may lead to a demand for the study of parameterised 
processes whether simple or higher-order. Whatever else this 
pattern of demand for space is, it is always a demand for objects 
in which geometric figures cohere. I have used the term 'space* as 
a shorthand for this, and really this needs some justification. My 
argument is that conceptions of space required by the Human 
Sciences is essentially no different from that required by the 
Natural Sciences. Now it may be readily appreciated that the demand 
for space by the QC-Sciences is on the same footing as that of the 
Natural Sciences; basically quasi-causal laws require a conception 
of space to support an objectified description of 'motion' of 
social processes. But in what sense is a demand for a structural 
mathematics a demand for space which is essentially the same ? What 
is the essence here ? Now there is a well-known technique in 
Mathematics by which one can view apparently different things as 
abstractly the same - that is the use of category theory, in which 
the operational complexities of widely differing branches of
69
mathematics are put on the same footing, in terms of objects and 
arrows, to exhibit their conceptual similarity. To see that these 
conceptions of space are essentially the same, we will have to take 
a mathematical tack through the categorical treatment of set-like 
categories.
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CHAPTER: FIVE 
SOME CATEGORICAL CONCEPTS
It is a commonplace that categories are there to make the 
different topics of mathematics more transparent by revealing 
common underlying patterns. For a category theorist, it is "... not 
Substance but invariant Form that is the carrier of relevant 
mathematical information" ([LWS] p.1506). For example, Goldblatt 
argues that ([GB] pp.1-2) :
"A category may be thought of in the first instance as a universe 
for a particular kind of mathematical discourse. Such a universe is 
determined by specifying a certain kind of 'object*, and a certain 
kind of .'arrow' that links different objects. Thus the study of 
topology takes place in a universe of discourse (category) with 
topological spaces as objects and continuous functions as arrows 
... and so on. We may thus regard the broad mathematical spectrum 
as being blocked out into a number of 'subject matters' or 
categories (a useful way of lending coherence and unity to an ever 
proliferating and diversifying discipline). Category theory 
provides the language for dealing with these domains ..."
Thus one way of looking at category theory is to see it as
classifying various branches of mathematics with respect to
underlying common patterns. However, "... category theory does not
rest content with mere classification ... (although a few of its
practitioners may do so); rather it is the mutability of
mathematically precise structures (by morphisms) which is the
content of category theory ..." ([LVJY] p.148). Thus Lawvere notes
that the development by category theory of methods of passing from
one domain to another has had the effect of altering (advanced)
mathematical practice itself ([LWY]). 'Such a universal instrument
for guiding the learning, development, and use of advanced
mathematics cannot fail to have its implications' for mathematical
practice. If Science is the rational reorganisation of knowledge
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achieved through a practice that alters its present form, then the
‘r
altered practice of mathematics has implications for Science 
(insofar as Mathematics is a component of the Sciences). Thus 
category theory acquires a metascientific flavour when it alters 
mathematical/scientific practice. Category theory has come to be 
seen as the reflection of Mathematics on itself. It is with good 
reason that Lawvere describes category theory as a form of 
objective dialectics ([LWI]).
This Chapter is not intended to provide a comprehensive 
introduction to category theory for the non-mathematician; such an 
introduction would be a formidable undertaking and beyond the scope 
of a thesis of this character. My aim is to outline the (naive) 
category theory ([BN]) I shall regard as familiar, by giving the 
definitions, results, and notation I shall be assuming in later 
chapters.
The three fundamental concepts of category theory are 
categories, functors, and natural transformations.
Definition 1 A category Ç  consists of three things :
a) A class of objects, usually denoted by capital letters A,B,C,...
b) A class of arrows or morphisms, usually denoted by lower-case 
letters f,g,h,... Each morphism has a domain and codomain which 
are objects of we write 'fîA— —^B* for 'f is a morphism and 
dom(f) = A and cod(f) = B'.
c) A composition law which assigns to each pair of morphisms (f,g)
with dom(f) = cod(g) a composite morphism f.g:dom(g) >cod(f).
(Sometimes we shall just write fg or f o g  for the composite 
arrow). Composition is required to satisfy two axioms :
(i) Composition is associative, i.e. (fg)h = f(gh) whenever
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composites are defined.
I
(ii) Ijor each object A, there exists an identity morphism
:A >A satisfying f.id^ = f and id^ .g = g, whenever
we have arrows f:A- >B and g:B >A.
Definition 2 A functor TîC—————XD is a morphism of categories. 
Specifically it consists of functions
(objects of Ç ) ------> (objects of D) and
(morphisms of Ç ) ------> (morphisms of D),
both denoted by T, such that
(i) If f:A >B, then T(f):T(A)---->T(B).
(ii) T(fg) = T(f).T(g) whenever fg is defined.
(iii) T(id^ ) = id-^^\ for all A.
Definition 3 A natural transformation t:S >T between two
functors S,T:_C >D consists of a function
(objects of _C)----- > (morphisms of D^ ), denoted by A f > t(A),
such that
(i) t(A):S(A)------->T(A) for all A.
(ii) For all f:A---- >B in £, we have T(f).t(A) =
t(B).S(f):S(A)----- >T(B).
Examples of categories abound. Perhaps the paradigm category 
is the familar category Set of sets and functions. Mathematicians 
frequently deal with concrete categories, whose objects are sets 
with some kind of structure and morphisms are the structure- 
preserving functions; the composition law being the usual 
composition of functions. Familiar categories are :
Category Objects Arrows
Lat lattices homomorphisms
Grp groups homomorphisms
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ÀbG abelian groups homomorphisms
Mon monoids homomorphisms
1
Ring rings homomorphisms
Bool Boolean algebras homomorphisms
Poset posets monotone maps
Met metric spaces Lipschitz maps
S£ topological spaces continuous maps
Man compact manifolds smooth maps
Note that a concrete category £  is always locally small. That is,
for each pair of objects (A,B), the class of arrows A >B in Ç
(denoted by hom^(A,B) or £(A,B)) form a set rather than a proper
class.
Useful categories for highlighting properties of topoi (of 
spaces) are certain categories of graphs.
Definition 4 A directed graph consists of two classes, the class 
of arrows and the class of objects, together with two mappings 
between them called source and target, as in
source \
arrows ^ objects
target
Instead of saying that source(f) = A or target(f) = B, we write
r
more briefly f:A >B or A— I— >B, where f is an arrow, and A and
B are objects. Sometimes the mappings source and target are called 
domain and codomain respectively. Borrowing from sheaf theory, we 
will call these source and target maps restriction maps. Sometimes 
arrows will be called edges, and objects called nodes or vertices. 
Edges whose source and target are the same node will be called 
loops.
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A graph homomorphism from a graph G to a graph H is a
function V:G >H sending nodes to nodes, and a function
E:G >H sending edges to edges so that, whenever f:A >B is
an edge in G, then E(f):V(A)----->V(B) is an edge in H. A graph
homomorphism preserves the source and target of an edge. That is 
source(E(f)) = V(A) and target(E(f)) = V(B).
Directed graphs and homomorphisms form the category Graph.
Definition 5 A reflexive directed graph is a directed graph in 
which every node has exactly one special loop known as the 
identity loop or degenerate loop. Of course, it may have other 
loops as well, but the degenerate loops are always there. A 
homomorphism of reflexive directed graphs is just a homomorphism of 
(irreflexive) directed graphs in which degenerate loops are always 
sent to degenerate loops. In a reflexive graph, we may picture the 
graph with one edge and two degenerate loops as :
with the degenerate loops suppressed. However, the same graph, when 
considered as an irreflexive graph must be pictured as :
in which all loops are shown. A homomorphism of irreflexive graphs 
is just a graph homomorphism. No special consideration is given to 
the question of the degeneracy of a loop. It merely asks that loops 
be sent to loops. Reflexive directed graphs and homomorphisms form 
the category RGraph. It can readily be seen that a category is a 
reflexive directed graph with an additional structure of
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composition on the edges (Definition 1).
New categories can always be obtained from old.
Definition 6 Given categories and we can construct the 
product category ex' D in the obvious way : objects are pairs (C,D) 
with C an object of C_ and D an object of D. An arrow
f X  g:(C,D)_____>(C*;D') has f:C >C* in £  and g:D >D’ in D^.
Definition 7 If A is an object of C^, the slice category C/k of
objects of £  over A has as objects (B,f) all arrows f:B >A of £
with target A. An arrow of £/A is an arrow h:B >0 of £  making
the following diagram commute :
B    ^  C
A typical slice category is Set/X in which the set X indexes other 
sets. Labelled graphs are objects in the category Graph/X, in which 
(in the simplest case), the graph X has one node and a loop for 
each label. A labelled graph (A,f) is then just a graph A equipped
with a graph morphism f:A >X assigning a label to each edge of
the graph A.
Categories may include subcategories.
Definition 8 A subcategory £  of a category £  is any category 
whose class of objects and arrows is contained in the class of 
objects and arrows in £, and which is closed under the operations 
of source, target, identity, and composition. Subcategory £  is full 
when for any objects C, 0’ of £, £(C,C*) = £(C,C’)»
Definition 9 A functor F:_A------>B is faithful, if the induced
mappings A (A, A»)----->B(F(A) ,F(A» )) sending f:A >A* onto
F(f):F(A)_____>F(A') for all A, A* in A are injective, and full if
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they are surjective. A full embedding is a full and faithful 
functor which is also injective on objects, that is F (A) - F (A ) 
implies A = A'.
Arrows can be classified by their qualities.
Definition 10 A morphism f:A >B in £  is called
a) invertible, if there exists an arrow g:B— — >A in £  with gf =
id ^  and fg = id g . Then we write A ^  B and say that A and B
are isomorphic and f is an isomorphism;
b) monic (or mono, or monomorphism) if whenever p:C >A and
q;C >A with fp = fq then p = q;
c) epic (or epi, or epimorphism) if whenever p:B ->D and
q:B >D with pf = qf then p = q.
Definition 11 Given a morphism f:A >B, a section is an arrow
g:B >A with fg = id , and a retraction is an arrow h:B >A
with hf = id ^  . If f has a section g then f is epic. If f has a 
retraction h then f is monic. If g is a section then g is monic. A 
category in which every arrow is invertible is called a groupeid.
A close inspection of some categories reveals that their 
objects may themselves be categories.
Definition 12 A category £  is said to be small if the classes of 
objects and arrows are sets.
For example, a topological space X (in Sp) may be viewed as a 
category whose objects are the open sets of X, and whose arrows are 
the inclusion mappings between them. More generally, any poset may 
be regarded as a category : elements are objects, and there is at
most one arrow A >B for any pair of elements whenever A < B. A
monoid is a category with one object (the unit), and with elements 
as arrows. Even a set may be looked upon as a discrete category in
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which there are no arrows other than identities.
From any category, we can form the dual category.
Definition 13 Given a category A, the dual or opposrhe category, 
denoted by A®^  ^ , has the same objects as A, but for each morphism
 >B in A we get an opposite morphism f ^ :B >A in A ,
by interchanging the domain and codomain of f. Composition in A 
is defined by f*' .g"' = whenever g.f is a composible
pair of arrows in A ([D01] p.8).
A functor from a "^ to B is often called a contravariant functor
from A to B. Functors which are not contravariant are sometimes
said to be covariant.
The category of small categories and functors between them
is called Cat. Here functors are treated as morphisms of Cat. A
more startling Idea is to treat functors from A to B as objects and
natural transformations between them as morphisms in a functor
category B—  . Functors from small categories into Set form the
basis of our understanding of variable sets.
Définition lit A variable set is a (contravariant) functor from a 
small category Ç  to Set. For each set-valued functor F, each object 
U in Ç  is called a stage of definition of F, and F(U) is called the 
set of elements of F defined at stage U. For each f:U- >V in C, 
the elements of F(U) and F(V) are said to (contra-)vary along the
restriction map f. In particular, a variable set of the form
 >Set is called a presheaf.
For example, consider the category P(2) represented by U ^
It has two objects and four arrows. A contravariant set-valued
functor, G:P(2) >Set is a pair of sets G(U) and G(I), and a
pair of arrows G(s):G(I)---->G(U) and G(t):G(I)----- >G(U). The two
identities are sent to identities. Such a functor G can be regarded 
as an irreflexive graph G. The elements of G(U) are the nodes of G,
S
I.
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and the elements of G(I) are the edges of p. The edges, G(I), 
contravary along the restriction maps G(s)j and G(t) to the nodes, 
G(U), and are said to restrict the edges to their source and target 
nodes respectively. We can represent this iconically as
V
G(I)
G(s)
G(U) t
G(t)
op
Thus irreflexive graphs can be viewed as presheaves in Set*
Also a graph homomorphism f:G— >G* is a natural transformation of 
functors (= graphs) in Set—  . In a similar vein, a set itself
may be regarded as a functor from the discrete one-object category 
1 to Set, where it can readily be seen that all variation is frozen 
into a constant object.
Other important classes of variable sets are the categories 
of M-sets. If (M,.,1) is a monoid seen as a one-object category 
with elements as arrows (Definition 11), then an M-set may be 
regarded as a functor from M ^ to Set. Thus an M-set is.a set A
with a map A X M >A describing a right action by the monoid M
on A. This is usually given in terms of (a,m) |--- > (a.m), such
that a.1 = a and (a,(m.m’)) = ((a.m).m’) for all a G A and
/
m,m’ <r M. For example, consider the monoid (M,.,1) with M = {1,s,t} 
and the following binary operation :
1 s t
1 s t
s s s
t t t
The right action of M on a set A is equivalent to a reflexive 
graph. If M acts on A, then A is a set of edges of a reflexive
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graph and a.s and a.t are degenerate loops associated with the 
source and target nodes of edge a A  A. Thus an M-set is a variable 
set with one stage of definition but in which variation may occur 
along differing arrows.
The central concept of category theory is thé notion of 
adjunction or adjointness.
Definition 15 Given functors F:A >B and
G:^----->^, we say F is left adjoint to G (denoted by F  1 G) and
G is right adjoint to F, if there is a bisection natural in the
variables A and B between morphisms f: A---- >G(B) in A and
morphisms f:F(A) >B in ^  (See Fig.4), such that E^F(A),B)
A(A,G(B)) for all objects A in A and B in B.
Picture of Adjunction
Category A
GF(A)
Category B
F(A)
FG(B)
Figure 4
The adjoint relationship is often presented schematically by
A — --- >G(B)
F(A) B
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which displays the left-right distinction. Given an adjunction
( F  i G), we may consider for each A in A the arrow
1
^  (A):A----->GF(A) which corresponds in the bijection to
id:F(A) >F(A) in B . Naturality of f i > f means that is a
natural transformation Id^  ----> GF called the unit of the
adjunction. Dually we can define a natural transformation 
£ : F G  > Id g called the counit of the adjunction.
Proposition 1 A functor G:B >A has a left adjoint provided we
can find for each object A in A an object F (A) in B and a morphism
/T)(A):A----->GF(A) which is universal among the morphisms from A
to the image of G, in the sense that for any f:A >G(B) there is
a unique f:F(A) >B satisfying f = £  (B)oF(f) with f =
G(f)«7^(A). (See Figure 4).
Proof : ([ML]) p.81).
The most familiar example of an adjunction is as follows. Let
U;Grp >Set be the forgetful functor which sends a group to its
carrier set and a homomorphism to its underlying function. If X is 
a set; the defining property of the free group F(X), generated by 
X, says precisely that the inclusion X CZI F(X) is universal among 
functions from X to the image of U. So U has a left adjoint; the
free functor F:Set >Grp. For further examples of adjoints; see
MacLane ([ML] p.85).
Adjunctions are the essential tool to explore similarities 
between categories.
Definition 16 Let F:A >B be a left adjoint for G:B >A. A
reflection is an adjunction for which the counit map E. (B) is an 
isomorphism for all B in This is equivalent to saying that G is 
full and faithful and B is a reflective subcategory of A. That iS; 
the adjunction induces a bijection between B(B;B’) and
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A(G(B),G(B’))1 If both the unit and counit are iso then A and B are 
said to be equivalent categories, denoted by A ^  B.
This notion of equivalence is weaker than that of isomorphism of 
categories (denoted ^  , which may be regarded as an adjunction
for which the unit and counit maps are identities. It can readily 
be seen that Graph and Set are equivalent categories. Also the
right action of the monoid on a set of arrows (mentioned after 
Definition 14) is equivalent to RGraph. Nevertheless equivalence is 
sufficient to ensure that two categories share the same categorical 
properties. Indeed sharing categorical properties through 
categorical equivalence more or less defines what a categorical 
property is.
Adjoint functors can be used to define the important 
categorical concepts of limit and colimit.
Definition 17 Let A and J be categories, with £  invariably small. 
Let A —  be the functor category, whose objects are functors
D:£ >A (called in this context diagrams of type £  in A) and
whose morphisms are natural transformations. There is an obvious
v7*
constancy functor A  :£----->£ , which sends an object A in £  to
IT
the constant functor in £  with value A. We say £  has limits of 
type £  if has a right adjoint j£m j- . We refer to ^im g- (D) as 
the limit of diagram D. Dually if A  has a left adjoint (denoted 
by ^  ^  ), then £  has colimits of type £. Limits and colimits are
dual concepts. A colimit of D:£----->£ is just the limit of
 >£‘’^ . ([ML] pp.62-71) (See Note 2, p.224).
I shall not give a detailed account of the various limits 
and colimits. They can be found in any standard text on category
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theory ([ML]). The following examples outline important (co)limits 
in Set. For variable sets (co)limits are often constructed 
pointwise, so the reader should have little trouble in transferring 
his knowledge of (co)limits in Set to variable sets. Consider the 
following diagrams of type £.
(a) Let £  be the empty category 0_, then a limit is a terminal 
object (denoted by 1), and a colimit is an initial object 
(denoted by 0). These objects are characterised by there being
only one function ! ^ :A— •— >1 and 0 ^  : 0 >A for any
object A. In Set, a terminal object is any singleton set {x}, 
whereas the initial object is the empty set 0.
(b) Let £  be the category consisting of two discrete objects, then 
a limit is a categorical product of two objects (denoted by
A y B) and a colimit is the coproduct (denoted by A + B). In 
Set, a product of a pair of sets (A,B) is the familiar 
cartesian product A x B, whereas the coproduct is the disjoint 
union of sets A + B. To be sure, products and coproducts can be 
generalised into n-ary products (TJ A ^  ) and coproducts
( X  A  ^ ) by making £  the category of n discrete objects.
Products and coproducts have morphisms p^ : A  >A
(projection onto the ith factor) and ij : k j  > Z. A
(injection of the jth component).
(c) Let £  be the category represented diagramatically by
A limit of diagrams of type £  is an equaliser. Dually a colimit 
is a coequaliser. In Set, an equaliser of a pair of parallel
functions f:A >B and g:A >B is the inclusion of E =
{a|f(a)=g(a)} in A. Coequalisers are somewhat more complicated.
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Let S be the binary relation {(f(a) ,g(a)) |a E  A} B X  B,
Then define R to be the finest equivalence relation on B
containing S. The coequaliser is then given by the rule
b e B I > [b] e  B/R, where the quotient set B/R is the
codomain of the coequaliser ([GB] p.63).
(d) Let J be the category represented diagramatically by
<
^ — — > «
A limit of diagrams of type £  is called a pullback. Dually a 
colimit is a pushout. In Set, we consider diagrams like
D ---------- > B
9
f
-> c
in which D = {(a,b)!(a,b)G A X  B and f(a)=g(b)}. The set D is 
called a pullback (or fibred product), and is sometimes denoted 
by A X ^  B. Again pushouts are more complicated. Consider the
diagram
A
A
f
-> D
A
c B
with given functions f and g. Vie form the pushout D by defining
the sum A + B and then coequalising i ^  .f:C >A + B and
 >A + B, and then defining D as the coequaliser.
I will not consider more complicated types of (co)limits, 
thanks to
Proposition 2 If a category has equalisers and all finite (resp. 
all small) products then it has all finite (resp. all small)
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limits. Dually for colimits.
Proof : ([ML] p.109).
Definition 18 A category is complete if it has all small limits 
and cartesian if it has all finite limits. Dually it is cocomplete
if it has all small colimits and cocartesian if it has all finite
colimits. A bicomplete category is both complete and cocomplete.
The relationship between (co)limits and adjoint functors can
be expressed by the following :
Proposition 3 If F:A >B Is left adjoint to G:B--->A, then G
preserves limits and F preserves colimits.
Proof : ([LS] Prop.5.10 p.25).
Definition 19 A functor which preserves all finite limits is said
to be left exact.
To clarify notation vis-a-vis (co)products :
Definition 20 Let f:A >A’ and g:B---->B« be arrows then a
product of arrows f and g is f X g:A X B---- >A* X B», given by the
rule (a,b) j-— — > (f(3-) >g(h)).
Definition 21 Let f:A >B and g:A- >C be arrows then the
product arrow <f,g>:A >B C is given by the rule
a J— ——^ (f(a),g(â)).
Definition 22 Let f:A------>A* and g:B---- >B» be arrows then the
coproduct of arrows f and g is f + g:A + B >A’ + B* given by
the rule a 6 A i > f(a) and b 6 B I > g(b).
Definition 23 Let f:B >A and g;C >A be arrows then the
coproduct arrow [f,g]:B + C >A is given by the rule .
b € B I > f(b) and c E C i > g(c).
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Later we shall see that categories of -spaces' need to be 
cartesian closed.
Definition 2U A cartesian closed category is a cartesian category 
Ç  (thus having products), such that for each object B of Ç, the
functor (-) X B:C >C (sending an object X in Ç  to its product
X X B) has a right adjoint (-) :C >C.
This adjunction means that for all objects A, B, and C in £  there 
is an isomorphism
X  :C(A X B,C)----->C(A,C ^ ).
The latter is often given the mysterious name of ’ A -conversion’.
However, this only means that /\ sends any map g:A X B >C to
its unique exponential adjoint §:A----- >C * . In a cartesian closed
category, the class of arrows C(A,B) enriches to an exponential
object denoted by B ^  in £. If e v : C &  B >C is the counit of
the adjunction, then we expect the following diagram to commute
/S
9
B
dV
X  B
If category C_ is locally small then there is a functor
Hom:C^^X £  >Set. The value of this functor for a pair of
objects (A,B) in £  is hom ç  (A,B) (or £(A,B)). For a product of
arrows g X  h:(A,B)----->(A-,B') (where g:A- >A and h:B >B-
are arrows in £) then Hom(g,h) sends f £ £(A,B) to hgf 6 £(A-,B'). 
If F and G are functors in a locally small category, we denote the 
set of natural transformations between them by Nat(F,G). •
Definition 25 If £  is locally small, a functor F:£ >Set is 
said to be representable if F is isomorphic to H o m ^  (C,-) for some
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objects C in C^. Dually F is representable when isomorphic to 
Hom Q (-;C) and F is a functor from to Set. We shall denote
Hom (C,-) and Hom ^  (-,C) by h^ and h ^  respectively.
For example in Graph, the following functors (= graphs)
and
are representables, as they are isomorphic to h ^  and h j  (see 
Definition 14, 25).
Of considerable importance is Yoneda’s Lemma.
Proposition 4 If A is locally small and F:A°^ ----- >Set is a
functor, then Nat(h^ ,F) is in one-to-one correspondence with F (A) 
for all objects A in A.
Proof : ([LS] Prop.2.7 pp.10-11).
Proposition 5 The Yoneda functor
Y:C —  > Set
defined by
C B Ç  I > h^ and
f;C*——— H———-
is a full embedding.
Proof : ([LS] Cor.2.9 p.11).
This allows us to assert that Ç  is equivalent to a full subcategory
Qop
of Set” " . For example, the Yoneda functor embeds
u
•
t
into Graph, by sending U to h ^  and I to hj. . This can be 
pictured as follows :
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u = and I  = « '—  ^  o
Also s:ü >I and t:U >I are sent to
and
__________ ^ »
« \--- -— - I
D
&
\
a
'------ ------------ -
I
0
respectively. It will be seen later that the Yoneda functor permits
Q C P
a fruitful abuse in confusing £  with its ’copy* Y(£) in Set —
It can readily be seen that the terminal object of Graph and 
RGraph can be pictured as
and
respectively. 1 is a representable in RGraph, but not in Graph. 
However, the condition 1 G may not for some be strictly true, 
yet may be true up to ’splitting idempotents’. There is for some 
categories £  a Cauchy completion K(£), such that
C ( 2  K ( Ç ) Ç  Set'
To explore this we need the following.
== Set
Definition 26 Any arrow f: A----->A in a category £  is an
idempotent if f.f = f. An idempotent is said to split when there 
exist arrows g:A >B and h:B >A such that f = h.g and g.h =
id g .
Definition 27 For any category £, the Cauchy completion or
Karoubi envelope (denoted by K(C^ )) is a category in which 1
(i) objects are the idempotent arrows of C^; and ;
(ii) arrows f---- >g (where ff=f and gg = g in Ç) are the triples |
(f; ;g); where (j) :A----->B is an arrow in Ç  such that (j) .f ’
= ^  = g. ^  , or equivalently ^,(j) .f - cf) .
Proposition 6 For any category £, the Karoubi envelope K(C^ ) is a 
category in which all idempotents split.
Proof : ([BU] Prop.3*2).
We shall only be interested in those Cauchy completions of small 
categories such that presheaves on £  and K(£) are equivalent.
For example, the M-set, equivalent to RGraph, described 
under Definition 14 is a category in which 1 is not representable.
By obtaining the Karoubi envelope of the monoid M (considered as a
category) a more plastic version of the category of M-sets is 
obtained in which 1 is representable. Now it can readily be seen 
from the multiplication table that st = s, ss = s, ts = t, and tt 
= t so that the monoid M is actually a band in which for all 
elements (other than the unit) e^ .ej = e ^  (i,j = 1,2). Next
treat the multiplication table of the monoid M as composition of
arrows in a category M and form the Karoubi envelope K(M). Simple
calculations show that K(M) has 3 objects and 13 arrows. However,
1
two of the objects are isomorphic and there are only seven non­
equivalent arrows. This results in the category M(2) equivalent to 
K(M) which we picture as
1 is representable. The category Set—  / is equivalentin which
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to RGraph. Elements of a variable set at stage 1 are nodes, -and 
elements at .stage I are edges. The restriction maps s, t describe 
the source and target of each edge, whereas the restriction
I
ujl >1 takes nodes to their associated degenerate loops.j The
monoid action on the set of edges is recovered through the 
variation carried along e ^  and e ^  .In principle, we can 
generalise graphs by taking any band in which e; .ej = e£ for i,j 
= 1,...,T. By taking the Karoubi envelope of these bands, we obtain 
categories M(T), which are pictured like M(2)
(T arrows)
but with T arrows instead of 2. Presheaves on M(T) may be usefully 
thought of as generalised reflexive graphs.
The same technique of Cauchy completion can be applied to 
the category whose objects consist of the natural numbers 
(1,2,3,...) and whose morphisms consist of the (monoid of) monotone 
endomaps. The Karoubi envelope is a category , known as the
simplicial category and pictured as
in which the monoid actions on objects have been suppressed (see 
[ML] pp.172-3). The variable sets of Set—  are known as 
simplicial sets. Algebraic topologists often use these simplicial 
sets to model spaces by affine simplices. They rewrite the objects 
{1,2,3,4,...} as {0,1,2,3,..*} using the geometric dimension ([ML]
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p. 174). Truncation at-dimension 2 results in variable sets in 
A \
Set —  ^ which canjbe used to model triangulated surfaces ([LWQ]
pp.26-7). It can easily be shown that the one-dimensional
simplicial sets in Set — are equivalent to reflexive graphs in
Set == RGraph ([LWQ]).
The variable sets X in Set—  where £  is a small category 
can also be characterised as a special class of small categories 
known as fibrations. Since £  is small, its structure has a basic 
description in terms of sets of objects and arrows. Given £, let 
Cg. be the set of objects and the set of arrows of £. Also we
have set functions dom: ----->C^ and cod:C^ >C^ indexing
the domain and codomain of each arrow in £. Now X in Set"" may 
well be described by a right action mediated by the arrows of £. As 
a variable set, X can be parameterised by the objects of £, by
rewriting the elements of X as a function ^  :X ^  >C_ which0 o
indexes the stage of definition of the elements of X. We call X^ 
the set of objects of a category %. The set of arrows X ^  can be 
formed by the following pullback (in Set)
Pi
P%
 >
Coc/
\|/ \ /
So that X^ = Xg/< ^ = {(x, X )! ^  (x)=cod( A )}, where x is
an element of X at stage C and A  :C* >C is an arrow in £. The
right action of (x, X  ) on x sends x to an element x* defined at 
stage C*, subject to the following conditions
(i) X.(x.id c ) = X; \
\ \
(ii) x.(x, A  ).(x*,yt/ ) = x.(x, A.ytw ) whenever C" >0' >C
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in Ç, \
To be sure, the projection p^ :X^ ----->X^ onto the first factor
describes the \codomain of the arrows in X ^  , and the right action 
indexes the domain.
Definition 28 The pairs of set (X^ ,X^ ) where X^ is formed by
pulling back : X ^ ----->C^ and codrC^ >Cg (where Cp and
are the sets of objects and arrows of £) constitute a full 
subcategory of the slice category Cat/C known as the discrete 
fibrations, and denoted by Dfib(C). As an object in Cat/C the pair 
(Xg ,X^ ) form a category denoted by ]C.
Proposition 7 Variable sets known as presheaves are equivalent to
the discrete fibrations; that is.
Set- ”  Dfib(C) C  Cat/C d  Cat.
Proof : See ([BW] pp.228-9) where the proof is given for the
Ç
equivalence between Set and the discrete opfibrations. The
Q C p
reader will have no trouble in rewriting the proof for Set and
fibrations.
Qcp
Proposition 8 The slice category (Set )/X where X is a 
presheaf is equivalent to Set—  , where X is the discrete 
fibration associated with X in Cat/C .
Proof : ([JT1] p.50).
The dialectical twist here is that variable sets are not just a
!
generalisation of the idea of sets, they are also categories.
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CHAPTER SIX
TYPE THEORY AS THE FORMAL
"... logic in its traditional form 
is a purely formal science, and 
thus in any specific use made of it 
in the sciences or elsewhere, it is 
one and the same; the life which it 
assumes for the knower in such use 
is its proper life."
H-G Gadamer
In Chapter One, I asserted that the 'mathematical subsystem' 
could be disaggregated into the Formal and the Conceptual with an 
act of interpretation between them (Fig.2). I have two objectives 
in this Chapter. Firstly, to outline type theory as the most 
powerful version of the Formal for Science. Secondly, to show 
(through a simple example of the application of elementary 
differential calculus to Galileo's studies of falling bodies at the 
dawn of modern science) that the type theories needed by Science 
may be non-classical, meaning that models will have to be found in 
set-like categories markedly different from Set.
I shall start with Lawvere's world-picture of mathematical 
activity.
Lawvere's World Picture
Space
&
Quantity
Numbers
&
Truth-Values
Figure 5 
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He has argued that ([L¥P] p.378) :
"... the essential object of study in mathematics is space and
quantitative relationships. Thus, as an essential part of the 
scientific world-picture, we have the mathematical|world-picture 
(see Fig.5) whose links with the remainder of the scientific world- 
picture should never be forgotten"
In this picture, our experience of the objects in ’the external
world’ is mediated through the concepts of space and quantity.
These concepts are operationalised in terms of numbers and truth 
values, and at the heart of mathematical activity is the 
elucidation and explication of mathematical concepts. Lawvere 
claims ([LWA] p.281) :
"That pursuit of exact knowledge which we call mathematics seems to 
involve in an essential way two dual aspects, which we may call the 
Formal and the Conceptual. For example, we manipulate algebraically 
a polynomial equation and visualize geometrically the corresponding 
curve. Or we may concentrate in one moment on the deduction of 
theorems from the axioms of group theory, and in the next consider 
the actual classes of groups to which the theorems refer. Thus the 
Conceptual is in a certain sense the subject matter of the Formal".
Here the mathematician visualises or conceives of entities such as
spaces, graphs, bundles, groups, rings, modules, and categories. He
uses axioms or sentences in some formal language to gain conceptual
control over these notions; essentially the concepts are to be
exhibited as models of a theory. The necessity of ’formality’ is
usually expressed in such terms as ’precision’, ’lucidity’, and
’clarity’, and the passage between the Formal and the Conceptual
relates what can be coherently visualised as a concept to what can
be sensibly said about it. ‘
Now mathematical knowledge is in no respect different to 
other forms of knowledge in that it is mediated through language. 
Searle has argued that knowledge, to count as knowledge, must be 
clearly expressible. Assuming a speaker (e.g. a mathematician) 
expresses his intention precisely, then it is possible (in
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principle) for every speech-act carried out to be specified by a 
complex sentence (in ordinary language). Searle’s Principle of 
Expressibility can be put formally in the following way ([SE]
p.20):
For every meaning Z, it is the case that, if there is a speaker X 
in a language community C, then it is possible that there is an 
expression E in the language spoken by C which is an exact 
expression of Z.
When knowledge is at issue that possibility is convertible to 
necessity. This Principle can help us to see that the passage from 
the Formal to the Conceptual is one of finding an exact expression 
for a concept. Formal languages are not just syntactical 
collections of symbols to be manipulated for their own sake (as in 
Formal Logic), but precise tools for the utterance of speech-acts 
with mathematical and scientific contents.
In the following exposition of type theory, I shall assume the 
reader is acquainted with first-order logic in which theories are 
written down as axioms and structured sets are produced as models 
of these axioms. The axioms usually use the logical symbols of the 
classical prepositional calculus on the set {true,false} (denoted 
by 2), together with the quantifiers \/ (’for all’), 3  ('for 
some’), and 3 j (’for some unique’), various brackets for clarity, 
and non-logical symbols which act as predicates or relations. Type 
theories are just an extension to this general idea. Axioms remain. 
However, as many types as will be needed are added to the single 
type of first-order logic. The need for type theory arises from the 
distinctions we make in ordinary language. As Lambek and Scott 
point out ([LS] p.125) :
"Types are inherent in everyday language, for example, when we 
distinguish between ’who’ and ’what’ or between ’somebody’ and 
’something’ ".
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When we make these distinctions, we may, for example, postulate
. f
types A and B, and if t is a term of type A arid s is a term of type 
B, then we may by abuse say t ê  A and s B  B* By making these 
distinctions in terms of types, we already have a useful extension 
to first-order logic. However, type theory is not like first-order 
logic in that it allows higher-order types. As Freyd puts it ([FR]
p.6) :
"... First-order logic is surely an artifice, albeit one of the 
most important inventions in human thought. But none of us thinks 
in first-order language. The predicates of natural dialectics are 
order-insensitive (one moment's individuals are another's 
equivalence-class) and our appreciation of mathematics depends on 
our ability to interpret the words of mathematics. The 
interpretation itself is not first-order."
The value of type theory is that it permits higher-order types, 
which fit more closely the natural dialectics of language.
The expressive power of formal systems described in type 
theory is great. After a little practice, we can easily acquire the 
feeling that all mathematics can be formalised in them. Type theory 
is the most powerful representation of the Formal available to us, 
for it offers us both discrimination between types (which is 
essential for Science) and the possibility of universal and 
existential quantification (which is essential for the law-like 
hypotheses of Science). Accordingly, I shall think of the 
formalised fragments of scientific discourse (making demands on 
Mathematics) as statements in a type theory requiring 
interpretation in a set-like category.
As the basis for my outline of type theory, I follow closely 
the formal system of Lambek and Scott ([LS]). However, my 
exposition differs in two main respects. Firstly, 'a seemingly
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stronger version' of type theory needs function types ([LS] p.132), 
and since even the most elementary examples from Science require 
function types I add in various fragments of a type theory with 
function types as suggested by de Vries ([VR] Chap.1). Secondly, I 
exclude all the usual axioms about Peano arithmetic and the natural 
numbers from my discussion of type theory. It is not that I think 
these axioms are not a part of type theory, but reasons of space 
and the need to concentrate on an exposition of type theory useful 
to Science lead me to suppress these features of elementary 
arithmetic, which we can tacitly regard as there. Furthermore, I 
shall make the usual assumptions about the conventions regarding 
free and bound variables and the renaming variables in substitution 
by terms, and will skate over the complexities of these problems 
([JT4] pp.19-23). These complexities would only obscure the picture 
of type theory outlined here, and hinder the understanding of the 
working mathematician/scientist. The super-logical reader will 
readily incorporate the adjustments as a matter of course.
Intuitionist type theory can be described as follows. 
Definition 1 The kernel of a type theory consists of the 
following data.
a) A set of basic type symbols A,B,C,... including the special 
types 1 ('one') and 31. ('truth type').
b) The smallest set of type symbols (including the basic types) 
closed under product and power-set formation :
i) if A and B are types, then so is A X B;
ii) if A is a type, then so is P(A);
iii) -O- will denote the type P(1).
c) A set of function symbols f,g,h,... where each function symbol 
has type symbols as domain and codomain, denoted by f: A >B.
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d) A set of axioms formulated in the terms and formulae of the
language constructed from the above data.
!
Definition 2 i  The terms of a type theory are freely generated from 
the types as follows.
a) * is a term of type 1, and for each type A we have countably 
many variables x^ ,x^ ,x^ ,... of type A. We shall denote 'let x 
be a variable of type A' by x 6  A. Variables of type P(A) will 
be denoted by upper-case letters e.g S 6  P(A). We tacitly assume 
all the conventions regarding free and bound variables (see 
Definition 3)»
b) <s,t> is a term of type A X B for all terms s of type A and t of 
type B.
c) {x 6 Al (JZS (x)} is a term of type X X  , if (j) (x) is a term of 
type XX and ^  is a predicate that can be applied to variables 
of type A.
d) t(r S is a term of type X X  for each term t of type A and S of 
type P(A).
e) f(t) is a term of type B for each term t of type A and function 
symbol f;A >B.
f) ”T' ('true') and JL ('false') are terms of type 3 X  .
g) If p and q are terms of type X X  , then so are p /\ q ('p and q'),
p V  q ('p or q'); and p => q ('if p then q').
h) If ^  (x) is a term of type X X  , then (\/ x B  A) çi (x) and 
( 3 x 6  A) (j) (x ) are terms of type X X  . The symbols \ /  ('for 
all') and ^  ('for some') are quantifiers.
Definition 3 Terms of type XX. are called formulae. The variable 
X in (j) (x) is said to be bound in quantified formulae and terms
like {x G  Al ^  (x)}. A variable is said to be free when it is not
bound.
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Definition 4 A full type theory is obtained by expanding the 
kernel with further symbols - ~1 ('not'), <=> (‘equivalence’), =
(’equals'), {x} ('singleton'), 3  ! ('for some unique'), (--
('inclusion'). The symbol 3  ! is also a quantifier. We define the 
extra symbols in terms of the kernel.
a) "1 p is p => jL .
b) p <=> q is (p => q) A (q => p).
o) a = a ’ is ( Vs 6 P(A))[a e S <=> a' e  S].
d) {a} is {x E Ala = x}.
e) ( 3  !x 6 A) ^  (x) is ( V  x' G A){x<z A| (x)} = {x'} .
f ) S C H  T is ( \/ X e  A) (x g  S => X g T)
where S and T are terms of type P(A).
The axioms and formulae of a type theory are governed by a
relation of entailment, denoted by j X, between terms of type
XL . Entailment is defined for each finite set X of variables 
between terms of type XL , whose free variables are contained in X
(see [LS] pp.130-1). We adopt the conventions j  for j 0 and
j—  p for |— — p.
Definition 5 The set of axioms and rules of a type theory
contains the axioms of the data defining the specific type theory,
together with the following standard set of axioms and rules,
a) Structural Rules
1 ) P I X p .
2) p I — X q q I — X r
p I —  —X r
3 ) p i ---X q
p I ———X LV {y} q
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(y) ! — -X u {y} (y)
ç5 (b) !— X y/ b
if y is a variable of type A and b is a term of type B, with 
the usual tacit conventions about free and bound variables.
b) Logical Rules
5) i) P I — “X T j
ii) JL I— -X p.
6) i) r I — X p A
iff r I X p and r I--X q.
ii) p V  Q I— -X r,
iff p I X r and q 1--X r.
7) P 1--- X q => r iff p A  q I--X r.
8) p I X ( V  V 6 B) (y)
iff p I X U {y} ^  (y).
9) ( j j y ^ B ) C ^ ( y )  I— X p 
iff y/ (y) I— X U{y} p.
c) Comprehension
10) I X {V  X 6 A)[x 6 {x 6 Al <j) (x)} <=> (f> (x)].
d) Extensionality
1 1 ) I ( \/s,T e  P(A))( ^ x  e A)[(x 6 S <=> X 6  T) => S = T].
12) i—  ( y  s,t e X I  )[(s <=> t) => s = t].
There are other rules relating entailment to products ([LS] 
pp.131), but the details will be omitted here.
Proposition 1 The following are consequences of the foregoing 
rules and axioms.
1) The usual rules of intuitionist propositional logic :
a) p => (q => p)•
b) [p => (q => r)] => [(p => q) => (P => r)].
c) (p A  q) => p; (p A  q) => q*
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d) p => Cq => (p A  q)]'
2) Axioms for symmetry and transitivity of = .
e) (V x,y 0  A)(x = y => y = x).
f) (V x,y,zS A)(x = y A  y = z => x = z).
3) Three rules of inference.
g) p, P => q
q
provided that the free variables of p appear free in q.
h) p => ^  (x)
p => ( V  X £  A) (x)
provided x does not appear free in p. 
j) ^  (x) => q
( 3  X £  A) ^  (x) => q
provided x does not appear free in q.
4) Two additional axioms for quantifiers.
k) ( Vx e  A) jzi (x) => ^  (x) = T .
1) ^  (x) A ( 3  X 6  A) T  => ( 3  X € A) (x),
where ( 3  x 6  A)T indicates that type A is inhabited or non­
empty .
Proof : ([VR] pp.5-6, [LS] pp.128-39)*
The full type theory outlined in the previous definitions is 
intuitionist type theory. It is well-known that among the 
tautologies of intuitionist logic the following propositions, 
p V/ "7p and 3  3  p => p, are not provable, and this applies to 
intuitionist type theory too.
On the other hand, p V *7 P and 3  ~1 p <=> p (or in view of 
Definition 4, ( 3 1  p => p) A  (p => 3  3  p) ) are tautologies in
classical propositional logic. Since 3 / P => P cannot be
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established in intuitionist logic, it follows that 13  P <=> P
not a theorem of intuitionist logic. We use this to distinguish 
intuitionist and classical logic with a further axiom.
Definition 6 A type theory is said to be classical when 
( V  t 6 _0- )(t V  3  t) or equivalently ( V  t 6-fL )( 3  I t => t).
A formulation of type theory without explicit function types 
is somewhat unsatisfactory for the needs of Science. It would be 
desirable to have available a notion of a function, such that 
whenever we encounter a predicate (p (x,y) we can prove that it 
represents a function through the statement
( V x e  A ) ( 9  !y e  B) (x,y).
To incorporate an explicit type for functions, we can extend the 
language in the following way ([VR] Chap.1).
Definition 7 For a type theory with function types.
a) Add to the rules, that define the formation of types, the new
rule ; closure under exponentials. That is, for a function 
symbol f:A >B, define the exponential type B ^  , and regard
A
f as a term of type B
b) Add to the rules, that determine terms, the rule of closure
A
under application. That is, if f is a term of type B , and if
X is a term of type A, then f(x) is a term of type B. A term of
type B ^  can be denoted by ( y\ x 6  A) ^  (x), which refers to
the rule x L > ^  (x) (where (x) is a term of type B)
determining the function f:A >B.
c) Add the following axiom concerning extensionality of functions 
and the axiom formulating the unique choice of functions.
i) ( y  f,g6 B^ )[f = g <=> ( y  X £ A)f(x) = g(x)].
ii) [( Vx e A)( 3  !y £  B) Çi (x,y)] =>
( zflf 6  sX )( V X £  A) 9^  (x,f(x)).
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As an example of a type theory, consider the following 
canonical type theory of the category Set. |
Definition 8 The internal language of Set,! denoted by L(Set), 
is a classical type theory and has as basic type symbols the 
sets A,B,C,..., and function symbols are the set functions 
f,g,h,... .In particular, the type 1 is the singleton set {0}, 
and type XI is the set {true,false} (denoted by 2) endowed with 
the structure of classical propositional calculus. IT is true 
and _L is false. Physicists and engineers often treat a 
variable x (in calculus) as a variable quantity. This approach 
is good enough for type theory and logic too. Variables can be 
treated as indeterminates ([LA]) and to every possible predicate 
(or polynomial) (j) (x) (in the variable x of type A with values
in B) we can associate a function f:A >B (where B is usually
the set 2). Furthermore, since Set is cartesian closed, to every 
f;A >B we can associate an exponential adjoint
[f]:1 —>6^4
called the name of f, such that the following diagram commutes :
B ^  )C A
Î T 1 X  i d ^
A
1 X A
B
We write f(x) = (x) and call this functional completeness.
X ^
Now L(Set) has as terms of type A in the variables x ^  of type A^ 
(i = 1,...,n) predicates (p (x;,...,x^^). In particular
a) * is a variable of type 1 ;
b) <a,b> is a variable of type A X' B;
c) S is a variable of type P(A).
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Furthermore, we can associate any predicate
d) a = a’ of type X I  with a function 
:A X A ------> 2,
A
<a,a*> f > true if a = a»
false otherwise;
e) a C A of type X I  with a function
ev;P(A) X  ^ ---- ^ 2,
<S,a> i---- > true if a £ S
false otherwise;
f) {x 6 A| (x)} of type P(A) with the function
rf\ : 1 ____> 2 ^  which picks out that function
( I X £  A) ^  (x) which defines
f : A  > 2, that is
X f > true if (/> {x)
false otherwise.
(More generally for any predicate (x) in the variable x of
type A with values in B is associated a function f:A >B
with exponential adjoint given by the name of f.)
Although P(A) and 2^ are different types, it is implicit that
they are equivalent. It is also easy to see that the type C is
equivalent with the type of composable functions
{<g,f>£ C ^ X  B |g.f=h£c'^ }.
How are we to interpret the entailment relation in L(S^) ?
Definition 9 Let X be a set of variables. Let true ^  ;C----->2 be
the unique arrows from all sets C to 2 such that true ^ (c) = true 
for all c G C. Let
be an entailment between terms of type _Q. , and let f ^  :A >2
be the unique arrows ( I  x £ A) Ç^*(x) (i = 1,...,n+1), then 
entailment means that for all arrows h:C >A and for all sets C
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where f ' .h = true , then .h = true ^  .
For example, let X be {x}, and let f:A >2 and g:A—  >2 be the
arrows given by ( A |x 6 A)j6 (x) and ( A x £ A) (x), then 
(x) j X (x) means that f.h = true ^  implies g.h =
true^. for all functions h:C >A. It can easily be seen that
{x 6 A|f(x)=true} is a subset of {x 6 A|g(x)=true}.
Definition 10 1--x p  (x) means (j) holds in L(Set), and we
write Set }== p  (x) and p  (x) = / .
By axiom 8 in Definition 5,
1 X P  (x) means |— - ( \/x £  A) ^  (x),
so there is a unique function f^ :A->2, such that f^(x) = true
for all a in A.
The internal language of Set can be put to work to prove 
familiar propositions about set functions. For example :
Proposition 2 A function f:A >B is
a) a monomorphism (or injection) iff
Set } =  ( Vx,x* 6  A)(f(x) = f(x') => x = x');
b) an epimorphism (or surjection) iff
Set 4==r ( V y £■ B)( 3  X ^A)(f(x) = y), and
c) an isomorphism (or bijection) iff
Set i== ( V  y £  B)( 3  !x £- A)(f(x) = y).
Proof ; ([LS] p.153)*
When we put the internal language to work in this way, we see that 
it is just the ordinary language in which we talk about 
mathematics. Now the trained mathematician tries to achieve a 
mental condition in which the concepts of sets and functions and 
the formal language of L(Set) are so intertwined that he might 
almost forget the difference between them ([AT3] p.1). 
Nevertheless, L(Set) and Set are different objects.
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In Definition 8 I showed how to transfer the category Set 
into a type theory called L(Set). I now show the rudiments of 
interpreting the axioms of a specific type theory into Set. 
Definition 11 An interpretation of a type theory H into Set is a 
mapping [ ] : H -----> Set taking types into sets such that,
C 1 ] = {0}
[il] = 2
[ A / B ]  = [ A ] X [ B ]
[ P(A) ] =
[ B ^  ] = [ B = {f|f:A--->B},
and a function f: A >B is mapped into a morphism
[ f ] : [ A ] -----> [ B ] in [ B ].
Axioms of the type theory H look like formulae in L(Set), and there 
is an implicit assumption that the axioms of the type theory H are 
simply being added to L(Set). Predicates and formulae have an 
interpretation as subsets and functions with codomain 2. I will not 
give details here, as they can be found in any standard text book 
on set theory and logic (see for example [JT4] pp.20-1).
For example, let H be ThC, the theory of small categories. It has 
two types A ('arrows') and 0 ('objects'), and three function 
symbols
i) d:A--- >0 ('domain'),
ii) c:A--- >0 ('codomain'),
iii) i:0*----->A ('identity'),
and a predicate K ('composition') on A X A x A.
Category theory has six axioms which formalise ordinary language 
statements.
1) ( V f e A)[d(i(o(f)))=o(f) A  o(i(d(f)))=d(f)].
'The domain of the codomain of f is the codomain of f, and the 
codomain of the domain of f is the domain of f'.
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2) ( y  f,g,h,16"A)[K(h,g,f) A K(l,g,f) => h=l] .
'Composition of arrows is unique when it is defined'.
1
3) ( V  f,g e  A ) 0  h e  A)[K(h,g,f) <=> e(f)=d(g)].
*The composition of g with f is defined iff the oodomnin of f is 
the domain of g '.
4) ( V  f,g,h6 A)[K(h,g,f) => d(h)=d(f)A c(h)=c(g)] .
'If h is the composition of g with f, then the domain of h is 
the domain of f and the codomain of g is the codomain of h'.
5) (V  h 6 A)[K(h,h,i(d(h))) A K(h,i(c(h)),h)].
'For any h, the domain of h is a left-identity for h under 
composition, and the codomain is a right-identity'.
6) ('Z h,g,f,l,j,u,v6 A)[K(h,g,f) A K(l,j,g) A K(u,l,f) A K(v,j,h)
=> u = v ] .
'Composition is associative when defined'.
An interpretation of the type theory ThC into Set sends the types A 
and 0 into two sets A and 0 which define the sets of arrows and 
objects of small category. The composition of the arrows as 
described by the six axioms means that there is a subset K 
contained in A X A x A such that K = {(h,g,f)|h=g.f} satisfying the 
axioms. The three function symbols have a simple interpretation as 
the domain, codomain, and identity mappings between the arrows and 
objects. Thus an interpretation (or model) of ThC is a small 
category (an object of Cat). For any formula p provable in ThC, we
write ThC |---  p. The following propositions are regarded as
/
essential by logicians if the type theory is to be used 
consistently.
Proposition 3 (Soundness Theorem) Let H be a type theory.
If H I p then Set [ = =  P«
Proposition 4 (Completeness Theorem) Let H be a type theory, 
then H ! — — p iff Set ! p•
Proof : ([GB] p.186 & p.227, [JT4] p.25).
107
Thus any theorem provable in ThC is valid for any object of Cat. 
And a formula in ThC is only provable if it is valid about all 
objects in Cat.
The example of ThC illustrates a general approach in
mathematics. Let H be the theory of lattices, groups, rings,
posets, topological spaces, or metric spaces, then an
interpretation in Set produces an object in a concrete category.
Similarly, let H be the theory of Peano arithmetic or Dedekind real
numbers, then an interpretation in Set produces the natural or
(Dedekind) real numbers respectively. Thus by 'adding' the axioms
of H to L(Set), the Formal and the Conceptual can be related
through the mapping of interpretation. It permits the discourse of
mathematics to be formulated as precise statements in a type
theory, and the concepts of mathematics can be regarded as
(structured) relationships on sets. For as Blass puts it ([BS] p.5)
"It is a remarkable empirical fact that mathematics can be based on 
set theory. More precisely, all mathematical objects can be coded 
as sets ... and all their crucial properties can be proved from the 
axioms of set theory".
This remark indicates the power of set theory in its guise as type 
theory. It would be unsurprising that scientists did not formalise 
their scientific theories (in type theory) given that sets can code 
(empirically) the objects of the universe.
For a Science with a technical cognitive interest, the 
categorial framework of space, time, and substance suggests the 
types of E (= a space), T (= time), and B (= a material body). To 
describe motions of a body through space and time, we need a type
theory with functions like m:B X T >E and a statement like
( V  m 6 E )( \/ <b,t>e B X  T)(3 !x é E)m(<b,t>=x.
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Thus already at this elementary level we can grasp the importance 
of type theory for Science, with a formal statement where the 
variables are interpreted as 'points' of a coordinate framework 
coding motion. Proceeding naively, Galileo could model a falling 
body ideally by a single point (the type 1), and both space and 
time could be typed by the geometric line (the type R). His
experiments produced empirical descriptions of motion as m £  R ^
7 \ 0
described by s = I6t (( A t 6 R)l6t ) (see Chapter 2, (1)).
Interpreting these descriptions in Set, we can use the Dedekind
reals to model the type R, and for every instant (or point) in time
there is a unique coordinate (or point) specifying the location in
space of the falling body.
However, the decision to interpret even this simple example 
of a physical theory in Set is not altogether a happy one, for by 
the I8th Century difficulties in interpreting statements were 
beginning to be felt ([DH] pp.242-3) :
"The leading problem was the connection between 'fluents' and 
'fluxions', what would today be called the instantaneous position 
and the instantaneous velocity of a moving body ... In the case of 
the falling stone the fluent is given by the formula s = ,l6t^ ,
... As the stone falls its velocity increases steadily. How can we 
compute the velocity of the falling stone at some instant of time, 
say at t = 1 ? We could find the average velocity for a finite time 
by the elementary formula : velocity equals distance divided by 
time. Can we use this formula to find the instantaneous velocity ? 
In an infinitesimal increment of time the increment of distance 
would also be infinitesimal; their ratio, the average speed during 
the instant, should be the finite instantaneous velocity we seek.
We let dt stand for the infinitesimal increment of time and ds for 
the corresponding increment of distance ... We want to find the 
ratio ds/dt, which is to be finite. To find the increment of 
distance from t = 1 t o t = 1 +  dt^we compute the position of the 
stone when t = 1, which is 16 X I*" =16, and its position when t = 
1 + dt, which is 16 X (1 + dt)^ . Using a little elementary 
algebra, we find that ds, the increment of distance ... is 
32dt + I6dt^ . Thus the ratio ds/dt ... is equal to 32 + I6dt 
Have we solved our problem ? Since the answer should be a finite 
quantity, we should like to drop the infinitesimal term, I6dt, and 
get the answer 32 feet per second, for the instaneous velocity.
That is precisely what Bishop Berkeley will not let us do."
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2.
Berkeley argued that neglecting the infinitesimal term I6dt in 
calculations was unintelligible. If a quantity is neglected, 
however small, we can no longer claim to jiave the exact velocity, 
but only an approximation. Either dt = 0 or dt / 0. By appealing to 
the law of the excluded middle, Berkeley argued that if dt / 0 then 
32 + I6dt is not the same as 32. On the other hand, if dt = 0 then 
ds = 0 and the ratio ds/dt is not 32 but a meaningless expression 
0/0 ([DH] p.244). Clearly Berkeley's objections rest on an 
assumption that the logic of these matters is classical.
At that time Berkeley's classical logic could not be 
answered. To avoid inconsistency, mathematicians under the 
leadership of Wcierstrass developed a rigorous approach to Analysis 
through set theory and classical logic. They achieved this by 
abandoning any reference to infinitesimals and any attempt to 
compute velocity as a ratio. Instead they defined velocity as a 
limit approximated by ratios of finite increments. Let A s and A t  
be finite increments of distance and time respectively. Then 
A  s/At is the quantity 32 + 16/It. By choosing A t  sufficiently 
small we can make A  s/At approximate values as close as we like to 
32. This approach removes reference to non-finite numbers. It 
avoids setting A  t to 0 in the ratio A  s/ At. It also avoids the 
apparent logical traps exposed by Berkeley, and allows the use of 
classical logic by differential geometers. Nevertheless there is a 
price to pay. The intuitively clear and physically measurable 
concept of instantaneous velocity becomes subject to the subtle and 
abstruse definition of a limit. For the sake of consistency we are 
led to a definition (limit) harder to grasp than our original 
concept (instantaneous velocity) ([DH] p.245).
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However, engineers and physicists have never ceased using 
infinitesimals. Indeed Robinson has made infinitesimals respectable 
again through non-standard analysis ([DH] pp.246-54). This involves 
classical reasoning in a non-standard model of set theory (see 
Chap.7, Def.11 ff.). However Lawvere feels that non-standard 
analysis is 'counter-intuitive* ([LWP] p.387). He argues that the 
essential issues of differential calculus can be dealt with in 'a 
more natural fashion' provided we abandon classical set theory and 
the appeal to the law of the excluded middle ([LWV] pp. 104-5).
This 'natural' approach assumes that any curve is a straight 
line in the infinitely small. When engineers postulate that 
distance(t + dt) = distance(t) + velocity(t).dt , 
then in order to neglect the term I6dt in 32dt + I6dt they must 
assume that dt =0. Taking this seriously, we are led to define 
the type of infinitesimals (as a subtype of R) D = {d £  R'd.d = 0}. 
Rewriting the assumption as 'any curve restricted to D is a 
straight line', Kock formulates an axiom basic to the differential
calculus ([KK2] p.3) : for any g:D >R there exists a unique
b G R such that ( \ / d £ D )  g(d) = g(0) +b.d. The assumption of 
enough nilpotents leads to immediate rigorous proofs ([LWP] p.384) 
of all the basic derivations of calculus (Chain Rule, Leibniz'
Rule, fundamental theorem of calculus etc.), provided the fluxion 
(derivative) f  of a fluent f is defined as being the (unique by 
the axiom) one characterised by Taylor's formula
( V d £  D) f(x + d) = f(x) + f  (x) .d 
To be sure, this axiom is incompatible with classical logic. On the 
one hand, using the Dedekind reals in Set is incompatible with the 
axiom since D would consist of 0 alone. On the other hand, by using 
the law of the excluded middle we can postulate the existence of
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h £ D with h / 0. Now Schànuel has constructed a function which is
; ‘x -
incompatible with the use of the law of the excluded middle in this 
way (see Note 3, p.227). Essentially this is a modern argument of 
Berkeley's case against fluxions, but it loses its destructive 
power when the unconditional validity of this logical law is 
surrendered ([RY] p.72). To retain the insights of engineers we 
must assume the derivations of calculus are examples of non- 
classical reasoning. So we may keep the axiom and abandon the law 
of the excluded middle ([KK2] p.5). The route followed by 
VIeierstrass was to develop the different type theory of non- 
intuitive rigorous Real Analysis in the context of classical 
reasoning of Set. The alternative is to interpret theories about 
space and motion in set-like categories which are non-classical.
CHAPTER SEVEN
KEY ASPECTS OF ELEMENTARY TOPOI
"... just good enough to be 
applicable not only to sheaf 
theory, algebraic spaces ... as 
originally envisaged by Grothen- 
dieck ... but also to Kripke 
semantics, abstract proof theory 
and ... independence results in set 
theory."
F.W Lawvere
For my purposes, the categories which are set-like are the 
elementary topoi. I have two objectives in this Chapter. Firstly, 
to give a basic outline of key aspects of elementary topoi, and to 
show how they can be used (like Set) to serve as a suitable 
universe of discourse in which to elaborate our models of a type 
theory. Thus a topos is a suitable category for encoding a 
description of the Conceptual. Secondly, to reveal the sense in 
which topoi can be regarded as generalised spaces, as a preliminary 
exploration of notions which need to be distinguished from those of 
a topos of spaces.
Topoi can be approached through axioms expressed in the
general language of category theory. Of course ([LVJV]) p.118):
"There can be no doubt that in mathematical practice both sets and 
their membership as well as mappings and their composition play 
basic roles. But in setting up a formal theory one should also try 
to get clear on which of these is primary and which is secondary in 
mathematical practice."
In my view, composition of maps takes the leading role, since set 
theory poses considerable problems for the working mathematician.
As Lawvere puts it ([LWV] p.118-9) :
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"The traditional view that membership is primary leads to a 
mysterious absolute distinction between x and {x}, to agonizing 
over whether or not the rational numbers are literally contained in 
the real numbers, to the 'discovery' that an ordered pair of 
elements in turn has elements which are, however, not the original 
elements, and to debates over whether the members of the natural 
number 5 are 0,1,2,3,4 or not, and all that is clearly just getting 
started; on its own formal face, a membership-based theory of sets 
is potentially littered with an infinite number of such formulas 
that even set theorists refrain from writing down due to their good 
mathematical sense. This situation, along with a very analogous 
situation with respect to the standard formalization of predicate 
logic, has led to the widespread view that a formalized theory and 
the calculations it tries to unify are necessarily so sharply 
divorced from each other that only a pedant would attempt to 
actually use a formalized set theory, which view only helps to 
isolate from most people the actual advances set theorists and 
logicians have made."
Thus the main problems of set theory would appear to be that it 
treats set-membership in vacuo as global and absolute. However, in 
practice mathematicians only usually consider set-membership as a 
relation between the elements of a given set and subsets of the 
same set; that is, set-membership is local and relative. In the 
latter context, membership can be described in terms of arrows
C---- >A f—  X, where C parameterises some element and A is a
subset of X. Thus to escape the paradoxes of set-theory, the local 
and relative notion of membership can be reduced to arrows and 
composition of maps. All this suggests that a purified approach to 
axiomatising the category Set in the language of category theory 
([LWS]) may be more relevant to mathematical practice than the 
traditional approach through the formal face of set theory.
Axiomatisations of the category of sets are described by 
Lawvere ([LWS]) and Tierney ([TY]). The following axioms of topos 
theory are a subset of an elementary theory of the category of 
sets. This outline is based on Tierney ([TY]).
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Definition 1 An elementary topos is any category which 
satisfies the following three axioms. I
El) ^  is cartesian and cocartesian. |
E2) E^  is cartesian closed.
Eg) Subobjects in ^  are representable; meaning that E has a
truth(-value) object together with a subobject classifier
trueil >S\f such that for any monic m:A >X, there is a
unique characteristic map (or character) char(m):X >-0. ,
such that
m
char(m)
true
is a pullback in E,
Before proceeding further, we need the following.
Definition 2 In a topos a monic m will be called the kernel of
char(m). Indeed any map h:X > X 1  will be the character of some
monic which is its kernel. The kernel of h will be denoted by 
ker(h). While characteristic maps are unique, kernels are unique 
only upto isomorphism. Thus
char(ker(h)) = h , and 
ker(char(m)) =V m.
A map true ^ :A » will be defined as the composition of
true .!^ .
Definition 3 A set G of objects in a category iÇ is called a
generating set if, for any two arrows f:A >B and g:A >B,
f = g iff for all objects C in G and all h:C >A, fh = gh.
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Proposition 1 The representable functors h ^  with C ranging over
r
the objects of C form a generating set for Set—
Proof : ([LS] Prop.9.2 p.171).
^  1
It is easily seen that for Set Set then {1} forms a generating 
set.
Proposition 2 Set is a topos.
Proof : Tierney ([TY]).
To satisfy El it is enough that JB has an initial object, terminal
object, equalisers, pullbacks, coequalisers, and pushouts.
Certainly it is well-known that all finite limits and colimits
exist in Set. Any singleton set {x} is a terminal object, and the
empty set 0 is the initial object. The truth-object is the set
{true,false} (denoted by 2), and trueil >2 is the map
X I > true for any singleton {x}. An exponential object is
the set of functions from A to B, denoted by Set(A,B). Given a
function g:C----- X A->B, there is an exponential adjoint
g:C----- >B^ , given by c |--- > g  ^ , such that ev:B^ X A----->A
is given by ev(g(c),a) = g^ (a) = g(c,a). It is well-known that
there is an equivalence between subsets (= monies, = inclusions)
m:A >X and characters char(m):X >2, that is the powerset
y
P(X) is equivalent to 2 .We have a string of equivalences
P(1) == 2 == 2^ == Set(1,2).
Set is, perhaps, the paradigm example of a topos. 
Nevertheless, there are many other categories satisfying the axioms 
of topos theory.
cep
Proposition 3 Any category. Set—  , of variable sets (dually
Set —  ) is a topos.
Proof : Goldblatt ([GB] pp.204-10).
Certainly El should hold since limits and colimits are inherited
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pointwise from Set. Adopting the fruitful confusion between an 
object A ±n\c and the representable functors h ^  (Chap.5, Prop.5), 
then the Yorieda Lemma (Chap.5, Prop.4) tells us that, for any 
presheaf F, the natural transformations from A to F are in 1-1 
correspondence with the set F(A) defined at stage A. This can be 
used to determine exponentiation in variable sets. If F and G are 
variable sets, then if F ^  is to exist at all then by E2 we must 
have
->F
A X G- ->F
We use this to define F , by letting the maps A X G >F be the
elements of F ^  at stage A. For example, working in RGraph, the 
Yoneda functor enables us to picture 1 as
and I as
F ^  at stage 1 (= nodes) is given by the set of graph morphisms 
from 1 X G to F. F ^  at stage I (= edges) is given by the graph 
maps from I X  G to F. The cohesion of the exponential graph F is
given by the restriction maps F ^  (h):F ^  (I)-----> F ^  (1), where h
is either s:1 >I or t: 1----->1. We have
1 X G
h X id
I X  G -------------- > F
e
and if n is a node in F and e is an edge, then the restriction 
of 6 along F (h) identifies that n, such that n = e.(h X  id).
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Thus we can picture the exponential object I in RGraph as
y  X
J
Note, however, that I must be pictured as
in Graph. There are no major difficulties in showing that 
exponential adjoints g:C ->B ^  exist for any g:C X A------ >B,
C
as calculations are done pointwise as in Set. Thus Set—  is
satisfies axiom E3, we definecartesian closed. To show that Set
as equivalent to - 0  as in S^. By Yoneda the^exponential
object -0. has natural transformations A >_T}. as elements of
SI (A) {0^ Sir (A)) at stage A for a representable A. However, 
these elements are in 1-1 correspondence with a morphism
1 X' A______ > S l , but these are just the maps from A to XI , as I X  A
"  k ±n a cartesian closed category. However, according to Eg 
characters h:A— — >il are in 1-1 correspondence with monies
ker(h):R >A, so that R is a subobject of A. We can use this to
define XI (A). At stage A,XI (A) {RjR is a subobject of A}. For 
example, in RGraph at stage 1, the only subgraphs of 1 are 1 itself 
(= T  ) and the empty graph (= JL ). At stage I the subgraphs of I
are
T  =
s =
b =
t =
and the empty graph (= ~J- )• Putting stages 1 and I together with 
the cohesion of restricting along the source and target, we can 
picture the truth-graph as
117
The truth-graph in Graph is the same graph as in RGraph, but must 
be pictured as
Clearly (in RGraph) we can define true:1-----> XI. as the map that
sends e | to T  in _Q , and true :A-----> S l  for any graph A
sends all nodes to T  and all edges to the degenerate loop
attached to node ( . Furthermore, the truth-graph is the universal
object required by axiom Eg to classify the subgraphs A of X, since 
the 'inclusion* of a subgraph A in a graph X brings about a unique
character X > X I  (which is a graph homomorphism) in the
following way :
a) all nodes of X in A must go to node I ;
b) all edges of X in A must go to the degenerate loop at / ;
c) all nodes of X not in A must go to node J. ;
d) all edges of X not in A must go to the degenerate loop at _L ,
t, s, or b, depending on whether both their source and target 
are riot in A, only their target is in A, only their source is in
A, or both their source and target is in A.
No other graph can serve this role. For example, if the edge b were 
to be removed then only 'full' subgraphs could be classified. Thus
all of SI is needed because of the variety of 'inclusions' which
exist in categories of graphs. Given any homomorphism h;X— ——^-TI,
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it is easy to see that the domain of ker(h) is isomorphic to the 
subobject classified by h.
Proposition 4 (Fundamental Theorem of Topoi).
If E is a topos then the slice category JE/X, where X is any object 
of E, is a topos.
Proof : ([FR] Theorem 2.31» pp.24-6).
Without going into the complexities of the proof, we know that for 
presheaves, Set—  /X is equivalent to Set—  , where X is the 
discrete fibration associated with the object X (Chap.5. Prop.7,8). 
Since X is a small category then by Proposition 3 then Set IS
a topos.
The previous propositions (3 and 4) provide us with a 
plenitude of topoi that share considerable similarities to Set. One 
could go on to add further axioms of infinity, Booleaness, choice, 
and that 1 1  be bivalent ([TY]). In this way, one could arrive at a 
theory of the category of sets (expressed in the language of 
category theory) such that (upto equivalence) Set was the only 
model ([LWS,MI,TY]). However, axioms El to Eg are just good enough 
to treat topoi as set-like categories for many purposes, including 
the treatment of elements, functional completeness, set-theoretic
operations on objects, and (most importantly) as the target of an
/
interpretation of a type theory.
Sets have elements, and they can always be represented by a
function x:1 >X ('select the element x'). This leads us to the
following.
Definition 4 An element (or point, or global element) in a topos 
is a section x:1----->X. More generally, a generalised element is
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an arrow with codomain X. The domain of the arrow is called , the 
stage of definition of the element. A generic element in a variable
set is an arrow A >X, where A is a representable (= a
generator).
Thus the fact that the only generic elements in a constant set are 
the global sections derives from Set having 1 as its only 
generator. Variable sets are abstractly the same as Set in that the 
generic elements are derived from the representables. To be sure, 
we must distinguish points from generic elements.
Definition 5 An object X in a topos E is called non-zero if it is 
not isomorphic to the initial object, and non-empty if there is at
least one global element 1---- >X. E^ is said 'to have empty
objects' if any non-zero objects are empty.
'Thus Set does not have empty objects; its only elements are the 
global elements, and non-zero and non-empty are coextensive. RGraph 
does not have empty objects as 1 is a representable. However, the 
situation in Graph is somewhat different. It is only too easy to 
have irreflexive graphs without global elements, and this is 
clearly related to the fact that 1 is not in the set of generators 
for Graph. Thus Graph exemplifies those topoi with empty objects. 
Graph has nodes and edges as generic elements, whereas RGraph has 
points and edges. The secret of variable sets would appear in 
choosing a topos with the generic elements that one needs.
The fact that topoi are cartesian closed means that any 
topos has the following important analogues to similar 
constructions in Set.
1) Consider in Set, the following diagram
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ev
A
fT |:1where given f:A' >B■>B is the name of f, and
is an exponential adjoint. If! picks out f in {gig:A >B}
(= B^ ), such that the above diagram commutes. Recall (Chap.6 
Def.8) that jfj picks out ( A  x 6  A) (x) which is the rule
X I > (j) (x) defining f. Now these diagrams exist in any topos
E^, and this implies is just good enough to provide the 
codomain of an interpretation with function types and closure 
under application. For example, in RGraph jfj must pick out at
stage C a graph map C X A----- >B, where C is a generic element.
It is obvious at stage 1, jfj picks out f in {g|g:A---- >B} where
g is a graph map. This works with empty objects too. For
example, in Graph I is an empty object, and there is only one
(irreflexive) graph homomorphism (= idj ) from I to I. If we 
picture the object I ^  as
then the name of that unique homomorphism is the map
jidj. 1:1 >I that picks out the node with the only loop.
2) Consider in Set, the following diagram
X
/N
{} X id^
X X’ X ^  ^/iûrC4^ 
where char(4  ) is the character of
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<id ^  ,id^ >:X >X X X (x |--- > <x,x>)
and {} is the exponential adjoint. The function {}:X----->P(X)
is the singleton map sending an element x to {x}. Analogues of
this situation exist in any topos. Thus if P(X) is defined as 
y
,_0_ , then there exists a singleton map {}:X----->P(X). In
RGraph the singleton map at stage 1 sends a node x in X to that
graph map 1 X X >XL in such that node x takes the
value T  and all other nodes take the value J. . An edge e in X
is sent to a graph map I X X > X. in X L  , such that e
takes the value T  and other edges take appropriate values 
depending on how their source targets are related to the source 
and targets of e. Thus the concept of singletons finds an 
appropriate expression in any topos. For example, in Graph, the 
powerset P(I) is the graph ._T1 . This has 4 nodes and 20 edges
and is too elaborate to picture here. However, the singleton map
{}:I----->P(I) can be approached in the following way. If I X  I
is pictured as
then the singleton at stage I sends I to the map I X  .1 >Xi-
which sends the only edge and its source and target to T  and 
the isolated nodes to JL .
In some ways the truth-object in a topos is rather like an 
injective space in topology.
Definition 6 An injective in a category is an object I such that
for every monic m:B—  >A and every arrow f:B >I there is an
arrow g:A — >I such that gm = f. Dually, a projective is an
object P such that for every epi e:A >B and every arrow
f:P >B there is an arrow g:P >A such that eg = f.
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In general it is a difficult task to sort out the injectives and 
projectives in a category. (But clearly 1 is projective and
I
injective in RGraph. 1 is nbt projective in Graph (hint: let B =
1). The following clarifies the status of X I  .
Proposition 5 In a topos X I  is an injective and _XL is an 
injective for any object A.
Proof : ([FR] Prop.2.52, 2.51 pp.31-2).
Essentially, this means that the singleton map {}:X----->P(X)
embeds X into an injective object.
As an example of how one operates with X X  in a topos, 
consider the algebraic structureXI. must carry.
a) We already have a map trueil >XI , which is readily seen as
the character of id : 1----->1.
b) Similarly, after establishing 0^ :0---->1 is monic, we have
false: 1 >X1 as its character.
c) We can establish conjunction as an arrow
A : _Qx _Q  > ü
which is the character of the product arrow
<true ,true>: 1-----> XI  ^ X X  .
d) Similarly disjunction \/ : X l ^ X X   >XI- which is the
character of the image of the coproduct arrow
[<id^ ,true^>,<tru^ , i ^ > ] : X L  +_fl------> X X ^ X X  .
e) Material implication =>: X X  ^ X X   >XX which is the
character of e:Ker(=>)- > X ^ X X  where e is the equaliser
of X X ^ X X .  -.X  J^ X X .  . It will be recognised that the domain of 
e is the partial ordering of elements of X X  .
f) Negation is ] : S 1  >XX which is the character of
false: 1----->XI •
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Proposition 6 X L  Is a Heytlng algebra object, with minimum-L
glven by the Image of false:1----->Jl', maximum T  given by the
Image of true:1 > ü  , and A  , V" , and => as defined above.
Proof :([BW] p.197)•
The reader will recall that a Heytlng algebra is a Boolean algebra 
if (t/ tCjTl ) 1 1  t => t. The Boolean algebras form a subclass
of Heytlng algebras.
The analogues of set-theoretical constructions are now available in 
any topos. Let D be an object in a topos, then we can define 
operations on the collection of subobjects of D as follows.
a) Complements : given a monic f:A >D, the complement of f
relative to D is the kernel of char(f).
b) Intersections : the intersection of monies f:A------>D and
gjB >D is the subobject A O  B------>D which is the kernel of
A ®  <char(f) ,char(g)>.
c) Unions : the union of the monies mentioned above is the monic 
P^ \j B >D with \/o <char(f) ,char(g)> as its character.
However, these set-theoretical operations may differ somewhat from 
ordinary set operations. It is well-known that the algebra of 
subsets is Boolean. In particular, H  A in D is equivalent to A. 
Underscoring the intuitionist character of topos theory, we have
the fact that H  : f l  rarely the identity in a
topos. For example, in RGraph if
0 ----- >  0
D is and A is
then ~~1~} A is
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In general, " 1 1  A is that subobject whose elements are, on 
restriction, in A and A C Z  ”1 1 A but 1 1  A is not contained in
A. Once it is recognised that  >-0. induces
containment then, in general, we can write A => 1 1  A but not
1 1  A => A. Thus the algebra of subgraphs is not classical. At 
stage I the truth-graph only carries the structure of a Heyting 
algebra
in which it can be seen that 1 1  b = T  is its only departure 
from Booleaness. Indeed RGraph is an example of the situation in 
which "... no logic stronger than intuitionistic logic can be valid 
for sets that are varying in any serious way" ([LVJV] p.105). The 
nature of the truth-object can be used to characterise an important 
class of topoi.
Definition 7 A topos E will be called Boolean iff -0. is a 
Boolean algebra, that is ( V  t € X I  ) 1 1  t <=> t.
Proposition 7 For any topos E, the following are equivalent :
a) ^  is Boolean;
b) [true,false]: 1 + 1   > X X  is iso, that is 1 + 1  == A  Z- .
Proof : ([GB] pp.156-7).
It is readily seen that 1 + 1 in RGraph, pictured as
is not isomorphic to the truth-graph. This proposition provides us
•>
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with a clear test of Booleaness. Once it is recognised that the 
Boolean algebras are a subclass of the Heyting algebras, we see 
that the manipulation of constant sets is just a special case of 
the manipulation of subobjects in a topos. A topos is just good 
enough for naive intuitionistic set theory, and a topos theorist's 
abuse of describing objects as sets has considerable justification.
The most important aspect of topoi, however, is that they 
are just good enough to serve as the codomain of an interpretation. 
On the one hand, every topos E has an internal language, denoted by 
L(E). This is constructed in exactly the same way as L(Set)
(Chap.6, Def.8). To be sure, the word 'object' should be 
substituted for the word 'set', and the types 1 and X I  are the 
objects 1 and X I  . Functions must be called morphisms. Where I have 
described characters as taking the value 'true, false otherwise', 
we must take account of the variety of 'inclusions'X^ permits by 
saying 'T  , or some other appropriate value of X X  '. Nothing 
precludes a topos with empty objects having an internal language. 
Empty objects become empty types in L(^). On the other hand, every 
type theory A generates a topos T(A). The details of this will not 
be needed. However, the importance of the topos generated by A can 
be assessed by the following. i
Definition 8 The category Lang has type theories A as objects.
The morphisms are translations. Translations preserve 1, X I  , 
powerset and product formation, and the closure of function types. 
They send closed terms to closed terms of corresponding types so as 
to preserve «, £  , { }, and < > upto provable equality. They send 
variables to variables in a prescribed way : with the i'th variable 
in the domain being sent to the i'th variable in the codomain. They
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send theorems to theorems. For more details see ([LS] p.197). 
Definition 9 The category Topoi has topoi as objects. Morphisms 
are logical functors which preserve 1,-0. , powersets, products, 
and exponentials.
Proposition 8 There is a functor L:Topoi >Lang which sends
every topos ^  to its internal language L(^), and a functor
T;Lang >Topoi which sends every type theory A to the topos,
T(A), generated by it. Furthermore, T is left adjoint to L, and the
counit £  (E):TL(E) >E is an equivalence of categories, that is
TL(E) E.
Proof : ([LS] Theorem 15.4,15.5 pp.204-5).
Actually the above proof only works for a subcategory of Topoi of 
'topoi with canonical subobjects with strict logical functors'. But 
as every topos E is equivalent to one with canonical subobjects, 
namely TL(E) ([LS] pp.201-2), and since the variable sets which 
interest Science are such topoi 'with canonical subobjects' , then 
we ignore these technical complexities. To give details of this 
adjunction would take us too far afield. What is important is the 
uses to which it can be put. Given that T — 1 L, we have the 
scheme Topoi(T(A),E)
Lang(A,L(E)) ,
in which the counit evaluates as an equivalence. Thus Lambek and 
Scott point out that ([LS] pp.123-4) :
"While not every type theory is the internal language of a topos, 
every topos is equivalent to one generated by a type theory ... For 
us, an interpretation of a type theory A in a topos ^  is a morphism
A >L(E) in Lang or, in view of adjointness, a morphism
T(A) in Topoi".
So although only some type theories are internal languages of 
topoi, every type theory can be interpreted into the internal 
language of some topos. Previously I referred to an interpretation 
as a mapping [ ]:H-----> Set. Strictly speaking, an interpretation
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is a translation in Lang from H into L(Set). But since the topos
. !
generated byjL(Set) is equivalent to Set then we are justified in 
taking the chuder approach of a mapping into Set. What Proposition 
8 tells us is that, in principle, we can interpret our theories 
into other topoi, and given that topoi need not be Boolean then 
they are potential targets for an interpretation of an 
intuitionistic type theory.
The interpretation of a type theory into a topos of variable 
sets is, in principle, not different from that of an interpretation 
into Set. Notice that the entailment relation for Set (Chap.6,
Def.9) was defined in such a way as to take no advantage that Set 
does not have empty objects. In classical logic, the presence of 
empty types would correspond to the presence of closed terms which 
do not always have a denotation (so-called free logic). However, it 
has long been recognised by topos theorists that one can obtain a 
set-like predicate logic if one quantifies not over the global 
elements of an object but rather over its generalised elements.
Recall that entailment means that for all arrows h:C >A and for
all sets C where f*:A >X]L = ( \  x G A) ^*(x) and f*.h = true^
then f7,y./-h = true ^  . Since entailment is defined only in terms of 
generalised elements, this syntactical approach can be used for 
variable sets too, with the topos-theoretic abuse that objects are 
just 'sets'. However, it may be more illuminating to recast this 
syntactical approach in terms of interpretation vis-a-vis stages of 
definition through what is called 'Kripke-Joyal Semantics'. 
Definition 10 If (x) is a formula in L(E) in the variable x of 
type A then ^  (x) = f(x) for a uniquely determined arrow 
fjA > XI • For an arrow a:C >A in JE we write (a) is f.a.
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by abuse of notation, and regard a:C >A as a generalised
element of A at stage C. We write C ||------^  (a) for f.a = true q  ,
and say ' ^  (a) holds at stage C* or *C forces ^  (a)». More 
generally, in the presence of a parameter y of type B, if 
0  (y,x) = g<y,x> where g:B X A > X l  then we write (p (y,a)
is g.<y.! ^ ,a>.
The following are consequences of Definition 10.
Proposition 9 If C II-—  0 (a) and hiD— — >C then 
D ||----^  (a.h).
Proof sketch: If C 11 ^  (a) then by Definition 10 we have f.a =
true ^ . Given h:D >C and composing with a, we must have f.a.h
- true • Since true q  .h = true = f.a.h then this means that
D II —  — (a.h).
Proposition 10 |— —x p  (x) in L(^) iff for all objects C and all
generalised elements a:C >A then C ||---- (j> (a).
Proof sketch: I x (p (x) means (Chap.6, Def.9-10) that for all
objects C and all arrows a:C—————>A that f.a = true ^ for a
uniquely determined arrow f:A- >XZ ; that is, by Def.10,
C 1}------- (a). Conversely, suppose C || 0  (a) for all objects C
and all a:C >A, then f.a = true ^  = trueyg .a for all C and
all a:C >A, and so f = true^ ; that is I x (j) (x).
Proposition 11 C ||-- (j) (a) iff I (V z 6 C) (a.z).
Proof sketch : C II—  0  (a) means f.a = true ^ ; that is,
f.a.z = ' T  , which translates to I— z 0  (a.z), or (Chap.6,
Def.5(8)) I ( y  z 6 C) 0  (a.z). Conversely, suppose
I z Cj) (a.z), then by Proposition 10 C II 0  (a).
Proposition 12 If h:D >C is epi and D ||- 0  (a.h) then
C || —  0(a).
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Proof sketch: D (|----0  (a.h) means that f.a.h = true p  . Now
suppose C II 0  (a) then f.a = true ^ and true .h = true p  .
The definition of an epi is that it is right-cancellable (Chap.5, 
Def.10). So if h is epi then f.a.h = true q  .h implies f.a = 
true ^  . The latter simply means C ||— - 0  (a).
Proposition 13 If G is a generating set of objects of E, then
I X 0  (x) in L(E) iff for all objects C in G and all generalised
elements a of A at stage C, then C || (p (a).
Proof sketch: Suppose C ||-- 0  (a) for all C in G and all
a;C >A then f.a = true ^ = true .a for all C and a, and
therefore f = true ^  ; that is j x 0  (x). By Proposition 10, the
converse is evident.
The meaning of Propositions 9-13 is clear. By Proposition 10, truth 
in a topos is equivalent to truth at all stages and for all 
generalised elements and this conforms with the earlier treatment 
of entailment. Proposition 13 allows us to restrict the stages of 
definition to a generating set. Proposition 1 means we can restrict 
these to the representables. So working in RGraph, Proposition 9 
means that truth forced at stage I (= edges) implies truth is 
forced along the restriction of source and target maps to truth at 
the later stage of 1 (= points). Proposition 12 means that truth 
forced at loops implies truth is forced at points. Proposition 11 
means that truth forced at any stage implies truth is forced at all 
later stages. This leads to 'Kripke-Joyal Semantics'.
Proposition 14 (For variable sets)
Given a generic element h:C--->A defined at stage C, then :
1) C II <p (a) iff a = true ^ , when A = X I  .
2) C II b ^  S iff ev(S,b) = true q when a:C---- >P(A) X A is
<S,b>:C----->P(A) X A.
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3) C jl
4) c II
5) c II
6) c 11
7) c II
D II
8) C II
b:D
—  T  always. : 1
  JL never. 1
 0 (a) A (0 (a) iff C II—  0 (a) and C ||—  ijJ (a).
 0  (a) V (a) iff C II 0  (a) or C jj ^  (a).
 (6 (a) => yy (a) iff for ail h:D----->C if
 Cj> (a.h) then D jj ip (a.h).
 ( \/y £  B) y/ (y,a) iff for ail h:D >C and ail
— >B then D |j ijJ (b,a.h).
9) C il ( 3  y £  B) y  (y,a) iff there is an epi. h:D >C and an
arrow b;D >B such that D jj (a.h).
10) C II 1  0  (a) iff for ail h:D---- >C if D (|--- 0  (a.h) then
D ^  0.
Proof : ([LS] pp.166-8, 172-3).
The above constitutes the useful logical machinery for conceiving 
models of any theory with an interpretation in variable sets.
For example, a model of ThC in RGraph would mean that the 
axioms of category theory would have to be forced at all stages of 
definition. Thus models of ThC in RGraph would be graphs in which 
both the sets of points and edges were small categories and in 
which the restriction maps would be functors between them.
Obviously a model of ThC in RGraph consists of two graphs 
corresponding to the types of arrows and objects. So we have as a 
category object in RGraph, a graph of arrows and a graph of objects 
with graph homomorphisms between them for domain, codomain, and 
identity mappings. (Indeed many of our results on variable sets
Q O p
could be extended to such topoi as E —  where £  is a category 
object in E), Again this illustrates a general approach. If H is 
some theory about mathematical objects, then an interpretation in a
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topos £  produces an H-object in that topos. Thus we can have 
natural number, real number, lattice, group, ring, metric, and 
topological space objects in E. Briefly we may say that "... the 
notion of a topos summarizes in objective categorical form the 
essence of "higher order logic" ... with no axiom of 
extensionality. This amounts to a natural and useful generalization 
of set theory to the consideration of "sets which internally 
develop"" ([LWI] p.3). The working mathematician will realise that 
the category of sets admits finite limits and powerset 
constructions. These are the essential tools to carry out all 
mathematical constructions and these are the features of sets that 
are generalised to topoi.
i
In what sense are interpretations valid ? If A is a type
theory and [ ]:A >E is an interpretation into E then, by abuse,
we write [ ]:A----->L(E) as the translation corresponding to an
interpretation, and we call this a model (or interpretation) too. A
standard model is a translation [ ]:A >L(Set), and for a
provable formula p in A we have L(Set) I  Cp] iff ÊÊl 5 P
the Completeness Theorem (Chap.6, Prop.4). Our discussion of 
Taylor's formula in differential calculus with Berkeley's attack on 
Newton and Leibniz shows that, in general, there are not enough 
standard models. Among all the interpretations of A there is the
canonical one, given by the unit nr) (A):A----->LT(A), and we have
LT(A) !____[p] iff T(A) 1 p. Furthermore, for a formula provable
by Kripke-Joyal Semantics we have L(E) I [p] iff â  ' P ([^S]
p.351). If we admit all interpretations then the Completeness
theorem holds trivially, and the unit of T  1 L is initial in the
category of all interpretations. The super-logical reader might 
look for a notion of a model [ ]:A----->L(M), in which the topos M
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resembles Set more closely than an arbitrary topos.
Definition 11 A model of type theory A is a translation
i
[ ];A_____>L(M), in which the topos M (also confusingly called a
'model') has the following properties :
M1) Not M r== _L (no contradiction holds in M).
M2) if M } =  P V  q then either M } =  p or M 1 =  q 
(disjunctive property).
M3) if M }== ( 3  X 6  A) 0  (x) then there is an entity a of type A
(actually an arrow a: 1----->A) such that M '---  0  (a)
(existence property).
The disjunctive property means that 1 is indecomposable; that is, 1 
is not the union of two proper subobjects. The existence property 
means that 1 must be projective ([LS] p.213). Property Ml is only 
there to rule out the trivial topos, 1_, in which 1 is also initial.
For every model M there is a left exact functor :M >S§t,
which sends an object to its set of global elements. When M is 
Boolean then is faithful and we may regard M as a subcategory
of Set ([LS] p.213). Indeed, the import of Henkin's work on 
completeness is that when M is Boolean then there are enough non- 
standard models ([LS] Theorem 17.6, p.216). Such non-standard 
models form 'the actual advances that set theorists and logicians 
have made' (e.g. Cohen on the Continuum Hypothesis and Robinson on 
Non-standard Analysis [DH]). When £  is not Boolean then M is a 
model of intuitionistic set theory. It is easy to see that RGraph 
is such a model, but Graph is not as 1 is not projective. The 
general completeness theorem for higher order logic asserts :
Proposition 15 Given any type theory A, L(M) |--  [p] for a
provable formula p in A iff M {— p for a topos M satisfying 
Definition 11 and all translations [ ]:A----->L(M).
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Proof : ([LS] Theorem 19.1 pp.223-5). \
In the course of this proof, it is established that the disjunctive
and existence properties are metatheorems of intuitionist type
j
theory. Working mathematicians are often content if a formula is 
satisfiable, that is, valid in at least one model. The emphasis is 
on the 'showing'. However, if one wants more from set theory and 
logic then one can always restrict attention to topoi satisfying 
Definition 11.
Given that type theories can be interpreted in a topos, then 
a fairly traditional way to proceed is to formulate some conception 
of 'space' in type theory and to interpret this in some topos to 
exhibit the 'space' objects therein. However, this ignores the 
context in which the notion of a topos was originally introduced by 
Grothendieck as a natural generalisation of that of a topological 
space ([JT3]). Since no discussion of topoi would be complete 
without reference to these topological notions, I give a brief 
outline of some of these ideas to offset them from those cases in 
which a topos actually is a category whose objects are spaces.
A useful starting point is the notion of a geometric
morphism. Recall that for every continuous map f:X -->Y between
topological spaces, it holds that the inverse image of
f~^:0(Y)----->0(X) preserves finite limits and arbitrary suprema of
the lattice of open sets. Related to f:X >Y there is also
another meet and suprema preserving function f^:0(X)----->0(Y)
[U ----> int(Y - f(X-U))] which can be seen as a right adjoint to
f ^, when the complete Heyting algebra of open sets of a space is 
treated as a small category. To generalise this to topoi, we have:
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Definition 12 Let E, F be topoi. A geometric morphism f:F- ->E
consists of a pair (f , f ^ ) of functors f ^  :F.----->£> f ''E.
(called the direct and inverse images of f) such that f --- 1 f ^
and f i s  left exact. F. is sometimes called an E-topos. A 
geometric morphism is said to be essential if f also has a left
adjoint f / :F >E. f is called an inclusion if f ^  is full and
faithful; and a sur.jection when f is faithful.
Proposition 16 If f:E >Set is a geometric morphism then it is
unique.
Proof : ([MI], [JT1] Prop.4.41 pp.119-20).
In fact f is the pair ( /I , ^  ) where is the 'points' functor 
which sends an object X to its set of points E(1,X). The inverse
image A :Set >E is the 'discrete' functor, sending a set X to
the constant set X(A) at each stage A; that is, a set is sent to a 
discrete object in £. It can readily be seen that the pair 
( ^  , ^  ) is a surjection.
The composition f^ .f "^O(Y)----->0(Y) has a number of
interesting properties. Writing j for f^.f , the endofunctor 
j:0(Y)----->0(Y) has for Ü, V open in Y ([VR] p.23):
i) j(Y) = Y;
ii) U Ç  j(U);
iii) j.j(U) = j(U);
iv) j ( u n  V) = j(U) A  j(V).
In topos theory, it turns out that an endomorphism on a complete 
Heyting algebra object satisfying these four properties is very 
fruitful. For example, the reflective subcategories (= subtopoi) of 
a topos are in 1-1 correspondence with such endomorphisms on its 
truth object.
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Definition 13 A (Lawvere-Tierney) topology on X X  is a morphism
-  L
j ; X l  > i i  such that (in the internal language, [VR] p.24):
i) j T  = T  ; 1
ii) ( V t ^ X l  )j.jt = t;
iii) ( V  t,t’ e X X  )j(t A  t') = j(t) A  j(t'); 
or more categorically :
a) j.true = true;
b) j.j = j;
c) j. A = A . ( j x j ) .
There is a partial order on topologies, j £  j' iff { V  t 6-0. ) jt <_
jt', and y  is said to be finer than j.
For example, the following endomorphisms on X X  are topologies.
a) id, t I > t (minimal topology).
b) max, t t > T  (maximal topology).
o) “71 , t I > 1 1  t (double negation topology).
d) t I— > (t V  p) (closed topology).
e) t /— > (p => t) (open topology).
The double negation topology is used in classical mathematics for a 
variety of problems, such as completion and compactification 
([VR]). In the context of Kripke's modelling of intuitionist logic
P
with a topos SetT* (where £  is a partial order of possible 
worlds), one way of reading ”11 ^  is to say that we keep open 
the possibility to prove 0  , or 'it is cofinally the case that 
0  '. Lawvere has suggested a geometric interpretation of j 0  as 
'it is j-locally the case that 0  ' ([LWI]).
The notion of a Grothendieck topology is related to that of 
a Lawvere-Tierney topology :
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Definition 14 A Grothendieck topology on X X  is a subobject 
J C  X X  , such that ([VR] pp.28-9)
i) T  e J;
ii) ( V t  e J)(\/t*£XX )[(t => (t'e J)) => (t'E J)].
Proposition 17 The Lawvere-Tierney and Grothendieck topologies 
are in 1-1 correspondence.
Proof : ([JT1] pp.32-3).
Thus to every Lawvere-Tierney topology j, there is a monic
h:J---- >X X  such that h is the kernel of j, and to every monic
h:J---- > X i  satisfying Definition 14 there is a Lawvere-Tierney
topology char(h) satisfying Definition 13.
For example, in Graph the double negation topology produces the 
graph XX-j-j
as the image of 1 1   >XX » and
is its corresponding Grothendieck topology.
Definition 15 Let m:B >A be a monic, with B'^  as the kernel
of j.char(m), then ([VR] p.32)
a) the j-closure B of B in A is the subtype
{a 6  A! j( 3  b e  B) m(b) = a};
b) B is j-closed if pX = B;
c) m is j-dense if ( V  a &  A)j(3  b G  B)[m(b)=a], that is B is
dense iff B^ = A;
d) A is a .i-sheaf if
( y  X e  A)[j( 3  ! a e  A)(a 6 X => ( H  !a e  A)j(a £  X))] , that is,
A is a j-sheaf iff for any dense monic m:B----->A and for any
f:B >0 there is a unique g:A >C, such that g.m = f.
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A topology will be oalled standard iff all the representables are 
j-sheaves. The finest standard topology is called the canonical 
topology.
Proposition 18 Let j be a topology in E, and m:A----->X a monic,
then m is j-dense iff char(m) factors through J----->X1, and j-
closed iff it factors through X I j  >iX .
Proof : ([JT1] p.78).
This leads to the generalisation of the idea of a sheaf in 
classical mathematics. The following bears no resemblance to the 
usual definition in terms of covers, but is adequate for my 
purposes.
Definition 16 Let £  be a topos and denote the full subcategory of
—  Q O p
j-sheaves by Ej . When E is a category of presheaves SeT" then
E : is called a Grothendieck topos, and the pair (£,J) is called 
— J
its site of definition, where J is the Grothendieck topology 
associated to j.
To be sure, all categories of presheaves are Grothendieck topoi 
under the minimal topology, in which all presheaves are id-sheaves. 
Unsurprisingly we have :
Proposition 18 A Grothendieck topos is an elementary topos, with
the image X X j  of j:XX.-----^ X X  &s its truth object.
Proof : ([JT1] pp.81-3).
Whereas every Grothendieck topos is an elementary topos, not every 
elementary topos is a Grothendieck topos. For example, Fins^, the 
topos of finite sets, is not a Grothendieck topos ([JT1] p.25). The 
motivation for using a Grothendieck topos is fairly simple : one 
tries to choose a topology in which the interesting objects are 
sheaves. To complete the analogy with sheaf theory, it can be shown 
that the inclusion i:EJ ----- >E of j-sheaves into a category of
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presheaves is the inverse image part of a geometric morphism with a
right adjoint L ? ;E >E f called the associated sheaf functor,
J J I
sending a presheaf to a sheaf. If À is a presheaf, then we 
construct its associated j-sheaf Li (A) as follows ([LWI] p.10).
1) Denote the image of the composite A— — > A Z  ------ J
the symbol MA. ^
2) Let char(m) be the character X X j  > X X  of the inclusion
MA C XX j  , then LJ (A) is the kernel of the composite 
j.char(m).
For example, using the double negation topology in Graph, the 
associated sheaf of 1 + 1 can be pictured as
Since L — (1+1) == XX.*t7 then it is clear that Graph —j-j is a 
Boolean topos (Prop.7). In fact this can be generalised. 
Proposition 19 If E is a Grothendieck topos then the subtopos 
E-j'-j of 1 1  -sheaves is a Boolean topos.
Proof : ([FR] Prop.2.62, p.38).
Thus the sense in which topoi might be called generalised 
spaces is captured by defining To£ as the category (not a topos!) 
whose objects are Grothendieck topoi and whose morphisms are 
geometric morphisms. Notice that Top. is a different category from 
Topoi. Whereas a logical functor in Topoi preserves all the logic, 
a geometric morphism is not a 'logical* arrow but a 'continuous' 
functor that preserves the fibrational structure of objects in a 
topos ([BN] pp.27-8). In fact, it can be shown that f' preserves 
a fragment of logic known as coherent or geometric logic ([JT3]). 
Thus Top can be regarded as a generalisation of S£, with
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Grothendieck topoi replacing spaces and geometric morphisms 
replacing continuous maps.
In Top there is a certain confusion between objects and 
geometric morphisms. This is in line with the doctrine that 
adjunctions are the central concept of category theory. This 
confusion will be evident in the following notes on various 
'topological properties' of geometric morphisms; the terminology 
being rather unsystematically borrowed sometimes from properties of 
spaces and sometimes from the properties of continuous maps. The 
following is an important sample of topological notions which have
their analogues in Top.
Definition 16 A geometric morphism f:£ >E is
a) connected if f ^  is full and faithful;
b) hvperconnected iff the unit and counit of the adjunction
 Î ) are both monic (or equivalently f preserves
c) loeallv connected if f is essential (that is, f has a left
adjoint f / :F >E) ;
d) atomic (or smooth) if f ^  is a logical functor;
e) localic if every object of F is a subquotient of one in the
image of f ^  (or equivalently there exists a complete Heyting 
algebra object A (= locale) in E such that F is equivalent to
the canonical topology on E —  ).
f) a innai homeomorphism if there exists an object X in E such that
F ^  E/X.
The notion of connectivity is derived from the fact that if Sh(X)
is the category of sheaves on a topological space X then the unique
morphism ( A  , X  ):Sh(X) >Set is connected iff X is a connected
space ([JT31 p.84). This applies to the notion of local
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connectivity too. Hyperconnectivity is a stronger form of 
connectivity. A localic topos is analogous to Sh(X) in the sense 
that a topological space X is a locale and Sh(X) is the subtopos of
KSet—  for the canonical topology. The 'smoothness* of 'atomic' 
comes from f preserving all the logic. It follows that if E is 
Boolean then F is a topos in which the lattice of subobjects of any 
object is a complete atomic Boolean algebra ([BD]). The notion of a 
local homeomorphism follows easily from the well-known connection 
between sheaves and local homeomorphisms, in which a continuous map
f:X >Y induces a local homeomorphism Sh(X) >Sh(Y) iff it is
a local homeomorphism in the usual sense.
Proposition 20 The following implications hold between the 
notions introduced in Definition 16 :
a) connected A  atomic => hyperconnected => connected => surjective;
b) local homeomorphism <=> atomic A localic;
c) atomic => locally connected.
Proof : ([JT3] p.86).
It is very easy to see that ( A  , ^  ) ; RGraph >Set is
hyperconnected. It follows that RGraph is connected as a Set-topos, 
and ( A , y  ) is surjective. Notice that Graph is connected but not 
hyperconnected.
Proposition 21 Let F be a Set-topos, then A  iSet >F has a
left adjoint (that is, ( A  , Y  ) is essential) iff A preserves 
exponentiation.
Proof : ([BP] Theorem 2,15,16).
In the case of presheaves, it is easily seen that A preserves 
exponentiation since A is full and faithful, that is (X ^ ) ==
A{y)
A  (X) . (In the case of topoi of j-sheaves, a necessary
condition for the preservation of exponentiation would be that the
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constant presheaves were also j-sheaves). It follows that both 
RGraph and Graph are locally connected. The left adjoint to'^  is
the 'components’ functor YTg :F >Set which sends an object X to
its set of connected components. In the case of graphs, this is 
just the connected components of a graph in the usual sense. More
categorically 77^; Set  >Set is given by coequalising the
structural maps of an object X considered as a discrete fibration 
([PA]). We have
x , = = = = | x   > J(„(X)
C o c/
as a coequaliser.
Nevertheless, "... the dictum 'a topos is a generalized 
space' is not entirely free from oversimplification" ([JTg] p.77). 
Whereas interpreting a theory of spaces formulated in type theory 
gives no guidance as to what constitutes a topos of spaces, it is 
also clear that the idea of a generalised topological space as it 
emerges in Top is too broad. How general should the idea of space 
be ? In the case of 'sets', category theory proceeded with a 
strategy of axiomatising the category of sets to reveal a broad 
class of set-like categories. Can this strategy also be used to 
reveal a class of space-like categories appropriate to the needs of 
Science ?
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CHAPTER EIGHT
TOWARDS TOPOI OF SPACES
Reason has always existed, but not 
always in a rational form. Hence 
the critic can take his cue from 
every existing form of theoretical 
and practical conciousness and from 
this ideal and final goal implicit 
in the actual forms of existing 
reality he can deduce a true real­
ity.
Marx to Ruge.
My argument, so far, has pursued two tacks. On the one hand, 
I have argued that, from a mathematical perspective, the most 
powerful representation of the Formal available to Science is type 
theory. In particular, I have remarked that even (what might be 
called) the simple experiments of Galileo require expressions in a 
type theory which is non-classical. Furthermore, through the 
adjunction established by Lambek (Chap.7, Prop.8), an 
interpretation of a valid type theory into some topos is possible. 
This is the passage between the Formal and the Conceptual that 
Science needs (Fig.2) to produce models for supply to Research 
Groups. On the other hand, I have argued that, from the perspective 
of the Philosophy of Science, the constitutive questions of a 
technical cognitive interest stem from a schematization of space, 
time, substance, and causality, in which natural phenomena are 
construed as non-intentional objects whose processes are to be 
explained in terms of a causal connection. The reduction of the 
logic of explanation to that of prediction requires the 
introduction of mathematics as a methodical device with natural
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invariances described geometrically as elements of spaces. 
Furthermore, secondary methodological objectifications constituting 
the practical interest permit the introduction of mathematics into 
the Human Sciences, either in terms of conditional predictions of 
quasi-causal processes or as a reference to 'structure* in some 
good-reason-assay. The time has now arrived to steer a direct 
course, in which the arguments of Philosophy and Mathematics are 
now more closely linked.
There is a certain indeterminacy in the injunction to 
interpret a type theory (even when it has no standard models) into 
some topos. On the one hand, there may well be theories which have 
an interpretation into every non-trivial topos, particularly those 
topoi which are models of set theory (Chap.7» Def.11). On the other 
hand, there may well be theories, such as the theory of synthetic 
differential geometry ([KK2]), where interpretation into an 
arbitrary topos would either be impossible or would not make much 
sense. To resolve this indeterminacy is, of course, one of the 
general tasks of logical and mathematical research. In my view, 
this research is sufficiently advanced to claim that whenever the 
concept of 'space' is embodied in a type theory in a fundamental 
way then interpretation should be into some topos of spaces. By a 
'fundamental way', I mean deictic concepts are involved. By a 
'topos of spaces', I mean a topos in which geometric elements 
cohere. By 'geometric elements', I mean generic elements 
parameterised by some geometric object such as a 'point' or 'path'. 
By 'cohere', I mean that the restriction maps of the topos bring 
together the geometric elements into a recognisable geometric 
object. Thus a topos of spaces is a set-like category in which the 
objects are 'spaces', and what I have said gives some indication
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that such a topos has variable sets as objects with the stages of 
definition indexed by geometric objects, which (by Yoneda) have 
geometric elements. To be sure, I do not mean that every type 
theory of a 'spatial* character can be interpreted into every topos 
of spaces, merely that it should be interpreted into such a topos. 
Thus the idea of a topos of spaces is to limit the possible 
candidates for a 'universe of discourse' in which to interpret type 
theories of a 'spatial' character. In a sense, the idea of a topos 
of spaces is to encode our knowledge of what, in general, a 
category of spaces is.
To clinch my first objective, that topoi of spaces encode 
knowledge arising directly out of the needs of Science, I shall 
argue that :
a) the study of the covariance of observable space-time events 
requires cartesian closure and a covariant approach to variable 
sets;
b) Lawvere's axiomatisation of a class of topoi known as the gros 
topoi of spaces encodes our most general idea of space as 
objects for describing the result of motion;
c) the gros topoi of spaces include the familiar examples of spaces 
used in Science; and that
d) the idea of topoi of spaces is a concept which includes both the 
gros topoi and any topos parameterised by a space (in a gros 
topos) such that objects have geometric figures in them. An 
important class of such topoi are the petit topoi of spaces, 
which are useful for studying many processes of interest to 
Science.
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All our reasoning is mediated symbolically through language.
I shall call the pre-symbolic influx of information into the
processes of reasoning the iconic moment. I purloin this (Peircian)
term from Ricoeur, who argues ([RI] p.189 & 199) that
"... the essential role of the icon is to contain an internal 
duality that at the same time is overcome ... the iconic moment 
involves a verbal aspect, in that it constitutes the grasping of 
identity within differences and in spite of differences, but based 
on a preconceptual pattern. Aristotelian seeing - ’to see the 
similar’ - does not appear to be different from the iconic moment 
... to grasp the relatedness of terms that are apart, is to set 
before the eyes".
I sloganise somewhat when I say the iconic moment relates ’seeing 
as’ and ’saying as’ and underlies the act of interpretation. 
Nevertheless, to reason about the spatial arrangement of objects 
requires geometric knowledge. The iconic moment in such reasoning 
requires the use of the geometric diagram. The material substratum 
of a diagram shares all the relevant features of the objects 
designated in the pattern, so that we can detect a relation of 
resemblance. A diagram denotes the pattern of the objects by virtue 
of the work of resemblance in relating the diagram to the studied 
objects. A geometric diagram refers only to those features which 
relate to the spatial organisation or rearrangement of objects. 
Insofar as physics conducts experiments on non-intentional objects 
in space and time, the geometric diagram is well-suited iconically 
to the study of space-time events where theory can be investigated 
geometrically.
The work of resemblance postulates the importance of 
geometric figures, such as ’points’ to reference location and 
’paths’ to describe motion. Resemblance would be impossible unless 
the ’points’ and ’paths’ cohered in a sensible fashion. Indeed the 
pre-symbolic influx of information into our reasoning processes is
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grasped through the cohesion of the geometric figures. To be sure, 
’points’ and ’paths’ are not the only geometric figures present, 
but they are the most obvious notions to effect the work of 
resemblance. Furthermore, there may be other less obvious notions 
at work such as ’infinitesimal’, ’orthogonality’, and ’dimension’. 
But in my view, it is sufficient for a general notion of ’space’, 
if the reader rests content with the idea of Science needing models 
in which geometric figures cohere.
Habermas’ argument, that the theories of a technical 
cognitive interest are law-like hypotheses which can be "... 
interpreted as statements about the covariance of observable events 
..." ([HA1] p.308), sets up a requirement for geometry and 
mathematics to supply mathematical objects to study that 
covariation. The work of resemblance must match the covariation of 
observable space—time events with geometric objects which permit 
the rational study of covariation. Thus a Science with a technical 
cognitive interest needs a mathematics geared to this covariant 
approach of relating formalised statements of observable events to 
concepts of a spatial or geometric character, which facilitate 
their explanation. To study the covariation of events, I have 
argued that ’points’ and ’paths’ are the basic geometric figures. A 
’point’ references location by virtue of characterising a ’place’ 
which is indivisible (= indecomposable) as it has no parts (= 
subobjects). A ’path’ references an observable (smooth) change in 
location. To be sure, the concept of motion as the presence of a 
body in one place at one time and in another place at another time 
only describes the result of motion, and does not contain an 
explanation of motion itself ([LWC] p.136). However, treating 
’points’ as locations on a ’path’ seems to be an elementary
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prerequisite for the description of the covariation of space-time^ 
events. To move beyond description to an explanation of motion in^  
terms of a technical cognitive interest requires (as Newton saw) a 
characterisation of motion which correctly expresses the continuity 
of time and space as the presence of the same body in two places at 
the same time ([GA2] p.13, [LWC] p.136). This is only an 
irreconcilable contradiction in a classical type theory when (as 
Lawvere puts it ([LWC] p.136)) "... we ignore the metaphysical 
opposition between points and neighbourhoods (introduced by the 
Platonic deification of points and revived by set theory)
Such an opposition between 'points' and 'neighbourhoods' is briefly 
touched upon in Atkin's attempt to construct a covariant approach 
to physical observations. He notes that momentum "... is only well- 
defined if we can somehow attribute velocity to a vertex (= point) 
only" ([ATI] pp.202-3), and yet velocity (in cohomological terms) 
is a map from infinitesimal paths to quantities. Thus we have a 
seeming paradox that velocity is both defined on paths and points. 
In this light, the "... successful development of Newtonian physics 
and the parallel development of the mathematical tool - the 
differential calculus - were not merely coincidental" ([ATI] 
p.203). The development of 'infinitesimals' as the geometric 
figures which permit the study of motion and momentum as the 1
I
presence of a body in two places at the same time is the ...  ^
burden of inventing the differential calculus" ([ATI] p.203). Thus 
whether the purpose is description or explanation. Science sets up 
a requirement for spaces as mathematical objects in which geometric 
figures cohere. To be sure, these remarks apply equally to 
metaphorical redescriptions of objectified or quasi-causal 
processes.
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Unfortunately, this covariant approach to the mathematical 
objects required for Science has not always taken this rational 
form. Lawyere notes ([LWB] p.1) that : 1
"The mathematical background for theories of geometry, analysis, 
and continuum physics is usually considered to be the category of 
topological spaces (Sp) or the category of Banach manifolds (Man), 
with of course an infinite grade of smoothness conditions needed 
(apparently) for various technical theorems".
Lawvere calls the us^ of these categories the contravariant
approach. In fact neither of these categories are topoi. Indeed, it
has long been a source of embarrassment that ^  is not cartesian
closed ([JT2] p.237). The situation with Man is even worse. It is
not even complete} it lacks certain quotients, pullbacks, and
coproducts ([D01] p.66). Yet the use of this contravariant approach
has not always been dominant. Lawvere argues that ([LWB] p.1)
"... two centuries ago, many problems in the calculus of variations 
correctly solved by mathematicians who, rather than defining a 
notion of 'open subset' for their function spaces, took the notion 
of 'path' as basic. Recognising the great importance of 
contravariant concepts such as open set (or real function) does not 
commit us to take these as the defining structure of a notion of 
space-in-general; they can be derived concepts in a theory where 
the covariant concept of geometric figures of some basic types, 
such as path, tangent vector, etc. are taken as primitive ...".
Essentially, Lawvere is urging a return to the covariant approach,
in which variable sets parameterised by geometric figures have the
topos-theoretic advantage of permitting a natural interpretation of
physical theories. These natural advantages include the ease with
which geometical and physically—motivated constructions and axioms,
such as function spaces (with good properties), can be simply
effected - advantages denied to the contravariant approach, which
tends to obscure the simplicity of these constructions.
This absence of well-behaved function spaces in S£ and Man 
is a considerable disadvantage, as a Science with a technical
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cognitive interest has a crucia;! need for ^ cartesian closure in 
obviously scientifically-motivated constructions. For example, in 
order to deal decisively with 'motion* or 'change', we need to 
treat the notion of 'path' or 'movement in the state-space'. So let
E be a cartesian closed category of smooth spaces and smooth
morphisms, and let B be a space in E representing a certain body, 
such as a system of 0-dimensional particles or a 3-dimensional 
fluid or solid body. Let T be a standard 1-dimensional space used 
to measure time, and let M be the ordinary flat 3-dimensional
space. Proceeding naively, we act as if we were working with sets
([LWP]). A motion of B in M can be represented by an arrow
q:B X T------>M, which can be thought of as assigning to each
particle in the body at each time instant the corresponding place 
in M. In the Galilean example, the motion q would be
^1,t^ f“— —^ l6t , 
where the body B is idealised as a single 'particle'. The fact that 
E has to be cartesian closed means that we can construct the space 
, which might be thought of as the space of paths in M. The 
space M ^  then parameterises all possible (and some impossible) 
placements of the body B in the space M, and we can usually obtain 
a functional M — ->M called the centre of mass. However, 
cartesian closure means that we have a diagram :
T
M X T/
q X id-
A
T
M
so that the exponential adjoint q:B >M (obtained through
lambda conversion) assigns to each particle in the body its path in 
M. In the Galilean example, q is defined by the rule
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1 [t l6t ] •
Indeed motion must be expressed in this way if we wish to compose
i T { f  T
it with the differentiation operator M -- -^ ->V , (where V is a
vector space of translations) to obtain the velocity
v:B% T >V. We have the diagram :
T
V y idy
A
V
T
and if V = ( ) ° q, then by inverse lambda conversion v:B X T >V
expresses the velocity of each particle in the body B at any time
instant. Galileo’s falling stone would yield v as
1 f“— —  ^ [t J-— 32tl
and V as
j  t^ f—— 32t.
Furthermore, any coherent science with a technical cognitive 
interest will need to consider the motion in a third way : as a map
—  D
q:T >M , which expresses the time dependence of the placement
of the body in space. We need a diagram
B — ^
A
q X  id 8
T X" B
tv
in which the the twist map tw:T X B >B A T is an isomorphism.
The map q is then just the lambda transform of qotw. Again, 
thinking of Galileo’s falling stone, we have the rule
t [ 1 ——^l6t 1
as defining q.
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In all of these examples, the elementary nature of 
exponential adjointness stresses the need for cartesian closure at 
a simple conceptual level, even before any detailed consideration 
of what the 'smooth' nature of E might be. Indeed, if the category 
of spaces, E, is cartesian closed then unambiguous function space 
constructions exist with the good properties not only for empirical 
description but for explanation in terms of a technical cognitive 
interest. Thus 1 claim that Science needs categories of spaces 
which are (at least) cartesian closed. If we take a covariant 
approach and use variable sets which permit the unambiguous use of 
geometric figures, then our cartesian closed categories will be 
topoi too, suitable for the interpretation of scientific theories.
The definition of a topos of spaces as a topos in which 
geometric elements cohere may be just good enough for a good— 
reason-assay at the philosophical level, but from a mathematical 
perspective it is somewhat unsatisfactory. My argument seems to 
imply that the conceptual basis for topoi of spaces is rooted in 
mathematical experience with variable sets. But are all variable 
sets topoi of spaces, and if not, how are we to distinguish those 
which can be counted as categories of spaces from those which are 
not ? In fact no complete mathematical definition of topoi of 
spaces has yet been achieved. However, it is possible to clarify 
mathematically certain properties a topos of spaces should have. 
Even if we cannot, as yet, give a full mathematical account of 
topoi of spaces as our idea of spaces-in-general, it is possible to 
produce models of (attempts to formalise) the idea. The principal 
starting point for any investigation of topoi of spaces is 
Lawvere's axiomatisation of the gros topoi of spaces ([LWG,LWQ]),
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where the axioms select criteria for defining those topoi, which 
can serve the description of motion as 'change in location'. 
Definition 1 A gros topos of spaces is an elementary topos,
defined over another topos, with an essential geometric morphism
f:E____ >S satisfying the following three axioms :
G1) f ^ : E----- >S has a right adjoint f* :S >E; since f is
essential, we have a string of adjunctions
^  I
f I —  I f — - 1 f  I f *  ;
G2) fj :E— -— >S^  preserves finite products, that is
f , (1) = 1, and
f , (X X Y) f ) (X) X f I (Y);
O « »
G3) f, :E_____>2 sends the truth object X I  to 1, that is
f j ( X I  ) = 1 •
In current scientific practice, _S is usually Boolean and E 
is a Grothendieck topos. For my purposes it is convenient if is 
the honest-to-God category Set, then we can restrict our discussion
to the geometric morphism ( A  » ^ -- — >Set, where JE is a
variable set such as a presheaf category. To be sure axioms G1-G3 
are formulated in the most general way possible to encourage the 
learning and development of mathematics. However, by restricting 
discussion to the case when ^  is Set and JE is a (pre)sheaf category 
then matters are somewhat simplified and readily understood. 
Firstly, ( 4  , à ) is essential when Z\ preserves exponentials
(Chap.7, Prop.21). For presheaf categories, A  is full and
faithful, thus Set" is always locally connected. VJhen E is a 
category of j—sheaves, then it is obvious that the topology will be
for some site in which the constant presheaves are sheaves, since
the constant presheaves are discrete objects ([BP] Theorem 16). We 
have the components functor rfo’l  >Set as the left adjoint to
/\ (Chap.7» Prop.21). In the second place, only has a right 
adjoint if 1 is a representable ([LWQ] p.272, [JM] p.283). This
right adjoint is known as the codiscrete functor :Set >^. It
sends a set X to a codiscrete object; that is, at stage A we have 
for X(A) the set hom( ^  (A),X) with the obvious action on 
functions. If 1 is a representable then E will need to be 
equivalent to a category of sheaves for some standard topology 
(Chap.7, Prop.17). Certain consequences flow from 1 being a 
representable.
Proposition 1 Each representable functor h ^  in a presheaf 
category Set*~ is indecomposable and projective.
Proof : ([LS] Prop.9.2, p.171).
Thus a presheaf category satisfying axiom G1 is a model of 
intuitionist set theory with no empty types (Chap.7 Def.11). 
(Clearly this rules out Graph since 1 is not representable). When E 
is bivalent, that is E(1,X1) ^  2, then E satisfies the stronger 
condition of being hyperconnected, since Y  preserves X I  (Chap.7
Def.l6). Thus with variable sets satisfying G1, there is a string
of adjunctions
 1 A  — I ---1 V  ( or verbally,
components 1 discrete 1 points 1 codiscrete).
To deal with axiom G2, we need the following.
Definition 2 A non-empty category A is called filtered if
a) for every pair of objects A, A' there is a diagram
A  > A" <-- —  A» ;
b) for every pair of parallel arrows f,g:A---- >A* there is an
arrow h:A*----- >A” such that hf = hg.
_A is cofiltered if _A ^ is filtered.
Proposition 2 If Ç  is filtered (dually cofiltered), then
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_  c c®/"
) (^;Set  >Set (dually T7_ :Set  >Set) preserves binary
products.
Proof : ([JT1] Prop.2.57)*
In fact the components functor fulfills the stronger condition of 
being left exact, when £  is filtered (dually cofiltered) ([JT1] 
Theorem 2.58). There is no general condition for a topos to satisfy 
axiom G3. However, as will become clearer, axiom G3 interacts in a 
strong way with axiom G2 to rule out Boolean topoi.
The motivation for these axioms is fairly simple : they 
select the simplest and most basic properties a set-like category 
of spaces-in-general should have. A generalised space as an object 
of Top, fulfilling the requirements of axiom G1, is rather like the 
subcategory of locally connected spaces in S£. Recall that the
forgetful functor U;S£ ->Set, which sends a topological space
to its (carrier) set of points (yes, points are continuous maps 
from the one-point space), has both left and right adjoints : the 
'inclusions' of spaces with the discrete and indiscrete (= 
codiscrete) topology .([D01] p.36). It is well-known that, in 
general, the 'inclusion' of discrete spaces does not have a left 
adjoint. However, such a left adjoint does exist for the full 
subcategory of locally-connected spaces ([ML] p.131). Thus axiom G1 
mirrors an important class of non-pathological topological spaces 
in terms familiar to those taking the contravariant approach. Axiom 
G2 marks the passage to qualitative considerations of path- 
connectedness and homotopy, which are necessary for a covariant 
approach in Science. It is well-known that path-connectedness 
implies connectedness but not conversely ([WA] Theorem 3.4). Thus 
any axiom relating to (local) path-connectedness is a stronger 
condition independent of considerations of (local) connectedness.
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The components functor can certainly be construed as an analogue of 
the path components of geometric topology. It results from 
coequalising the domain and codomain maps (Chap.7 Prop.21) of a 
discrete fibration (= small category); thus it identifies those 
objects of a category which are connected along a path of 
composable forward or backward arrows ([BW] p.10). But to make the 
analogy complete, axiom G2 insists that the components functor 
preserves binary products, since a product space X >( Y implies that 
)7^(X X Y) = X JlJX) ([MS] Theorem 7.1). We interpret
77^(X) as the number of path components of X, and when )1[^(X) = 1 
we say X is (path) connected. Forgetting the topos-theoretic 
aspects for a moment, axioms G1 and G2 together mirror certain 
minimal requirements a category of path and locally connected 
'spaces' should have. However, axiom G3 marks the crucial move to a 
topos (and a cartesian closed category) rather than a category of 
spaces. The truth object X2 of E is a Heyting algebra object in E, 
which in turn means that-XI has the structure of a join 
semilattice (or monoid with zero). In the presence of axiom G2, its 
being connected (G3) implies that Xi. is contractible, in that
^  X
) ( X X  ) = 1 for all X in E ([LWG] p.181). Thus every space X
has an embedding into an injective and contractible space through
pv X
the singleton map {}:X-----> L ([LWG] p.181). Taken together
axioms G2 and G3 imply that JE cannot be a Boolean topos. Since )(g 
has a right adjoint, it preserves all colimits (Chap.5 Prop.3), so 
that ( 1 + 1) = ]%^ ( 1 ) + )(^(1) 1» and 1 + 1 == XI in a
Boolean topos. Note that this does not say that XI cannot be 
contractible in a Boolean topos. For example, the Boolean algebra
- Q 11
156
for the double negation topology on RGraph is contractible, as can 
be seen. What it does say is that one cannot have the components 
functor preserving path and local connectedness and have a 
contractible truth object at the same time in a Boolean topos. In 
practice, variable sets with a non-Boolean truth object are the 
norm in algebraic and differential geometry ([LVJV] p. 106), 
supporting Lawvere's contention that "... no logic stronger than 
intuitionistic logic can be valid for sets varying in any serious 
way ..." ([LVJV] p.105). Thus in the passage from categories to 
(gros) topoi of spaces, axiom G3 forces the logic of these topoi to 
be non-classical.
The gros topoi provide the basic notions of spaces-in- 
general for a Science (with a technical cognitive interest) needing 
to describe motion as a change in location. Axiom G1 captures the 
notion of locally connected spaces with indecomposable and 
projective points to reference location. Whatever geometric figures 
cohere in JE, then axiom G2 makes them cohere in path-connected 
components just good enough to reference change in location.
Finally axiom G3 means that our topoi of spaces will be models of 
non-classical type theory, and enable possibilities which would 
only seem contradictory in the classical case.
Perhaps the simplest category of a space-in-general is 
RGraph. Here points (= nodes with degenerate loops) reference 
location, and edges reference possible movements between points. 
Thus RGraph is the most primitive candidate for a description of 
motion as a change in location.
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Proposition 3 RGraph is a gros topos of spaces.
Proof : Lawvere ([LWG]).
With RGraph we set £  to Set. Of course ( 4  , ^  ) is essential, and 
we have the components functor )(^ as a left adjoint to . Since 
1 is a representable, then 1 is indecomposable and projective, and 
Y  is left exact (Chap.? Def.11) and the inverse image of a 
geometric morphism whose right adjoint is the codiscrete functor
V  «Set >RGraph. It sends a set X to the codiscrete graph,
where the points are the elements of X and there is exactly one 
edge in each direction between every pair of points. Thus RGraph 
satisfies G1. The components functor J7o just the connected 
components of a reflexive graph in the usual sense (Chap.?,
Prop.21 ff.). It is easily seen that 1 is connected ( TT^(1) = 1). 
Indeed connectivity is preserved in products.
For example, the product
0
X —
is preserved under the action of components. It is easily seen that
Mhr? _  4 Of
Set" == Set — / == RGraph satisfies axiom G2 since M(2) is
cofiltered, with every arrow from I to 1 as a retraction. Finally,
it is obvious that the truth graph is connected and contractible, 
satisfying axiom G3.
The last Proposition suggests the following.
Proposition 4 Categories of generalised graphs Set~ ' ^ for
0
7>
M(ry^—  y J 
for D > 1 areT > 2, and categories of simplicial sets Set 
gros topoi of spaces.
Proof : ([LWQ]).
Indeed it is readily seen that a change in parameter, T in the case
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of graphs and D in the case of simplicial sets, would make no 
difference to the proof of Proposition 3* Thus we have many 
examples of gros topoi, with fibred products and quotient 
constructions with exactness properties similar to those in the 
naive category of constant sets. Indeed, as Lawvere argues ([LWB]
p.2) :
"The axiomatics at the category level is also valuable because 
there are many related categories which immediately come up. For 
example, if E is a gros topos of spaces and G is a group in E while 
B is an object of E then the categories jE/B of B-parameterized 
families of spaces, of actions of G on spaces in £, and E ^  /B
(of central interest to bifurcation theory) are all categories 
which satisfy the same axioms as E, as does (a reasonable 
determination of) the category of all objects of E equipped with 
affine connection."
Thus, for those wishing to take the covariant approach, there are 
many topoi meeting the stringent requirements of axioms G1-G3, 
which distinguish the gros topoi from variable sets in general.
The availability of gros topoi of spaces for a covariant 
approach is not quite the same thing as saying that Science needs 
them, even if it is admitted that a covariant approach is suitable 
for Science. Much of current mathematical practice takes the 
contravariant approach using objects and morphisms drawn from Sj^  
and Man. However, I claim that the non-pathological spaces and 
manifolds (and their morphisms) useful for Science can be included 
in some gros topos of spaces. If it is admitted from a logical 
point of view that it is better to be in a topos rather than in an 
arbitrary category, and if in practice physicists and engineers 
continue to argue naively as if they were in the category of sets, 
then I claim that the rational form of the notion of space-in­
general (suitable for describing the motion of moving matter) is 
embodied in the concept of the gros topoi of spaces. Science needs 
the gros topoi, in that it needs always to find the rational form
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for its conceptions. ■
; j
The most useful objects of for Science are the sequential
spaces which permit notions of 'symbolic dynamics', where points
reference states-of-affairs and sequences of points reference
trajectories of objectified processes. As Isbell puts it "...
sequential spaces seem to suffice for 'geometric topology' ..."
([IS] p.197). Here, categories like Set—   ^ come into their own,
where an 'edge' at stage I has T arrows to the points at stage 1.
These 'edges' can represent 'paths' or 'trajectories'. The T arrows
send the 'edge' to the t'th point on the 'path'. It is tempting to
set T to the cardinality of an infinite but countable set, to
obtain the category Set~ . However, Set is too large ,
for clearly such variable sets may include sequences of elements
which are not sequences in the topological sense. Nevertheless,
Johnstone shows ([JT2]) that, by the simple expedient of endowing
Set~^^ ^   ^with the canonical topology, one can obtain a topological
topos, denoted by Tsp., in which a topological space can be
associated with a sheaf in a subtopos of Set . The generic
figure 1 is the one—point space. The set of points of the generic
~h
figure I (modulo the canonical topology) is the set N = N IV 
{ Oo }, where N is the set of natural numbers. N is endowed with 
the topology of one—point compactification of the discrete space of 
natural numbers. Thus, (the Karoubi envelope of) M ( W  ) can be 
embedded (by Yoneda) in Tsp_ to obtain the full subcategory of Sp_ 
consisting of n'^ and 1. Indeed, the monoid of endomorphisms on N 
is just the action of M ( W  ). It is now possible to define a
functor H:S£ >Tsp, which sends a topological space X to its
sets of points at stage 1 and to Sp(N ,X) at stage I. Thus the set
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of convergent sequences in X are regarded as figures at stage I, 
and the points of X are the generic figures at stage 1. The T i 
arrows from X(I) to X(1) identify the t'th point of the convergent 
sequence, and the single arrow from X(1) to X(I) picks out the 
constant sequence equal to the t'th term. From a covariant point of 
view, the cohesion of these spaces comes from identifying the t'th 
point of a generalised edge called a 'sequence of points' by 
topologists.
Proposition 5 The functor H:£p_ >Tsp is faithful; and it is
full when restricted to the subcategory of sequential spaces.
Proof : ([JT2] Lemma 2.1).
I do not have the space here to give a full survey of Johnstone's 
results. However, Tsp contains all the first—countable spaces, and 
hence metric spaces. Since the sequential property is inherited by 
quotients, then every quotient of a metric space is sequential and 
thus an object of Ts£ ([JT2] pp.240-1). However, unlike the 
categories of topological and sequential spaces, Tsp has all the 
good properties of being a (gros) topos. For an explicit account of 
the site of definition and the bivalent nature of X %  , the reader 
is referred to the lengthy details ([JT2]) needed to fully 
comprehend the construction of this topos. However, two points are 
worthy of attention. Firstly, one of the attractions of this topos 
is that the Dedekind real number object is just the reals with the 
usual topology ([JT2] Prop.4.4). Thus all those constructions in 
topology requiring the reals with the usual topology may find their 
rational form in Tsp. Secondly, an even deeper result is : 
Proposition 6 There is a geometric morphism, actually a 
surjection, r;Tsp >Set—  , such that
a) if K is a simplicial set, r"^(K) is the geometric realisation of 
K (considered as a sequential space and hence as an object of
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Tsp); and ;
b) if X is a sequential space, (X) is the singular complex of X.
i
Proof : ([JT2] Theorem 8.1). j
It seems to me that one of the subterranean ideas in algebraic 
topology is that singular complex and geometric realisation are 
adjoint functors. With Proposition 6 they are actually direct and 
inverse images of a geometric morphism between two gros topoi of
spaces. Thus spatial notions which are usually developed
contravariantly are easily construed as objects and arrows in a 
gros topos of spaces, with the advantage that we can talk (and 
refer covariantly to objects) with the internal language of Ts^.
The construction of the topological topos provides the basic 
insight into the construction of another interesting gros topos due 
to Lawvere. He was interested in finding a covariant definition of 
topological spaces suitable for studying the foundational problems 
of continuum mechanics. He argued that the important feature of a 
space is the set of continuous paths which can be followed in it 
([LWB]). He therefore sought to establish the notion of 'path’ as a 
generic figure. Lawvere's topos (denoted by Law) is rather like 
Tsp, in that the canonical topology is placed on the generalised 
graphs of Set— ^, where T is now the cardinality of the 1 
continuum. Thus the figure I might now be thought of as the unit 
interval [0,1], with a monoid of continuous endomorphisms on it,
• such that the points 1 >I are the points of [0,1] in the usual
sense. The figure 1 is, of course, the one-point space. Thus, for 
any space X, the set Path(X) of continuous paths is a right M-set 
for which all the M-sets are sheaves. Essentially, we have a 
faithful functor Sp— — ->Law (X H---> Path(X)), which "... is full
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on a reasonably large subcategory of £2 (which includes, for \
example, all the C-W Complexes and all the topological manifolds) , Î
..." ([JT2] p.239). In Law, the maps I X I >I are just the |
usual continuous functions of two variables ([LWQ] pp.275-6),
"... which is mildly surprising, but not too difficult to prove. / 
The corresponding statement for the monoid of smooth (= 0  ) self
maps of the line is surprising (once one realizes that one has to 
show that all the higher formally defined partial derivatives are 
the actual partial derivatives so in particular commute) and rather 
difficult to prove (see [LWB],[FK]). Having calculated Y , even
more interest attaches to the natural path functionals Y -^---->Y.
In both of the examples mentioned, the real line R determines an 
object ... with just the reals as points by defining its elements 
... (at stage) ... I to be just the continuous (resp. smooth) paths 
in R. Since multiplication is continuous it gives rise to a 
morphism R X R—————)R ... and hence to a left action R R by 
(a.f)(x) = a(f(x)). Thus (in the smooth case) one can look for the
object of linear functionals
R iZ
Lin ^  (R >R) ^ --- ^ R »
whose points are just the morphisms I :R'^   >R ...".
Nowhere is the connection between a gros topos as variable sets and
a covariant approach in Science, requiring just such paradigmatic
figures as 'points' and 'paths', as explicit as this.
The gros topoi, discussed so far, have one thing in common; 
they are graphs or subtopoi of generalised graphs, in which the 
topology is standard in order to preserve discrete objects. The 
representables form a full subcategory (of two objects) of the 
spaces being modelled. All this suggests taking some full 1
subcategory C (including 1) closed under the formation of subspaces 
of some concrete category of spaces £, and then with the aid of 
some standard topology studying the resulting category of j-
sheaves. There is always a faithful functor H:Z >E j which is
full when restricted to £, and generally full on a much larger 
subcategory of Z, Obviously, this programme can have its 
difficulties : a site of definition could be large and unwieldy,
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and it might be difficult, in practice, to compute anything j 
directly about it. Nevertheless, this is a convenient route jfor the 
study of differential geometry. Kock's book ([KK2]) develops!the 
theory of synthetic differential geometry from a topos-theoretic 
viewpoint, which is just differential geometry in terms of set-like 
reasoning. This is a vast subject and cannot be entered into in any 
detail here. Nevertheless, I wish to draw the reader's attention to 
three elementary aspects of models of this theory. Firstly, that 
models of the theory are variable sets also satisfying the axioms 
for a gros topos. Secondly, that the usual categories of manifolds 
(used extensively in the Sciences) can be embedded in such a topos. 
And thirdly, that these variable sets possess a distinguished 
object (= space) of infinitesimals suitable for reasoning about 
differential calculus in a non-classical fashion.
Reyes seeks models of the theory in variable sets of the
QOf>
form Set—  , where £  is a category of (small) rings ([RY]). The 
objects of £  are quotient rings of the form (R^)/I, where
cOO(R'yi) the ring of smooth functions R ^  >R, and I is a
germ-determined ideal. That is, fiR^^---- >R is an element of an
ideal I, such that for all p 6 R there exists an open 
neighbourhood Vp around p with functions g and h 6 (R^ ), where
f = g + h, g 6 I, and h vanishing on Vp ([KK2] pp.230-1).' 
Intuitively we think of the pair (n,I) as the locus of the set of 
equations f(p) = 0 for f e  I. If A = C^(R^^)/I and B = C~(R*^)/J
are rings in £, a morphism B >A in £  is the dual of a ring
homomorphism A >B which is induced by composition with a smooth
function r"^-----> R ^ . Explicitly, a morphism [ Çl ]:B; >A in £
is an equivalence class of smooth functions 0  : R ^ ----->R^, such
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that for all smooth f:R*^----->R, f <2 J implies f. ^  ^  I;
Any two such functions ^  and ^  * are equivalent if for all
projections p^ : R ^  >R (i = 1,...,m) then p^.{^ - p^ '. ^  ’ 6- I.
In fact £  contains all isomorphic copies of rings of the form 
C^(U)/I where U is an open subspace of some Euclidean space R ^  
and I is a germ-determined ideal. To be sure, a full understanding 
of the construction of £  depends on a good grounding in commutative 
algebra and algebraic geometry. However, for the purposes of this 
thesis all that is essential is an intuition into the idea that a 
category £  of small rings can be founded as the domain of 
contravariant Set-valued functors. Strictly speaking, these 
presheaves are not altogether a good model for reasoning about 
differential geometry. Actually, a standard (but not canonical) 
topology (known as the open cover topology) is required for a range 
of technical reasons which are beyond the scope of these notes 
([KK2] Chap. 3.7). I shall denote the open cover topology (in the 
sense of Lawvere-Tierney) by j, the topos Set j by Smooth, and 
the site of definition by (£,J), where J is the Grothendieck  ^
topology associated with the open cover topology.
Now the topos Smooth is an example of a gros topos (see 
[KK2] pp.292-3). Reyes quite specifically gives details ([RY] p.76) 
of the discrete and codiscrete functors which are adjoint to the 
points functor (axiom G1). Proofs that Smooth satisfies axioms G2
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and G3 require extensive development of algebraic and differential 
geometry which is beyond the scope of these notes. However, some 
pointers that Smooth does satisfy these axioms,^  will be mentioned in
what follows.
/
Now the site (C,J) contains copies of all compact manifolds. 
Basically we work with the following diagram of functors:
Yoneda
(C,J) Smooth
Man
in which the functor s sends a compact manifold to a j-sheaf in
Smooth. The full and faithful functor :Man >(£,J) sends a
manifold M to the set of smooth functions M >R, and denoted by
(M) ([KK2] Chap. 3.5). Now the image of C^°(M) in (C,J) is a 
subcategory of finitely presented rings in (C,J), which on 
composition with Yoneda yields the full and faithful functor
s:Man >Smooth ([KK2] pp.216-8). Not only is the functor s a
full embedding, but it has the excellent qualities of preserving 
products, (transversal) pullbacks, partitions of unity, finite 
intersections of open subspaces, open covers, compactness, and 
connectedness ([KK2] Part3, [MR] p.65). In turn, the preservation 
of products and connectedness of manifolds when embedded in S moo^  
gives a pointer to the importance of axiom G2. In particular, in
Smooth we have smooth spaces like:
1 = s(R^ ) the generic point,
L = s(R) the smooth geometric line, and
[0,1] = s([0,1]) the smooth unit interval.
Of course, differential geometry in Smoo;^ is not quite the same as
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differential geometry classically conceived, ifor Smooth contains
r
not only 'constant quantities' such as 0, 1, TT , (defined at
1
stage 1), but also 'variable quantities' (defined at other earlier 
stages) as well. Nevertheless, Smooth is 'well-adapted' to study 
the 'analytical' differential calculus for manifolds, for the real 
number object is the type of smooth geometric line. From this 
perspective, manifolds are objects in a topos and it is now 
possible to rationally reconstruct classical differential calculus 
in terms of set-theoretic reasoning ([KK2]).
For instance. Smooth has useful structure available that 
only degenerates in the classical context. For example, the 
subobject D of L defined (in the internal language) by
D = {d 6 L I d.d = 0} 
is the type of first-order infinitesimals. This is somewhat 
different from the one-point space (which is the only nilpotent in 
the classical case), as can be illustrated by the fact that 
functions from D correspond to tangent vectors. For every manifold 
M there is a canonical isomorphism relating to the tangent bundle 
T(M), that is s(T(M)) Sï (s(M))^ ([RÏ] p.76). We can picture an
element of s(M) as
on a suggestion from Kock and Reyes ([KR] p.194); ia which an 
infinitesimal is ... a certain definite (but small) piece of the 
line ...' associated to a point m in M. The first principles of 
differential geometry revolve around showing that any element (= 
function) in is a straight line.
Proposition 7 Smooth satisfies
( V  g ^ )( 3  !b L)( V  d ^ D) g(d) = g(0) + d.b
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T> ; ^
such that L L X L. ;
Proof : ([RY] p.78, [KK2] pp.3-6).
Of course, the Dedekind reals in Set fail to satisfy the formula of 
Proposition 7. But the line object L and the infinitesimals D in 
Smooth do meet these elementary requirements. Kock points out that 
Proposition 7 is ([KK2] p.6) :
«... incompatible with the law of the excluded middle. Either the 
one or the other has to leave the scene ... this means that the 
logic employed is 'constructive' or 'intuitionistic'. We prefer to 
think of it just as 'that reasoning which can be carried out in aJJ^  
sufficiently good cartesian closed categories'."
The incompatibility of the law of the excluded middle with
Proposition 7 is a pointer to the significance of axiom G3. Thus
this gros topos provides a universe of discourse to confound Bishop
Berkeley.
The axioms of gros topoi seem to encompass all the familiar 
examples of 'spaces' known to Science. Thus the idea of space-in- 
general finds a rational form in such topoi as RGraph, T^, Law, 
and Smooth. All these topoi are models of axioms G1-G3. To be sure, 
these topoi differ in that some of them meet further axioms of 
relevance to Science. However, the important point is that the gros 
topoi englobe the study of geometrical objects. It would be 
possible to argue that the gros topoi have the features relevant to 
Science with a technical cognitive interest, and that a scientist 
could effect all his calculations in such a topos. However, this 
seems unduly restrictive, and the following examples provide 
grounds for exercising some caution here. Firstly, a localic topos 
cannot be a gros topos since it cannot satisfy axioms G2 and G3 at 
the same time ([LWG] p.182). Secondly, Graph fails to satisfy 
axioms G1 and G2 ([LWG] p.183). In the first case, localic topoi
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(in their guise as sheaves on a topological space) have been used 
extensively in mathematics since 1945 ([GY]), and have been 
successfully transferred to modern physics. For example, the 
twistor theory of Penrose rests heavily on the theory of sheaves 
for operational reasons, since physical theories are never 
perfectly localised. Indeed, the logic of twistors is 
intuitionistic, usually determined by the Heyting algebra of open 
sets of the 2-sphere ([JZ]). In the second case, irreflexive graphs 
have been used successfully by mathematical sociologists. Thus, in 
practice, scientists can be found using topoi which do not meet the 
requirements for a gros topos.
Nevertheless, I claim that these scientists are using a 
topos of spaces, in the sense that these (non-gros) topoi have 
objects in them in which geometric elements cohere. Thus, in the 
case of the sociologists, irreflexive graphs have recognisable 
geometric elements such as nodes and edges; and in the case of the 
twistor theorists, precise global points are required as well as 
neighbourhoods for quantised events. Yet in all these cases, the 
scientists are using a topos parameterised by an object from a gros 
topos of spaces. For example, the twistor theorists are using a 
localic topos parameterised by a space (= 2-sphere) which may be
considered as a Heyting algebra object in Law; and it can be shown
(as below) that the sociologists are using a topos (Graph) 
parameterised by the 'generic' loop in RGraph. Thus we are lead to 
define a topos of spaces either as a gros topos or a topos
parameterised by objects and morphisms in a gros topos.
The appearance of non-gros topoi of spaces should not be too 
surprising. Lawvere puts it in a Hegel-like fashion ([LWQ] p.261 &
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;p.262) :
(«... 'Being is doing', and hence particular being is known (at 
ileast partly) by what it can do. If B is an object in a 'gros' 
itopos ^  of cohesive active sets, what it can do is to continuously 
parameterize and dynamically act on mathematical structures ... I 
have used the term 'space' as short for cohesive/active set; 
already in Grassmann it was clear that space is generated by, and 
lays the foundations for, motion and hence general spaces have 
aspects of both."
Whereas a gros topos is a category of active/cohesive sets, with 
the emphasis on the 'active' aspects of motion (= (say) the monoid 
action on figures at stage I), it is possible to conceive of 
categories of cohesive/active sets, in which the emphasis is on the 
'cohesive' aspects of spatial organisation. One such class of 
categories emphasising 'cohesion' rather than 'action' is the petit 
topoi of spaces.
Definition 3 A petit topos of spaces is an elementary topos,
S g(B), where f;E >S is a gros topos of spaces and B is an
object of E, such that S ^ .(B) is the full subcategory of the slice 
topos ^/B, consisting of all objects E in E/B such that the 
following diagram is a pullback :
Where ^  is understood, we write ^(B). The topos _S(B) is conceived 
as a special class of variable sets varying over B. If B is the 
discrete fibration associated to B, such that E -  == E/B, then 
E ^ Çy S(B) ; where R(B) is the reduced category associated to 
B. Essentially, R(B) is the same category as B, but in which the 
only endomorphisms are the identity maps ([LWQ] pp.295-7) • The
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point of this mathematical manoeuvre is to ensure that the objects 
in ^(B) have discrete fibres (yes, something 'active', like 
particle spin, is being forgotten). For example, if ^  is RGraph and 
B is the special case
then the topos Set(B) is equivalent to the category of bipartite 
graphs. Generalising this to any B in RGraph, then the topoi Set(B) 
might be thought of as categories of B-partite graphs ([LWG]).
Given a morphism g:B >B' in RGraph, the topoi Set(B) behave
with excellent functorial comportment, in that objects of such 
topoi can be transported 'continuously' from Set(B) to Set(B'), and 
vice-versa. Indeed, (g ,g ^  ) is an essential geometric morphism 
([JT1] Theorem 2.34). Furthermore, it can be shown that if L is the 
'generic' loop
then those L-labelled graphs (sending all non-degenerate loops and 
edges to the single non-degenerate loop of L) form the topos Set(L) 
(of L-partite graphs) which is equivalent to Graph ([LWG] p.185). 
Clearly under this definition. Graph is a simple example of a 
petit topos, in which the objects vary over the 'generic' loop.
We can conceive of categories Petit(E,S), in which the 
objects are the petit topoi ^(B) where B is any object of a topos
of spaces •>S^ , and the morphisms are geometric morphisms.
Clearly under this definition ^(1) =V just as JE/1 If E is
RGraph then the topos of 1-partite graphs (or points), Set(1), is 
equivalent to Set. This makes Set an example of a generalised 
space. However, it is instructive to invert the usual way of
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looking at things, and consider Set as derived from some When 
the scientist passes from studying his usual variable sets to some 
constant sets he is usually freezing some variation. As Lawvere 
puts it ([LWC] p.136) :
"Every notion of constancy is relative, being derived perceptually 
or conceptually as a limiting case of variation and the undisputed 
value of such notions in clarifying variation is always limited by 
that origin. This applies in particular to the notion of constant 
set, and explains why so much of naive set theory carries over in 
some form into the theory of variable sets."
Clearly no harm can come through using Set (in the inversion of the 
usual way of looking at things) in which we pass from variable sets 
to constant sets and back again. However, we might not wish to 
think of Set as a generalised space in isolation from its role in 
Petit(E,Set). If Set is construed in splendid isolation from this 
framework then there are obvious dangers in forgetting the 
'geometry* underlying the 'points'. One way of looking at the 19th 
Century development of Analysis is to (anachronistically) think of 
it as living in Set (D-
The class of petit topoi is one (rather important) way to 
associate an object of a gros topos with a topos to obtain a topos 
of spaces. It is perhaps a paradigm of future attempts to broaden 
the concept of a topos of spaces, by loosening in a disciplined 
fashion the stringent requirements of a gros topos. However, I feel
that enough has been done to illustrate that we can produce models
of (attempts to formalise) the notions of a topos of spaces, and 
have good ideas about their prospective developments. In
particular, the claim made in Chapter 4 that the conceptions of
space required by the Human Sciences are essentially no different 
from that required by the Natural Sciences has been fully 
substantiated. Whereas a natural or quasi-causal scientist will
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emphasise the 'active' aspects of (metaphorically redescribed) 
motion, a research worker in the Human Sciences (with a good- 
reason-assay in mind) may only need to emphasise the 'cohesive' 
aspects of 'structure' and so a petit topos may be adequate for his 
needs. However, there can be no hard and fast rule here. The choice 
of the topos (of spaces) will depend on the model-theoretic job it 
will be required to fill.
Few scientists these days will concur with the savage 
Duhemian rejection of models ([HE2]). One cannot remain frozen in 
the Formal. The Conceptual is needed also, even though most 
scientists "... do not regard models as literal descriptions of 
nature but as standing in a relation of analogy to nature" ([HE1] 
p.201). One understands the world through metaphorically 
redescribing it with the model. Of course, one can interpret a type 
theory into the topos generated by it. But this is constructed 
linguistically and is not necessarily a topos of spaces. An 
interpretation, properly conceived, is a logical functor from the 
topos generated by the theory into such a topos of spaces. Even the 
relationists (Chap.4) have some foothold in the Conceptual with 
their idea that space is a network or lattice of relations. Of 
course, these relational notions are notoriously unclear. Perhaps 
we might pursuade them that this network should take the form of a 
small category. In this case their network of relations could take 
the form of variable sets. If we were more insistent, we might 
pursuade them that these variable sets were (gros) topoi of spaces, 
and that their abstract set of relations were the same as the 
'concrete' spaces of the Newtonians. Ontological issues apart, the 
rational form of space is as a variable set in which geometric 
elements cohere.
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If formalised fragments of scientific discourse are to be 
cast in terms of type theory, and if such theories elucidate 
relations between elements construed as geometric figures, and if 
theories must be interpreted in an elementary topos, then it might 
be thought unsurprising that interpretation must be in some topos 
of spaces, in that such topoi are categories in which geometric 
figures cohere. Nevertheless, there are examples of scientists 
attempting to understand notions involving spatial ideas with 
mathematical concepts which are NOT drawn from any topos of spaces. 
Perhaps this might be taken as empirical evidence refuting my first 
objective. 1 do not think this proposition can be seriously 
entertained. On the contrary, 1 believe that when we examine such 
examples, we are likely to witness troublesome mathematical and 
logical difficulties, and a struggle to realign the mathematical 
ideas in terms of some topos of spaces. From the perspective of my 
first objective, this is understandable. If topoi of spaces encode 
our knowledge of space, then there is a mathematical and logical 
compulsion to realign our mathematical ideas with them.
To support this argument, 1 shall outline two studies in the 
realignment of mathematics drawn from my own research interests. 
Perhaps my own experience is untypical. Nevertheless, 1 was 
somewhat surprised to find such support so readily to hand.
Possibly the reader might find other examples drawn from their own 
research experiences. My two studies focus on .
1) Varela's use of a calculus of self-reference for studying the 
autonomy of autopoietic systems in the Biological Sciences; and
2) Atkin's use of some concepts of algebraic topology in the Social 
Sciences.
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Both Varela and Atkin are scientists with rich imaginative ideas. I 
shall not attempt to engage in any detailed critique of their work, 
or to explore the plenitude of interesting philosophical, 
scientific, or mathematical ideas that may stem from any serious 
consideration of their work. This would take us too far afield. 1 
shall deliberately restrict my reflections to questions regarding 
the realignment of their mathematical conceptions with topoi of 
spaces. It is no part of my argument that either Varela or Atkin 
(or their coworkers) were necessarily concious or self-reflective 
about the realignment of their conceptions with some topos of 
spaces. But it is a part of my argument that they are logically 
compelled to do so. On the other hand, if research groups are 
concious and self-reflective about the knowledge encoded in topoi 
of spaces, then this should lead to a rapid diagnosis of any 
mathematical difficulties caused by not being in such a topos.
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CHAPTER NINE
VARELA AND SELF-REFERENCE 
IN BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
Varela's requirement for a conceptual analysis of self­
reference in biological sytems stems from his studies of the 
lymphoid network. Contemporary interest in the immune system 
postulates the existence of a biochemical network resulting from 
the action by determinants of antibody molecules. Varela argues 
([VA] p.221) that :
"It is misleading to view the activity of individual clones in 
isolation, because once the first (antigen-binding) antibodies are 
formed, they generate anti-antibodies (anti-idiotypic), which in 
their turn would generate anti—anti—antibodies, and the process 
would grow in an everbranching tree involving the whole lymphoid 
system. It is obvious, therefore, that the system exhibits closure, 
which modulates the magnitude of this process; in other words, at a 
certain point this cascade of stimulating reactions must start 
'biting its own tail' and leave the system in a new state of 
equilibrium."
Thus Varela proposes that the immune system be regarded as an 
autonomous unit; that is, as a network of cellular interactions 
that at each moment determines its own identity. Cellular 
interactions give rise to the connectivity of the lymphoid network, 
which consists of the totality of the lymphoid tissue. The study of 
specific immune response against the huge variety of specific 
antigens is viewed as the response of a 'system-whole' to 
environmental perturbation. The 'organisation' of the system 
exhibits cumulative effects as an 'everbranching' process, which 
must be 'closed' to obtain a new state of equilibrium (or 
behaviour). Since the 'everbranching' process of causal effects is 
closed, then the 'system-whole' must 'bite its own tail'. The
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latter is called self-reference or re-entry
: i'
Some insight into Varela’s perspective can be gained from 
Eigen’s work on the hypercycle. Eigen studied the successive steps 
of stability in biochemical interactions through a system of non­
linear differential equations derived from non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics. Selective pressures are brought to bear in the 
processes of molecular evolution. The circular concatenation of 
processes is called the hypercycle, and is postulated as the unit
of selection in early life ([VA] p.28). Of course, Eigen’s work is
not equivalent to a formalisation of an autonomous system. Starting 
from a need to use the differentiable approach, Eigen concentrates 
on the network of interactions and their temporal invariances, and 
deliberately disregards the way in which these reactions constitute 
a unit in space. Nevertheless the hypercycle, as a biochemical 
process of ’biting its own tail', is an example of a self-
referential process. It is to the logic of self-referential
processes that Varela turned.
Varela thought that he had found a general mathematical and
I
logical language in Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form ([SB]). He
I
developed a calculus of self-reference as an extension to Brown’s
work, and thought that this could not only illuminate the
/
philosophical language, which his biological studies required, but 
also act as a very general test bed for ideas about self-reference 
in biological systems. He never intended the calculus as a 
realistic representation of any biological process. Unfortunately 
Varela’s calculus exhibited various logical difficulties. In joint 
work with Goguen, he redefined the calculus in terms of an object 
in a cartesian closed category ([VG]). Essentially, Goguen drew on
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contemporary work in the theory of computation and fixed-point 
algebras in modal logic ([SY]), to realign Varela's notions with a 
special class of cartesian closed categories, in which an infinite 
sequence of algebraic processes (= biochemical interactions) could 
be identified with a fixed-point or limit. Thus many of Varela's 
ideas could now be discussed in terms of the properties of a 
cartesian closed category, functionals, and elements of objects. 
Much of the discussion about Goguen's realignment of Varela's 
calculus has centered on his formation of objects, which can be 
regarded also as models of the lambda calculus. However I shall 
focus on an overlooked aspect of their work; that is, the objects,
to which Goguen refers, can also be construed as variable sets or
objects in a topos of spaces. Indeed we would need to think of them 
in this fashion, if we desired to theorise using type theory.
Brown's Laws of Form are concerned with the basic act of 
making a distinction against the backcloth of some indicational 
space. His Calculus of Indications (01) has two indicational 
constants :
a) ; and
b) , or the empty space, which will occasionally be written
as the underscore _  , for clarity.
Brown's two axioms for these indicational constants are :
B1) "1^1 = ^  ; and
B2) =T] = _  .
Now Brown, like Smorynski, works in the tradition of those 
logicians, who believe that "... algebra rarely has anything deep 
to say about logic" ([SY] p.217). Their basic aim is to study logic 
in terms of its arithmetic. Thus from these two axioms, we may
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calculate the value of any indicational expression-, (or form) as an
i  '
arithmetical expression. In arithmetic the sign for equality is 
usually to be read as the expression on the left has the same value 
as the expression on the right.
So arithmetically we can calculate :
" i n  = -) ,
M n  = ~1 , and
^  I = _  ; by means of (B1) and (B2).
When variables are introduced, a complete algebra called the 
Calculus of Indications (Cl) can be obtained ([SB]). It has two 
axioms :
Cl) "^ql I r = q I’i'j ; and
C2) "p)P
where p, q, and r are variables which can be given the value of an 
indicational constant.
Now Cl has an interpretation as the ordinary propositional 
calculus (PC), in which axiom (C2) has an interpretation as the law 
of the excluded middle. Table 4 shows how to translate Cl into PC.
Interpretation of Cl as PC -
i
ÇI PC
T  true
_  false
p q P or q
3] not p
"p] q p implies q
Table 4
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Indeed by translating Cl into PC, we can readily prove all of 
Brown's theorems in the more familiar context of PC. Some have 
argued, therefore, that formally Brown's calculus adds nothing new. 
Strait-laced universal algebraists have complained that Brown's 
notation is ambiguous, in that ^  is both a nullary constant and a 
unary operation ([KP]). I think this criticism is pointless. It is 
doubtful that any competent mathematical user could be misled by 
the ambiguity in the notation. Indeed it could be said that the 
point of the ambiguity is to solve (what could be regarded as) 
complex theorems in PC by means of a highly visual technique of 
calculation in Cl. The rotational ambiguity is a conceptual gain, 
in that such a well-charted domain as PC could be enriched by 
considering it as an interpretation of Cl.
One of the key innovations in Brown's work is that 
indicational expressions are relative to one another, since they 
all stand in relation to some indicational space. Thus in Brown's 
work an expression like
a = ^  (1)
is not a valid expression, when interpreted in PC with equality 
interpreted as logical equivalence. However, (1) may serve as a 
good representation of a self-referential process, in which the 
expression 'bites its own tail'. We can capture this circular feed­
back process by rewriting (1) as
in which the expression (1) re-enters its own indicational space or 
form. Brown calls such expressions like (2) 'boolean expressions of 
higher degree'. Strictly speaking. Brown's Cl cannot handle such 
expressions of higher degree, for we have a situation in which 
either we cannot express a re-entering form or the calculus is
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inconsistent. Since Brown's Cl has an interpretation ab PC, then ^t
I
is clearly consistent ([KP]). It immediately follows that Cl cannot 
handle the variety of self-referential forms that interested
j
Varela.
/
Varela saw this failure of Cl to meet his objectives as an 
illustration that self-referential processes could not be 
represented by non—self—referential ones. He proposed extending the 
calculus by assigning a specific value to the self-referential 
domain, by expanding the set of indicational constants to include a 
sign, ~l1 , standing for self-reference or autonomy. The
additional axioms required to incorporate the addition of the new 
constant were ([VA]) :
E D  = T1 ;
E2) "3 n = ~o >•
E3) n n = 1 •
Similarly, when variables were introduced, an algebra called the 
Extended Calculus of Indications (ECI) could be obtained ([VA]), in 
which the following axiom is substituted for (B2) :
V2) V j  T] P~~] = P*
Thus the law of the excluded middle is replaced. ,
Now Varela argued that ECI was functionally'complete. 
Essentially this means that it could be potentially used for 3- 
valued switching circuits. His claim is false, and it attracted 
considerable criticism ([KP]). Thus Varela's project of exploring 
self-reference was in severe conceptual difficulties. Varela 
acknowledged these difficulties, which appeared to him as two main 
problems ([VG] p.298) ;
1) "... the introduction of a third arithmetic value ... will not
really do ... because every re-entering form which is infinite 
('viciously' self-referring) takes the same value ... and we 
can't see the differences as we need to ..."
2) "... in introducing a third value, certain forms, with a great 
deal of intuitive meaning, lose this meaning ..."
So Varela concluded that ECI did not represent a satisfactory means 
of handling self-referential forms. "What ECI provides us with is a 
map where things went wrong, rather than a map of the forms we wish 
to express ... re-entry requires a more extensive ground than 
purely non-re-entering expressions" ([VG] p.298). Goguen was to 
find that extensive ground in a cartesian closed category.
The key idea, in Varela's joint work with Goguen, is really
\ .
very simple. Expressions have a very natural ordering vis-a-vis 
relative degrees of determination and approximation. By dropping 
the indicational constant, "Q , and by using axioms (B1), (B2), 
(C1), and (V2), a revised ECI is possible. Let F denote the 
collection of all forms in the revised ECI. Let F^ denote the 
collection of all forms of depth n or less. Naturally F ^  is 
contained in F^^^ . A natural order can now be placed on the
collection F of all forms.
Definition 1 Let f, g be any expressions in F . Then g is at 
least as determined as f, and we write f g, if the contents of f 
coincide exactly with a part (or are equal to) the contents of g 
when compared, starting at the shallowest depth.
For example, "a^j b | ^  ^  b | *c] | d . To see this more clearly, it is 
convenient to display a form as a tree. Thus we display^/ b] Tj jd 
as
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/""n '\
*-] b c
where denotes the operation of juxtaposition or continence.
So f < g when we take both trees and superimpose them (starting at
their roots), then the branches of f will coincide exactly with a
part of the branches of g. At some points, f will stop, but g will 
continue to branch further. In this sense, f is less determined 
than g, or f approximates g by a lesser degree of determination. 
Note that the ordering, £  , in F is not total, for if the roots of 
two forms are not the same, then they cannot be compared. 
Definition 2 Let X  denote the undetermined expression which 
approximates everything. Thus ^  f, for all f in F.
Proposition 1 The ordering of forms in F is a partial order. That 
is, f g and g ;< f iff f = g.
Proof : ([VG] Prop. 1),
Definition 3 Let f, g be any two forms. The join or least upper 
bound, denoted by f V  g, is that upper bound of f and g obtained 
by superimposing f and g at their roots, identifying identical 
branches and dropping bottoms, where some determined expression 
occurs at its place. The join is undefined whenever f and g cannot 
be superimposed.
For example, the join of V j ^  ~c| jd and "a b] c |d is
a a ^  c] c d. To be sure, f V  g = g iff f ^  g»
Now consider some sequence of expressions ) ;
denoted by < f p ^ , then the concept of a join can be extended to
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that of a supremum over any collection.
Definition 4 The supremum of a sequence < f ^ , when it„exists, is 
a form f such that
f = V  f. = (,v fi)
L-l  ^ L-l
This permits consideration of the notion of a limit, by extending 
joins over countably infinite sequences.
Definition 5 The limit of a sequence < f - , when it exists, is a 
form f such that ^
f = lim V f ^  = V  *
i- I c - /
Oo -> Co
The collection of all forms, F, is an example of an 6u -
poset. The only sequences with a limit are those constructed from
elements drawn from a countable chain of ascending elements. 
Definition 6 A category, ^  , of -posets has, for objects, 
partially ordered sets with a unique bottom ( J_), in which every 
countable ascending chain of elements has a supremum. The supremum 
of an ascending chain
< f^, < ... 1  ^
will be denoted by V  f^ . The limit of a countably infinite
ascending chain will be denoted by \/ morphisms of 2
are monotone functions preserving supreme and limits.
Proposition 2 %  is a cartesian closed category.
Proof : Lambek & Scott ([LS] p.108).
The mathematical reader will readily appreciate that products,
order, and supreme are constructed pointwise.
Since F is a poset, it is well-known ([GZ] p.9) that every 
monotone map
:F— ——XF
gives rise to a partially ordered set of fixed points
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{f ! çS (f)=f}.
For every map :F >F, let j
®(f) = f and
01- /
cf)'^  = {6 « Y
for any f in F, then we have the following:
Proposition 3 For any monotone map ^  :F >F, and a given f in F,
< (f)>^ is a chain, with a limit ^  > oo •
Proof : ([VG] Prop. 4).
Proposition 4 Every monotone map (j) :F >F, where F has a unique
minimum ( J. ), has a least fixed point, f ^  .
Proof : ([VG] Theorem 1).
In fact, the least fixed point can be identified with the limit of 
the following sequence
f 0  = \/ < (#'( JL)> 00 ([VG] p.307).
Now since 2  is cartesian closed, and F is a poset with a
unique minimum, we can form the following functional
F
fix : F -----> F,
which sends a monotone map 0  to the least fixed point,
f ^  = \/ < ^  ( iX OP •
It is now possible to see Goguen's solution to Varela's problems 
with ECI. Arithmetical equations, such as f = f? are to be
identified with a monotone map (p :F---->F, which sends every
expression f (in the revised ECI) to IFl . A solution to the equation 
f = (j) (f) is to be found in the least fixed point,
fix( ^  ) = f ^  ^  ( J^)> 43 •
For example, the least fix point solution for f = ”fl is
V  If] V  m i ... = q
which can be represented as the infinite tree
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p  
p
p
It is clearly better to represent this as IQ ([VG] p.308). Again
consider a monotone map which sends an expression f to ~fj p 
A least fixed point solution to this is ([VG] p.309)
7 1  ^ = L - p  ^
71 p p
which can be better represented as p^ | q
In fact; Varela and Goguen show that all re-entrant forms can be 
viewed as monotone endomorphisms on F, or F % F, or F X F X ... 
([VG]).
The cartesian closed category of Uj -posets and the 
functional ’fix’ enable Varela to talk about expressions which 
reduce to 1  , _  ,as well as the differentiated re-entrant forms 
such as f = f ( and f = *F] p | q . The latter are to be identified 
with the limit of countably infinite sequences
(d), 0 ' d ) .  0^(1), ... ),
where ^  specifies the equation. Varela concludes "... this tells 
us how it was unnecessary to assume the autonomous state ( T7 ) 
rather than to construct it" ([VG] p.314). Thus the solution to 
Varela’s problems is one of finding fixed point solutions in a 
cartesian closed category.
So far I have shown that Goguen has realigned Varela’s 
mathematics with the cartesian closed category 2* Now 2  is not a
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topos, but its objects and morphisms can also be regarded as
objects and morphisms in a topos oi* spaces, namely Set — , and
it seems to me that this aspect ofjGoguen and Varela’s work can
easily be overlooked. They have concentrated on the construction of
U
objects U (in 2) which are isomorphic to U X  U and U . The latter 
are basically models of the lambda calculus ([LS] p.107), and are 
useful primarily for relating logic to recursive calculation. There 
is a danger here of ignoring both the formal aspects of theorising 
about these objects in terms of type theory and the spatial notions 
implicit in their work. We could, for example, take a contravariant 
approach to these objects in 2» by endowing the posets with the so- 
called Scott topology ([GZ] p.98). The objects in 2  could now be 
thought of as topological spaces, and we could investigate their 
formal properties in terms of sequences, convergence, and limit 
determined by that topology. However, since we are foresworn to the 
covariant approach, we may embed 2  Set , with topos-
theoretic advantage.
Let F be an ^  -poset in 2* The elements of F can be 
construed as the elements of the set F(1) defined at stage 1 of an 
object F in Set—  ^ . Thus an expression f or g (in ECI) is 
simply a ’point’ of F(1). The sequences <f[>oo drawn from any 
countably infinite ascending chain in F become the elements of the 
set F (I) defined at stage I of an object F in the same topos. The 
internal cohesion of F (considered as a topos object) is such that
a) for a map F(t);F(I)----> F(1), a sequence <fi>oa is sent to
V  f.£ for the first t elements in the sequence, and to the limit
as t tends to Oo ;
b) for F(m);F(1) ----> F (I), a ’point’ f is sent to the constant
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sequence
c) the monoid action on F (I) picks out the constant sequence equal 
to the t'th supremum.
I omit the trivial labour that the above constructions extend to an
embedding P  -> Set"   ^ . Essentially any monotone map
(j) :A >B in 2  preserves exactly the same structure that is
realised as cohesion in Set
The justification for taking this covariant approach and
treating the collection of forms as an object in a topos of spaces
lies in the way that Goguen and Varela want to talk about the
revised ECI. They claim ([VG] p.304) that every expression f can be
defined as a limit of a sequence, and that for any f they can
construct a sequence, that approximates f with any desired
degree of accuracy. They report that "... this is quite nice,
because there is a neat correspondence between sequences and
elements ... this is as much as we need to know about the grounds
of completed indicational forms " ([VG] pp.304-5). Thus in order to
talk about their problem in any serious way, they need the Kripke-
Joyal semantics of Set— ^ to discuss the truth-claims of
variable sets of forms at both the stages of forms (= 1) and
sequences (= I). To be sure, they do not conciously in any self-
reflective way discuss their problems in terms of topos theory.
They remain content to discuss these with respect to the category
2* However, the ’neat’ correspondence between elements and
sequences, of which they speak, is no more than the cohesion of an
IV)
object in the topos Set—  ^  ^ . The category 2  is not a category of
variable sets, and yet their language implicitly discusses objects 
in 2  as if they were variable sets, as they swap between defining 
forms in terms of elements defined at the stages of definition of
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r
points and sequences. Thusithere seems to be some point in
recognising the implicit discussion of variable sets in their work
!
and identifying the topos of spaces which they really need. So I 
conclude my discussion of the realignment of Varela's notions with 
a topos of spaces with a further question. VJhat is the smallest 
subtopos (of spaces) of Set—  in which Varela’s ECI can live
and how does this relate to Johnstone’s topological topos ?
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CHAPTER TEN
ATKIN AND SIMPLICIAL COMPLEXES 
IN SOCIAL STUDIES
Atkin’s intriguing attempt to revitalise the use of 
mathematics in the Social Sciences with concepts borrowed from 
Algebraic Topology stems from his interest in mathematical physics.
He argued that the deployment (in the Social Sciences) of
mathematical models borrowed from physics was often superficial and 
ill-conceived. He thought "... that perhaps Physics is not
formulated in such a manner as to show us the heart of its methods,
as opposed to the fruits of its labours" ([AT2] p.139). Perhaps a 
better way forward for the civil application of mathematics in 
social studies was to study what lay at the ’heart of the methods’ 
of physics, and to transfer to social studies what lay there, 
rather than to borrow at the surface level of the ’fruits of its 
(i.e. Physics) labours’.
In some ways, Atkin’s search for a methodology that went to 
the heart of the matter is akin to my own quest for a topos of 
spaces. He noted that Galileo’s profound revolution, in using 
mathematics as a methodical device, rested on a technical cognitive 
interest. "Galileo set his mind against the pursuit of ’why’ of the 
motion and concentrated on the ’how’. This required hypotheses ... 
and experiments to test their validity" ([AT3] p.6). He pointed out 
that Galileo’s experiments required a coordinate framework to 
reference space-time events ([AT3] pp.6-8). Thus Atkin was led to 
place great emphasis on geometric figures such as ’points’ to
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reference position ("...let us use the word ’point’ without 
prejudice" ([ATI] p.200)) and ’paths’ to describe motion ([AT3] 
pp.6-8). Notwithstanding his espousal of Leibnitzian doctrines 
about relational theories of space ([AT3] p.83), Atkin viewed 
space-time as a backcloth against which the physicist could make 
material observations ([ATI] p.191). So " —  the property of space­
time structure that really matters is its connectivity ..." ([ATI] 
p.191), which is, perhaps, another way of saying that space-time 
should have that cohesion which can support motion of matter.
Just exactly what sort of cohesion, Atkin had in mind, can 
be outlined as follows. The space-time manifolds used by physicists 
model space (locally) by the mesh diagram of the cartesian 
coordinates of n-fold copies of the real line R ([ATI] p.200-3). 
However, Atkin noted that, at best, the measuring instruments of 
the physicists could only record ’observations’ in the rational 
numbers ([AT1,AT2]). As the mesh diagram is refined, because of the 
limitations of the measuring technique two unequal points (on the 
real line) could no longer be distinguished. This lack of 
distinction defines a neighbour-relation on the set of points 
referenced by mesh diagram. If point x cannot be distinguished by 
the measuring technique from point y , then points x and y are 
neighbour-related, and such a relation is clearly a binary 
reflexive and symmetric relation. Furthermore, since our techniques 
of observation have nothing to say about space refined beyond this 
lack of distinction, we assume the space has the ’geometry’ to 
support motion. Thus if point x is neighbour-related to point y , 
then it is assumed that there is a ’path’ from x to y to support 
motion. Basically our observations mean that the moving body
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travels on boots large enough to span the gaps or holes we cannot 
observe. Space has the cohesion to support motion. A mathematical 
physicist, by demanding that the neighbour-relation define an 
infinitesimal path, could undertake "... the burden of inventing 
the differential calculus" ([ATI] p.203). The observations with 
respect to the motion of a body along a path can be found by the 
process of integrating the changes in observations along the path. 
Thus, as in equation (7) (Chapter 2), integrating velocity over 
elapsed time is the distance travelled by the body. Now Atkin 
argued that these observations by the physicist were such that they 
portrayed a natural invariant called the cocycle law ([ATI] p.243, 
[AT2] p.143). Furthermore, there was a relation between the sort of 
cohesion (or connectivity) that a space has, and the observations 
which it permits.
We can approach the geometric meaning of the cocycle law as 
follows. In the first place, a 1-form, Oj , is a law (or map) which 
assigns, to every pair of neighbour-related points x and y , a value 
in a (multiplicative) group (G,.,e) 'measuring' the 'observation' 
or 'change' from x to y ([KK3]). For example, if points are related 
by infinitesimal paths, then W  (x,y) may be the 'amount of work' 
needed to move a body the infinitesimal distance from x to y. Of 
course, we require W  (x,x) = e (the neutral element of the group 
G), since no work is required for the null path. If we keep passing 
from point a to another neighbouring point, then this process 
traces out a curve or path to a point b. The infinitesimal amounts 
of work, Uj (x,y), will accumulate (when multiplied) to a.value,
UJ (a,b), in the group G, which is to be thought of as an integral 
as follows.
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Under what conditions can we assume the accumulation is an
integral ? Recall (Chapter 2, Prop. 1), that every differentiable
function on an interval (with values in R) yields an integral whose
value depends only on its value at the endpoints of the curve. Thus
in general, for a differentiable function f defined on the interval
[a,b] with values in R, we can set an integral to
b
Co (a,b) = J ' f'.dt = f(b) - f(a) (1)
a
where f  is the derivative of f.
Generalising this to the situation with values in a 
(multiplicative) group G, we can define a 0-form, T) , as a law (or 
map) which assigns, to every point x, a value in the group G. We 
can also define a 1-form, d^^ » which assigns to each neighbour- 
related pair (x,y) the 'difference' of T) between x and y. Thus
— I
d '>7 (x,y) = ^  (x) . (y) (2).
If a 1-form, UJ , is equivalent to do^ for some 0-form, , then 
UJ is said to be an exact 1-form. So one condition for a 1-form to 
be regarded as an integral might be that it is exact.
In the second place, if the value of an accumulation around 
an infinitesimal closed curve is the neutral element e, then it is 
reasonable to expect that the value of an accumulation around a 
finite nul1-homotopic closed curve is also e. Our reasons for this 
expectation are based on the following :
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1) The value of the amount of work, kJ (x,x) for the null curve
must be e, as no work is done.
2) The infinitesimal closed curves, which are homotopic to the null 
curve can be taken to be the triangles (x,y,z), where the pairs 
(x,y), (y,z), and (z,x) are neighbours.
Since the points x, y, and z are neighbours, it is assumed that 
the triangle has the geometry to support homotopy to the null 
curve, since our measuring techniques yield us no knowledge of 
any 'holes' inside the triangular region bounded by 
infinitesimal paths. We can define a 2-form, d W  , which is a 
law (or map), assigning to every triangle (x,y,z), the value of 
accumulating the values of Uj around the sides of the triangle. 
Thus
d LU (x,y,z) = W  (x,y). W( y , z ) . W  (z,x) (3)«
VJhen d w  = e, then Lu is described as a closed 1 -form.
Assuming conservation of energy, the value of work done to move 
an object around an infinitesimal closed curve is to be regarded 
as accumulating to e, since the work done to return it to its 
original position cancels out the work done to move it away from 
that position. So another condition for a 1-form to be regarded 
as an integral might be that it takes the value e on closed
infinitesimal paths.
3) The amount of work done around a finite null-homotopic closed 
curve cancels out in exactly the same way as an infinitesimal 
closed curve. On the one hand, if null-homotopy is not assumed,
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then we may have a closed 1-form which is not exact. On the 
other hand, we may observe a 1-form which is not closed. In this 
case, some ’interference’ is assumed to alter the amount of work 
done so that accumulating the amounts of work done around the 
closed curve no longer cancels to e.
The notion of an integral can be made precise through the 
cocycle law, which states that all closed 1-forms are exact. That 
is
(d = e) => (d 0] = U j ) (4).
Essentially the cocycle law says that space admits integration if 
closed 1-forms are exact. One of the fundamental theorems of 
differential geometry says that if space is a connected and simply 
connected manifold and G is the geometric line ([KK2] p.2), then 
closed 1-forms are exact ([KK4] p. 146). Here connected means that a 
path exist between each pair of points, and simply connected means 
that all finite closed curves are homotopic to the null curve. 
Proofs are provided by Kock ([KKg] p.372).
With the cocycle law, Atkin felt he had arrived at the heart 
of the methods of mathematical physics. Physical observations were 
natural invariants, in the sense that observations of ’changes’ of 
a body against the backcloth of space were values in a group such 
that the pair (backcloth, group of observations) admitted 
integration. That is, closed 1-forms were exact. But this in turn 
meant that the backcloths used by the physicist were connected and 
simply connected (or acyclic). For Atkin, the cocycle law and the 
acyclic backcloth "... summarise all we can expect from this sort 
of backcloth. They are amply illustrated in theoretical physics,
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albeit somewhat hidden under the various formulations of field 
theories ..." ([ATI] p.203).
Now it seems to me that Atkin had nearly all the material to 
hand for developing a topos-theoretic formulation of differential 
geometry. Working within a suitable topos (in which the axioms of 
differential geometry were valid), models of the backcloth which 
admit integration could be exhibited. If it were felt that the 
cocycle law was of interest to a social scientist as a model of 
’sociological observations’, then interpretation of that cocycle 
law in an appropriate topos (lacking the special features of 
differential geometry) relevant to the social scientist could yield 
models which may account for such observations. However, this 
interesting suggestion is only possible with the benefit of 
hindsight. Atkin formulated his ideas about the relationship 
between physical observations and the cohesion of the backcloth 
long before topos-theoretic approaches were widespread amongst pure 
mathematicians. He attempted a programme of transfering these 
notions from Physics to Social Science through concepts drawn from 
algebraic topology. Since I claim that, whenever ideas of space are 
involved in scientific questions, what we should be reasoning about 
are objects in some topos of spaces, then it is worth investigating 
Atkin’s programme as a possible alternative to my own.
The most important concept Atkin required from algebraic 
topology was that of a simplicial complex.
Definition 1 By a simplicial complex, K(X), with vertex set X, we 
mean a family K of non-empty subsets of X, such that if A €ZT X 
belongs to the family K then every non-empty subset of A also
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belongs to K. Such subsets in the family K are called simplices and 
possess a dimension given by
dim(A) = card(A) - 1 (5).
A simplex with dimension p is called a p-simplex. The complex K(X) 
has dimension m, when m is the maximum dimension of all the 
simplices of K(X). A subcomplex of K(X) is a family L of simplices 
of K(X), such that the family L is also a complex L(A) in some 
subset of vertices A C.  X.
To be sure, families of sets satisfying the above definition may 
occur without any reference to geometry. However in his discussions 
of physics, Atkin had in mind the modelling of spaces with these 
simplicial complexes. The set, P, of points
in the space were to be regarded as a vertex set P of 0-simplices 
Neighbour-related points x and y
were to be regarded as 1-simplices, and represented by the 1- 
simplex {x,y}, by taking "... away the underlying Euclidean support 
..." ([ATI] p.201). Infinitesimal paths composed of neighbour- 
related pairs (x,y), (y,z), and (z,x)
were to be represented by the 1-simplices {x,y}, {y,z}, and {x,z}, 
and regarded as faces of the 2-simplex {x,y,z}. A surface would be 
regarded as a collection of 2-simplices obtained from glueing the 
triangles together along appropriate edges and points. This process
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may be generalised to higher dimensions, but we will not need to ; 
deal with this here. |
i
i
As well as these geometrical models, Atkin was much taken 
with Dowker's discovery that any binary relation between two sets A 
and B could be modelled by a pair of simplicial complexes ([DW]). 
Definition 2 If R A X  B is a binary relation, then s =
{a^,a^ ,...,a^} is a p-simplex of K^(A) iff there exists b e  B, such 
that a" is R-related to b for i = 0,1,...,p. Similarly t = 
{b^,b^,...,b^} is a q-simplex of K^(B) iff there exists an a é- A, 
such that a is R-related bj for j = 0,1,...,q. The complexes K^CA) 
and K (B) are said to be a pair of conjugate Dowker complexes.
A
There is a category, SComplex, whose objects are simplicial 
complexes, and where the morphisms are the simplicial maps
f:K(X) — -— > L(Y), consisting of functions f:X ->Y, such that
if s is a simplex of K(X) then f(s) is a simplex of L(Y). It can 
readily be seen that the category, SComplex, reduces to one of a 
simple type of posets and order-preserving maps.
Armed with a technique which could produce a plenitude of 
simplicial complexes, and an attempted synergy between differential 
geometry and algebraic topology, Atkin proceeded to argue that the 
(mathematical) methodical centre of Physics could be transferred to 
Social Science in the following steps ([AT2] p.159, [ATS] pp.88- 
90).
Step 1
Set up an observing system and define a binary relation, R, between 
observed ’phenomena’. A, and the ’points’, P, of a backcloth.
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Working in the category of constant sets, Set, use the relation R \ 
to form a Dowker complex K^(P). In the case of social studies, any !
*observer’ could observe such a binary relation almost anywhere, |
and Atkin gives a good selection of these in Mathematical Structure ' 
in Human Affairs ([AT3]). In the case of mathematical physics, the 
selection of a relation is a somewhat trickier affair. Atkin s 
definition of the complex K^(P) is somewhat obscure ([AT2] pp.154- 
5, [AT3] pp.85-90). Yet in his earlier account ([ATI]), it is clear 
that the 1- and 2-simplices were to be formed from a neighbour- 
relation on the set of points. It is possible that Atkin could 
treat the collection of infinitesimal triangles homotopic to the 
null curve as the set, A, of observed phenomena. In that case, the 
observed binary relation between phenomena. A, and points, P, would
have to be the incidence of points to infinitesimal triangles in
order to produce an equivalent complex K^(P) to that obtained from 
the neighbour-relation.
Step 2
Observe p-forms to be associated with the p-simplices. In the case 
of Physics, 1-forms were usually observed and these were expected 
to obey the cocycle law. In the case of Social Science, integer 
valued p-forms or ’patterns’ were to be observed. These patterns 
would not necessarily conform with the cocycle law, as the complex
K (P), when thought of in a geometrical way, might possess ’holes’
/
causing failure of exactness in the observed pattern of closed p- 
forms. Since the observed patterns were no longer observed against 
an acyclic backcloth (as was presumed to be the case in Physics), 
Atkin argued that q-connectivity at dimension q was crucial for 
understanding the cohesion of the backcloth vis-a-vis observed 
patterns.
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Atkin proposed exploring q-connectivity with the following 
tools. He says that two simplices, s and t, are q-near iff 1 
dim(sn t) _> q. More generally, in a complex K(X), a q-tunrlel 
exists from s to t, when there is a sequence of simplices^
s = a ^ , a ^  , ... , a^ = t ( 6 ),
such that each aj in the sequence is q-near to the next for j = 
0,1,...,n-1. Two simplices, s and t, are said to lie in the same q- 
component iff they can be joined by a q-tunnel from s to t. The 
number of q-components is denoted Q ^  , and Atkin described an 
algorithm for calculating the Q-vector (Q^,Q^,...). A path in K(X) 
is clearly a 0-tunnel, from which it follows that is the number 
of path components of K(X) ([GI] p.406).
Atkin claimed that the techniques of analysing the q- 
connectivity of a Dowker complex, K^(P), when used in conjunction 
with the study of q-forms, could yield useful material for 
theorising about social structure in human affairs ([AT2]). In the 
next decade, Atkin’s ideas about Q-analysis were applied by social 
scientists (for a survey of applications, see [JS3]). However, the 
mathematics of Q-analysis was subjected to criticism and refinement 
by mathematicians ([EJ,GE,GI]). In the early eighties, a Social 
Science Research Council (UK) discussed the theory and practice of 
Q-analysis, in which the arguments for and against were/rehearsed 
([MG]). I do not propose to enter this particular debate here. From 
my perspective, many of these criticisms of Q-analysis stem from 
difficulties in relating the Formal to the Conceptual, so it is to 
these problems I now turn.
Not that questions of the relation between the Formal and
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the Conceptual have altogether been absent from those commenting on
r ^
Q-analysis. Consider the following : .
1) Griffiths and Evans have observed that Atkin’s q-conn^ctivity 
analysis primarily consists in the listing of q-connebted 
components (and possibly q-forms), followed by a scrutiny and 
interpretation ” ... in ordinary language, quite exacting to 
read, because he now adds detail from ... (elsewhere) ...> to 
which he has been led by the Q—analysis. It has told him were to 
look ..." ([GE] p.7). The difficulty here is. not that we can 
associate a Dowker complex with any ordinary language statement 
that we like, but that a variety of interpretations may suggest 
themselves. Now Atkin’s interpretations (in ordinary language) 
are often very plausible, but without some form of conceptual 
control a Q-analyst can always make "... assertions which are 
not unreasonable but which do not follow from the mathematics as 
it now stands" ([GE] p.8). Now to a certain extent, it is 
possible to regard Atkin’s practice as unorthodox prescientific 
work in a raw state ([GE] p.9). Nevertheless, disciplines can 
only prosper when they are "... based upon rational, 
scrutinisable argument" ([GE] p.10).
2) A similar perspective is stressed by Couclelis. She notes that 
"... the polyhedra of Q-analysis have strong aesthetic appeal 
for those ... endowed with a geometric imagination ..." ([CU] 
p.436). Although we can discuss these in an intuitive fashion, 
she goes on to suggest that this can be no substitute for "... 
the logical steps to make scientific argument transparent" ([CU]
p.437).
What these examples suggest is the difficulty in Atkin’s work of 
relating what can be exactly said to that which can be precisely 
conceived. In my view, this is the problem of relating the Formal
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to the Conceptual. The ordinary language intuitions need to be 
formalised then checked rigorously to see that the conceptions are 
right. Now I do not think that we can follow Couclelis along her 
road of relating the Formal to the Conceptual with prepositional 
calculus and boolean algebra ([CU]). Atkin’s notions require a more 
sophisticated level of relating type theory to topoi, and given 
that notions of ’space’ saturate his writings then these topoi will 
need to be topoi of spaces.
Thus the following questions are raised :
a) what universe of discourse defines Atkin’s practice, and is this
a topos of spaces ?
b) if not, then what struggles have taken place to find such a
topos ?
Now Atkin always proceeds as if his universe of discourse 
was the category SComplex. However a number of authors argue that a 
simplicial complex is not altogether a suitable representation of 
the problems referred to by Atkin ([EJ,GE,JS1,SD]). I have not the 
space to enter into this in any detail here. But basically, when 
Atkin refers to a Dowker comple K^(B), he was in the habit of 
naming the elements of A as a p-simplex {b^,...,b^} when a € A was 
R-related to b* for i = 0,...,p. Now it is possible that a number 
of elements of A may name the same simplex ([JS1] p.75, [GE] pp.62-
3). Furthermore, a simplex may have ’named’ faces, but usually its
faces will not be ’named’. For this reason, Seidman has suggested
that the category of hypergraphs, Hph, is a more appropriate 
category for Atkin’s universe of discourse ([SD]). A hypergraph is 
a pair (X,F) where X is the vertex set and F is a family of non­
empty subsets of X whose union is X. A member of the family F is
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called a hypergraph-edge. Given a binary relation R (—  A X  B,
Seidman claimed that we could form a hypergraph (B,A), in which
each a G- A could be regarded as a hypergraph-edge in the vertices
{ b ^ , b ^ } , whenever a was R-related to b* for i = 0,...,p. Thus a
hypergraph can have copies of hypergraph-edges for each a which is
R-related to the same set of vertices { b , b A l s o  we need only
add in, as hypergraph-edges, those subsets of vertices we require
in any analysis. In a similar vein, other authors have defined
Atkin's work in terms of simplicial families, but these would
appear to be formally similar to hypergraphs ([EJ] p.377).
Unfortunately the category, Hph, is not a topos. It is not even
cartesian closed, for almost the same reason as the category of
topological spaces; that is, for a general hypergraph B, it does
not seem possible to form an adjunction between products (_ X B)
S
and exponentials (_ ). Thus Hph is not a set-like universe of
discourse suitable as the target of an interpretation of a 
formalised fragment of scientific theory. Hph describes the 
hypergraph-objects (in Set), which can serve as models of the 
theory of hypergraphs when interpreted in the topos Set. Earl and 
Johnson quite properly point out that Atkin's objectives.are not 
the same as developing the theory of hypergraphs. Rather his aims 
were directed to the development of scientific methodology ([EJ] 
p.378). However this aim requires the interpretation of a 
scientific theory in a topos.
Initial attempts to realign Q-analysis into some topos of 
spaces stem from theorising in terms of a metaphorical 
redescription of propulsion of a body along a path as the q- 
transmission of a q-dimensional object along a q-tunnel ([GE] 
pp.30-3, [GI] p.407, [JS2]). Consider the motion, m, of a body, B,
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through a space, X,i described by
1 B X T ------> X,
where T parameterises time. If the dimension of B is q, then q must 
be less than or equal to the dimension of X. Now imagine the space 
X has regions with varying dimensions. If U and V are regions of X 
in which B can be placed, then a q-tunnel is needed to support 
motion or q-transmission of B from U to V. The regions U and V are 
said to lie in different q-components if U and V are only connected 
by a p-tunnel when p < q. Thus the existence of multiple q- 
components is a limitation to communication (or motion / q- 
transmission) throughout X.
To follow Atkin's movement of thought, Griffiths and Evans 
([GE] pp.37-51) have suggested modelling a relation R Ç  A >( B 
with a labelled graph (see also Earl & Johnson [EJ]). Call the set 
A, the nodes of a graph, G. If a and a' 6 A name simplices in the 
Dowker complex K.(B) such that a is q-near to a', then form a 
directed edge from a to a' with the label q.
The resulting graph, G, is an object in the category RGraph/Q. 
Objects are reflexive graphs with a morphism into the labelling 
graph, Q, which consists of one node and a non-degenerate loop for 
each label q = 0,1,..
Morphisms of RGraph/Q consist of the commutative triangles which
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preserve the q-labelling.
In proposing RGraph/Q, as a suitable universe of discourse 
in which to grasp Atkin’s ideas, Griffiths and Evans have 
unerringly elected to work in a gros topos of spaces (although it 
was not put quite like this). Thus the way is now open to formulate 
precise scientific theories in type theory and interpret them in 
this topos. To be sure, this opportunity to use type theory was not 
taken. However, this realignment of Atkin’s mathematics with the 
simplest sort of space, namely a (labelled) graph, became the 
primary means for grasping Atkin’s ideas. In particular, if X is a 
q-labelled graph then we can study the subgraphs of X with 
different labels. In this context, Atkin’s q-components identify, 
as coproducts of q-labelled graphs, those maximal subgraphs where 
edges are labelled with a value greater than or equal to q. If 
these subgraphs are not connected then q-transmission cannot be 
supported between subgraphs. The relation between Q-analysis and 
graph theory has been fully surveyed by Earl and Johnson ([EJ]).
Nevertheless, the topos RGraph/Q may not altogether be a 
suitable category in which to tease out the problems posed by 
Atkin’s practice. In the first place, mathematical physicists do 
not need a notion of a q-tunnel. A path or 0-tunnel is sufficient 
to support the motion of a particle or 0-dimensional object of 
which the body B is formed. Although it is possible to give some 
substance to the notion of a q-tunnel in physical applications, 
Griffiths and Evans "... know of no significant applications" ([GE] 
p.34). Thus working in RGraph/Q, the placement of a body B (= 
graph) can be described by
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> X
So we can form the exponential object, X^ , of placements of B in X 
which preserve the q-label. However difficulties appear when we try 
to describe motion, m, in terms of the time-dependence of 
placements,
T -------- > X
This would appear to need different copies of the graph 
representing time, with different labels of q, depending on the 
motion, m, of the particular body, B. This may or may not be 
thought 'un-natural*. In the second place, after some empirical 
investigation, Johnson argued that "... despite a formal 
development of the theory of q-transmission, it is very difficult 
to find good examples of q-transmission in real systems ... (since) 
... few real systems have q-transmission properties for q > 0" 
([JS5] p.294). Given that we have obtained a q-labelled graph from 
a relation R A X  B, Johnson argues "... properties which are 
going to be determined by q alone do not distinguish between 
vertices (in this case the set B), and this implies some kind of 
homogenous interpretation of the vertices ... determined by q 
alone" ([JS4] p.466). He gives a number of reasons why this may 
prove unacceptable in the social sciences, and these will not be 
repeated here. Suffice to say that Johnson’s analysis moves in the 
direction of replacing the labelling graph, Q, with a more general 
graph, V, with values v 6 V natural to the application. However a
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Q-analysis which is now a V-analysis runs the risk of parting with 
Atkin’s programme. March has argued ([MA]) that many of the, 
features of Atkin’s pair of conjugate Dowker complexes can leasily 
be conceived as bicoloured graphs. The import of March’s argument 
is that an appropriate universe of discourse for many of Atkin’s 
ideas is the petit topos of bipartite graphs. Indeed Johnson’s 
later work is set (essentially) in that topos ([JS4,JS5]).
Now it might be argued that, in choosing to work with 
simplicial complexes, Atkin was already in a gros topos of spaces.
A simplicial complex is not just an object of SComplex. It may also 
be regarded as an object in the category of simplicial sets.
Set—  , which is well-known to be a topos of spaces ([KK2] p.293)*
I do not think this can be seriously countenanced. To be sure, it 
is open to Atkin to interpret any theories in Set , but there is 
no evidence to suggest this was seriously considered. Indeed, 
Griffiths points out that p-forms would have to be specified by 
more than numerical values. "One would expect a requirement that it 
have a structure compatible with that of a ... (simplicial 
complex)" ([GI] p.422). Now I think there are grounds for 
associating the question of compatible structure with the cohesion 
of objects in a topos of spaces. So if Atkin were assumed to be 
working in Set—  , then the group, G, for valuing p-forms would 
also need to be a simplicial set (= simplicial complex); This is 
sufficiently absurd to rule out Set as a useful topos for 
Atkin’s practice. A useful way to interpret Griffiths’s remark 
could be to say that simplicial objects and group objects would 
need to live in the same topos; the compatible structure being that 
the objects possessed the same kind of cohesion. Thus progress in 
realigning Atkin’s notions with a topos of spaces must issue from
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working in such a topos.
Rather than continuing to search for a suitable topos for 
Atkin’s practice, might it not be better to reformulate the cocycle 
law in a sufficiently general way that it could be interpreted in 
any topos of spaces useful to a social scientist ? I suggest we 
recast Atkin’s ideas about simplicial complexes in terms of 
simplicial objects in a topos of spaces. I-Jhen we do this, it is 
possible to redefine Atkin’s programme along the following lines.
Step 1
Choose an object, X, in some topos of spaces, E, which can serve as 
a backcloth against which our experience of patterns made by an 
object (of E), B, can be observed. Thus we might register our 
experience of the observed covariation of elements of B with 
elements of X. For example, physicists might need a topos in which 
the backcloth possessed geometric figures such as ’points’,
’paths’, and ’infinitesimals’ to support the observed covariation 
of space-time events. On the other hand, social scientists might 
require something simpler, such as a graph in RGraph, to support a 
metaphorical redescription of social structure as a space. 
Accordingly, Atkin’s ambiguous notion of a binary relation between 
phenomena and geometric points is replaced by the covariant 
approach to geometric figures in a topos of spaces.
Step 2
Atkin points out that ’nearness’ is not just a mathematical 
concept, but is also deeply embedded in the process of 
’observation’ ([AT3] p.85). In the case of the differential 
geometry used by the physicist, a point x is ’near’ or neighbour- 
related to a point y if x and y are not distinct modulo the
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observational technique; that is,.connected by an infinitesimal
path ([ATI], see also similar notions in Beck [BK]). Furthermore,
1
this neighbour-relation, denoted by N, is ’canonical’, in the sense
that any map f:X >Y between manifolds preserves this property
of being neighbours ([KK3] p.364) :
X N X ’ => f(x) N f(x’) (7).
Thus we are led to define a neighbour relation as a binary (not 
necessarily symmetric) reflexive relation on the (generalised) 
elements of the objects of E, such that the morphisms of E preserve 
the neighbour relation. Except for two trivial extreme cases, 
objects in an arbitrary topos do not generally carry any ’natural’ 
relation of this kind. More than anything this indicates that we 
are working in a topos of spaces, such that ’neighbours’ can be 
observed expressing some aspect of the cohesion of a space. For 
example, in RGraph we can readily ’observe’ a neghbour-relation in 
terms of the adjacencies of a graph. Two vertices a and b are 
neighbour-related if there is an edge f from a to b. Similarly, two 
edges f and g are neighbour-related if their source and targets are 
also neighbour-related. It is clear that a graph morphism must 
preserve the adjacency structure of a graph, and such morphisms 
must preserve the above neighbour-relation. Thus we are led to 
reject Atkin’s ambiguous notion of observing a binary relation
between phenomena and geometric figures, which seems to have been
/
introduced merely to facilitate the use of Dowker complexes. 
Instead, we introduce a neighbour-relation on the elements of the 
backcloth, and this would appear to be in line with Atkin’s earlier 
procedure ([ATI] pp.200-3)*
Step 3
We may use the neighbour-relation, N, to form a simplicial object 
in E ([KK2] p.108) :
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à
X i X(1)    X(1,1) (8),
where the maps, , appearing in (8) describe the ’face’
operators : ’omit the ith vertex’. X is the object of 0-simplices, 
X(1) is the object of 1-simplices, and X(1,1) is the object of 2- 
simplices. The object of 0-simplices is just the backcloth X. Thus 
a 0-simplex is just a geometric figure in X defined at various 
stages of definition.
The object of 1-simplices, X(1), is just equivalent to the monic
N -------- > X X X ,  defined by
N ^  X(1) = {(x,x’) I X N x ’} (9).
Thus, in RGraph, a pair of neighbour-related edges, (f,g), would be 
a 1-simplex defined at the stage of edges. Such a pair would force 
the truth of N at the stage of definition of vertices. However, a 
1-simplex in RGraph is an element of a graph X(1). Note that the 
objects X and X(1) form a graph-object in
The object of 2-simplices, X(1,1), is a subobject of X X X x X such 
that
X(1,1) = {(x,y,z) I x N y & y N z & z N x }  (10).
To be sure, such an object is defined at all stages of definition, 
and I leave it to the reader to picture how a 2-simplex might look 
in his favourite topos. It is possible to form objects of higher 
dimensional simplices ([KK2] p.108). But these will not be required 
here.
A degenerate simplex is one in which two vertices are equal, e.g. 
(x,y,y) is a degenerate 2-simplex and (x,x) is a degenerate 1-
simplex. There is an obvious diagonal map X -----> X(1) given by
X I > (x,x), which may be thought of as a ’degeneracy’ operator.
This method of forming a simplicial complex (= simplicial object)
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from a neighbour-relation contrasts strongly with Atkin’s 
unmotivated use of Dowker complexes defined only at the stage of 
’points’.
Step 4
The object is now to define the cocycle law so that it can be 
interpreted in a topos of spaces. Obtain a (usually abelian) group 
object, (G,.,e), in E, which is to ’measure’ the changes in the 
patterns formed by B ’observed’ against the backcloth X. In 
physics, G is usually the geometric line used to measure 
’quantities’ ([KK2] pp.2-5). A social scientist, working in RGraph, 
will need a graph which is also a group object. It is well-known
that there are various ways to represent groups as graphs; however,
the meaning of such a graph may well be obscure. Let us grant, for 
the time being, that such a group object has scientific meaning for 
the social scientist, and proceed as follows.
Definition 3 A k-form on X with values in G is a morphism
U) : x(1,...,1)-------”> G.
(k times)
For 1-forms, we require that whenever A/ (x,y) = a and y N x then 
iQj (y,x) = a”  ^ . A k-form is called normalised if its value on a
degenerate simplex is e. In practice, we will always work with 
normalised k-forms. It is not difficult to see that for a 
normalised 1-form, that
Co (x,y) . W  (y,x) = e (11)'
for all X, y in X such that x N y and y N x. m e n  k = 0, we usually 
denote a 0-form by :X >G. Since we are working in a topos,
we can easily define
G ^  as the object of 0-forms,
as the object of 1-forms, and 
G ^ 0  as the object of 2-forms.
211
It is now possible to define the following operators. 
d°: G ^  ------— > G ^ ( 0  by
j--------> d')') and, !
d‘ :----------------- > G^ (^ ) 0 by
Lo I— — > d Lw .
The formation of these objects and operators in a topos of spaces 
permits an interpretation of the cocycle law :
( Vco& [(d ' ( ) = e) =>
(~3g  ^& G ^  ) (d^ (1^ ) )] (12),
where, by abuse, we denote the constant map from the object of 2— 
simplices with value e as e.
Objects X, X(1), X(1,1), and G which satisfy the cocycle law are 
said to be a model of the law. Now Atkin argued that physicists 
used models (in a smooth topos) satisfying the cocycle law.
However, he speculated that the k-forms, observed by social 
scientists, would not necessarily result in models satisfying the 
law. Of course, the onus would be on the social scientist to 
theorise about these forms (in type theory). He suggested that the 
social scientist may well find closed forms which were not exact, 
and this could be accounted for by the presence of 'holes' in space 
([AT3] Chap.5). A further problem (not mentioned by Atkin) could be 
the failure of the accumulation of 'changes' around à closed path 
to result in a closed 1-form. Recent work by Kock reveals that the 
concepts needed to theorise about these problems are pregroupoWs  ^
(= principal fibre bundles), Ehresmann connections, curvature, and
holonomy ([KK4]).
Now it seems to me that these four steps generalise, to any 
topos of spaces, the notions that Atkin saw at 'the heart of the
212
methods’ of physics. A good generalisation does not search for the 
maximum generality, but for the right generality. Perhaps the right 
generalisation for a social scientist, wishing to use mathematics 
as a methodical device, is that physicists use topoi in which 
geometric figures cohere. As it is, Atkin’s perceptions (when 
viewed through these four steps) are a particular model in which 
cohesion is related to ’measure’ through a neighbour-relation. We 
have a supply of models and, as yet, no demand from the Social 
Sciences. A clear difficulty for a social scientist will be to 
relate his social scientific concerns to abstract measure theory 
with a group object (in a topos) for valuing p-forms. m a t  is 
certain is that we cannot begin to think seriously about Atkin’s 
programme until we realign the mathematics in terms of a topos of 
spaces. VJhen this is done, a supply of properly formulated models 
becomes available, and perhaps this may stimulate social scientists 
to reinvestigate his programmme. A critical question must be: ’will 
these models be suitable for GRA-type studies as well as QC-type 
studies ? ’.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The dictum, that whenever the concept of space enters 
Science in a fundamental way then our discourse should be 
interpreted in a topos of spaces, cannot fail to have its practical 
implications. The claim, that one ought to be in such a topos, is 
normative and this is a practical matter. As such, the claim is a 
regulative speech act oriented towards reaching an understanding 
about norms. The validity claim raised is about the 'rightness' of 
observing the norm encapsulated in the dictum. To be sure, the 
'rightness' of a norm can be countered by force of will. However, 
my claim is not posed in that sphere of strategic action oriented 
towards power, but in the realm of the theoretical discourse of 
Science whose concerns are the rational understanding of the World. 
If Science is the rational reorganisation of knowledge achieved 
through a practice that alters its present form then the good 
reasons for amending that practice need to be judged with respect 
to the reasonableness to which Science aspires.
A part of those good reasons for changing current practice 
from a contravariant to a covariant approach rests on Lambek and 
Scott's adjunction between type theories and topoi. In my view. 
Formal Logic is a science which systematically attempts to 
reconstruct and explore the intuitive reasoning powers of competent 
subjects. Science is couched in constative speech acts which assert 
the claim to truth. The locutionary element in such speech acts is 
the content of some proposition, whose truth claim is asserted.
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However, formal relations (such as validity, derivability, and
■ 1
consistency) between propositions are the subject matter of Formal
1
Logic, which tries to explicate the mechanisms (and puzzles) of 
human reasoning. Furthermore, the model theory of Formal Logic 
attempts to elucidate what can be counted as a model of a (formal) 
theory. Thus model theory can be regarded as one aspect of a 
rationally reconstructed knowledge explicating concepts. The 
adjunction between «.type theory and topoi tells us that scientific 
theories with prepositional content can be interpreted in topoi.
The latter are the subject matter of the Formal and serve as the 
universe of discourse in which one may find models. Now it might be 
claimed that my argument places too much weight on this adjunction 
as the relationship between the Formal and the Conceptual needed 
for Science. To be sure, there are other well-known relationships 
between the Formal and the Conceptual. For example, there is an 
adjunction between cartesian closed categories and typed }\ - 
calculi ([LS]). Although Science needs cartesian closure for 
elementary calculations (see Chap.8), this is not enough. If theory 
is to take on the character of universal, existential, and unique 
quantification typical of the law-like hypotheses of Science then a
more powerful version of the Conceptual than typed )\ -calculi is
i
needed. The most powerful version of the Formal available to us is 
type theory, whose appropriate opposite in the Conceptual is Topoi. 
Now it may be possible that even more powerful versions of the 
Formal and the Conceptual may be developed which could amend our 
practice. However, this is speculation. Science is always in the 
historical situation of depending on the Last Theorist ([HA5] 
p.277). The truth of tomorrow is an empty concept, and "... we 
cannot simultaneously assert a proposition or defend a theory and
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nevertheless anticipate that its validity-claims will be refuted in 
the future" ([HAS] p.277). Thus if type theory is the best rational 
reconstruction of reasoning about the propositions of Science 
available to and Topoi is its opposite in the Conceptual, then 
there are good reasons for claiming it is 'right* to recast one's 
mathematics in a topos. There is a rationally grounded norm . 
interpret theories in a topos.
When 'space' enters the consideration of a theory, then the 
injunction can be tightened up : interpret the theory in a topos of 
spaces. Another part of the good reasons for amending current 
practice is that the rational form of sequential spaces and 
manifolds used by Science lies in models of the axioms for a gros 
topos. It is not so much that the contravariant approach is 
'wrong', but that it obscures the importance of cartesian closure 
in function space construction and fails to recognise the 
importance of choosing a topos with the geometric elements that one 
actually needs. Thus an amended practice stems from the recognition 
of the importance of exponentiable objects (= function spaces) and 
geometric figures in indexing objects. The defining feature of 
'spaces' are that they are variable sets in which geometric figures 
cohere (= restrict). They are well—suited to a Science that 
observes and theorises about the covariation of space-time events. 
Now it might be argued that a definition of a topos of spaces as 
'variable sets in which geometric figures cohere' is insufficiently 
precise from a mathematical perspective. In Lawvere's view, the 
difficulties in axiomatising the categories to be counted as 
'spaces' stem from "... the lack of a stabilized definition of 
morphisms apropriate to categories of spaces in the way that 
'geometric morphisms' are appropriate to generalized spaces" ([LVJG]
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p.179). It may well be that clarification of the hotion of a 
'spatial morphism' could lead to elegaht mathematical theories 
about topoi of spaces. Indeed it would]be nice if there were one
set of axioms for such topoi. Again the truth of tomorrow is an
/
empty concept and this speculation must be set aside. The 
differential calculus was used for two centuries before it was 
'reformed' by Weierstrass. Similarly there are no grounds for delay 
in introducing the present (perhaps clumsy) attempts to reform 
practice through a covariant approach to topoi of spaces. I'Jhat we 
do have are various attempts to formalise the idea of a topos of 
spaces, in which the concept of a gros topos is primary (or, if you 
prefer, is the earliest stage of definition). There are no a prio^ 
grounds for supposing that the idea could be encapsulated in just 
one set of axioms. The current ideas seem to be just good enough to 
amend practice, but the current ideas depend on the primacy of the 
gros topoi.
However, the pivotal role of the gros topoi in 'generating' 
other examples of topoi of spaces rests on the argument that the 
gros topoi arise directly out of the needs of a technical cognitive 
interest to describe and explain 'motion'. In constructing an 
equaliser (so to speak) between Mathematics and the Philosophy of 
Science, I have argued that the gros topoi are the domain in which 
the constitutive questions of a (quasi-)causal Science can be 
posed. What I have required from Habermas' and Apel's theory of
leading knowledge interests is the schématisation (appropriate to a
I
technical cognitive interest) of space, time, and substance which 
can support a causal explanation through 'geometry'. Not only do 
these different schématisations lead to an understanding of why
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mathematics (in the form of topoi of spaces) is the methodical 
device of the Natural Sciences, but they also lead to an 
understanding of the differing grounds on which spatial notions can 
be introduced into the Human Sciences. From my perspective, the 
theory of leading knowledge interests contributes to a rational 
reconstruction of the pragmatic dimensions relating knowledge to 
practice. Thus the good reasons for amending scientific and 
mathematical practice to a covariant approach using topoi of spaces 
is grounded in the felicity by which variable sets with coherent 
geometric figures serve as the methodical tool for describing and 
explaining the constitutive questions. The path to topoi of spaces 
for the Human Sciences rests on the second-order methodological 
objectifications which can arise in the practical cognitive 
interest. Although these circumscribe the conditions under which we 
can use categories of spaces, the demand for ’space’ is essentially 
the same.
To be sure, in basing my arguments on these different 
schematizations I have constructed this equaliser to secure 
(hopefully) the agreement of those who would not necessarily agree 
in toto with the theory of leading knowledge interests. It might be 
argued that the theory is too broad for the conclusions I draw from 
it, and that I have skated over important problems in the 
Philosophy of Science. For example, the idea of a technical 
cognitive interest is floated on the reduction of the logic of 
explanation to that of prognosis and control. This presupposes 
observation-controlled feedback of theory amendment, and this in 
turn presupposes the objectivity of experience. Yet, the 
presuppositions of the objectivity of experience have hardly 
entered, except in a tangential way, into my arguments about the
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relation between ’geometric figures’ and ’experience’. I shall 
respond to this in two ways.|Firstly, in spite of the fact that the 
theory of leading knowledge interests does not address itself to 
evidential questions in any detail, I believe Habermas’ and Apel’s 
arguments are robust enough to deal with questions about grounding 
the objectivity of experience ([AP3»HA5,HA6]). I haven’t the space 
to go into this in any detail here. But simply note that in posing 
my questions within the framework of Metascience I have assumed we 
have been dealing with corroborated scientific experience.
Secondly, in my view these evidential questions are more 
appropriately located under the heading of Epistemology rather than 
Metascience. The choice of a particular representation of geometric 
elements to reflect the objectivity of experience is more properly 
the subject of Phenomenology in relation to Geometric Logic rather 
than that of Metascience. With the latter our focus is on how 
theoretical knowledge (episteme) can best serve practical 
intelligence (phronesis), and this has been the framework to guide 
the relevance of questions.
Another part of the good reasons for changing practice lies
'
in the improved steeringtof the scientific enterprise itself. The 
injunction to interpret one’s theories (with spatial content) into 
a topos of spaces is designed to improve scientific practice. There 
is no need for me to argue (counterfactually) that if knowledge of 
topoi of spaces had been available to Varela, Atkin, and their 
coworkers then much time and wasted scientific effort could have 
been saved. However, the case for an increased reflective 
understanding that one ought to be in a topos of spaces seems to be 
an overwhelming one, for cases similar to Varela’s and Atkin’s
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problems continue to arise. For example, Dodson and Lok have 
elucidated the categorical properties of a series of concrete 
categories, which might be loosely dubbed 'generalised hypergraphs' 
([D02,LK]). Now this is a quite proper activity for mathematicians. 
However, when these categories are presented as offering "... an 
alternative to continuum mechanics for modelling real phenomena" 
([LK]), claims are being made which encroach on the province of my 
dictum. Now their categories are not topoi (see, for example, [LK] 
Cor. 3 .1.9), nor are they cartesian closed. In fact most of the 
categories they discuss are not even complete ([LK] Chap.3). Thus, 
from the vantage point of my dictum their categories do not form a 
suitable domain for an interpretation of a scientific theory 
couched in terms of type theory. Now Lok argues that "... it is 
painfully clear to any physicist that real measurement can only be 
carried out with finite precision" ([LK] p.3). She postulates that 
"... this gives rise to the construction of a mathematical model 
with built-in local uncertainties within which points are 
indistinguishable" ([LK] p.3), and the concrete categories 
developed by both Dodson and herself are presented as fulfilling 
the requirements of just such a mathematical model. However, the 
import of my own argument is that structure = logic + internal 
cohesion. While it seems possible to theorise about imprecise 
measurement in terms of the logic component, it does not seem 
possible to substitute 'built-in local uncertainty’ for the 
internal cohesion that a space actually has. For example, the 
twister theorists use the internal cohesion of a localic topos to 
parameterise imprecision ([JZ]). They find no need to build-in 
uncertainty into their spaces. In my view, theories of imprecise 
measurement are best formulated in a type theory and then 
interpreted in a topos of spaces with the geometric figures that
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one actually needsU Perhaps the mathematical models presented by
; /
Dodson and Lok caii be viewed as models of a yet unspecified theory
1
in a petit topos Set g  (1) for some gros topos E over Set. Thus
when mathematicians suggest useful models for Science, my raeta-
/
scientific injunction can serve to raise appropriate questions 
before decisions are taken to invest time and effort on scientific 
research.
Our ability to embed sequential spaces and manifolds in
topoi of spaces might suggest that mathematicians have been using
topoi all the time. There is a grain of truth here. But Reyes in 
recalling (with nostalgia) the benefits of a liberal engineering 
education argues that the 'synthetic reasoning' (= Kripke-Joyal 
semantics for variable sets) of engineers and physicists "... does 
not fit , without violence, into the 'analytic' or set theoretical 
type of reasoning which has evolved since the end of the last 
century ..." ([RY] p.69). Thus the injunction to physicists and 
engineers to use topoi of spaces has certain implications for the 
modernisation (= renewal) of the mathematical/engineering syllabus. 
But a start can be made. The first part of Kock’s book ([KK2]) is a
locus classicus,for such synthetic reasoning in differential
calculus. Frolidher's and Kriegl's textbook ([FK]) elaborates 
cartesian closed categories of smooth vector spaces suitable for 
those taking a covariant approach in the (quasi-)causal Sciences, 
with scarcely a whisper of their relationship to the gros topoi. 
Lawvere has also taken a great interest in relating a covariant 
approach to advanced experimental work in the paradigmatic science 
of Continuum Mechanics ([LSB]). It seems certain that topoi of 
spaces, in one way or another, will make their presence felt in the
22l'
Natural Sciences; and given that the quasi-causal sciences demand 
space on a basis derived from that of the Natural Sciences, then 
the leakage to the Human Sciences will be inevitable.
Much of current mathematical sociology borrows heavily from
graph theory in its attempts to express social arrangements and
bonds as links in a network ([BH]). It seems to me that
mathematical sociology, as a GRA-type Human Science, has much to
gain from reflecting about graphs as objects in a topos of spaces.
In the first place, graph theory is too often conceived as
exploring the combinatorial connectivities of binary relations. To
stress the importance that an idea of 'space' is needed for
sociology is to point to the really useful part of graph theory
(for sociologists) is that consisting of directed multigraphs (=
RGraph) and B-partite graphs for some B in RGraph. In the second
place, recognition that topos-theoretic structure gives access to
exponential objects (a viewpoint not available to traditional graph
theory) should tempt mathematical sociologists to apply their
theories, whether about graph automorphisms as role-substitutions
or the application of predicates to subsets of graph elements, to
graphs of this form. Thirdly, the recognition that graphs are
objects in a topos of spaces should stimulate exploring other
topoi. I have argued that one should choose a topos with the
generic elements that one actually needs. Seidman's and Foster's
theories about cohesive social subgroups revolve around the fact
that these groups can communicate with their members in two steps
M (3 ) 'f
([SF2]). Thus it might be worth theorising in Set  ^ (which has 
these figures) rather than constraining one's theorising to RGraph 
2^ Set""  ^ . Fourthly, recognition that mathematics enters
mathematical sociology as a secondary methodological
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objectification supporting some good-reason-assay should end 
misplaced talk about testing predictions ([BH] p.240) and the 
analytical power of graph theory ([BH] p.236). It is customary for 
mathematical sociologists to bewail, from time to time, the sad 
plight of their subject. However, the metascientific injunction to 
be in a topos of spaces, when coupled with an understanding of the 
conditions under which mathematics can enter a GRA-type Science, 
should serve to encourage in such a Science appropriate, but more 
limited, expectations.
Finally, nothing in this thesis suggests that a scientist 
should not be using any other category or topos. If a scientist 
wants to experiment with other categories, then he should do so. If 
he wants to continue naively thinking in a set theoretical way then 
he should do so. But at some point, a scientist will want to move 
from prescientific meditations to a formal theory and undoubtedly 
working in a topos of spaces will ease this move. My claim has been 
a modest one : if you want to talk (formally) about ’space' then 
find a topos of spaces.
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NOTES
(1) Note to Chapter 1
The injunction to work in a topos is clearly normative. My argument 
that topoi of spaces encode our experience and knowledge of matter 
jQOving in space is a rational reconstruction. Such rational 
reconstructions can play an important role, both positive and 
negative, in the process of scientific discovery itself. On the 
positive side, rational reconstructions may ’automatically 
provide solutions for many problems (see Chaps. 9 & 10). On the 
negative side, they may (but not necessarily) be a brake on 
progress. On the one hand, it forms no part of my argument that a 
research worker need be concious or self—reflective about working 
in a topos of spaces. If I am right then such work can be realigned 
with such a topos later. Indeed there may well be some good reason 
for not subjecting the Conceptual to the Formal at an early stage. 
Thus the discovery that differential forms are really ’gloiified 
functions’ derived from ’amazing right adjoints’ emerges from 
conceptual considerations ([LWP] pp.388-90). These ’amazing right 
adjoints’ were quite unknown to categorical logic and only became 
subject to the Formal after some reflection ([KK2] pp.117-21). The 
perspective of ’creativity’ will always set limits on any norm. On 
the other hand, by pushing a precise but inadequate rational 
reconstruction to an unacceptable conclusion, we may expose the 
source of the inadequacy. Thus if one has some good reason for not 
heeding my dictum then this rational reconstruction may yet one day 
find its sublation.
(2) Note to Chapter 5
The gap between this rather abstract definition of (co)limits and 
the concrete examples in Set (Def.17 ff.) may seem too wide for
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some readers to cross. To bridge this gap I take the case of 
equalisers. Firstly, I show that Definition 17 gives us precise 
ideas of what conditions an equaliser should meet. Secondly, I show 
that an equaliser in Set is defined as in example (c) following
Definition 17 and meets these conditions.
(i) Assuming the right adjoint ^im to -A exists, then for each
object B in , there is an object lim -j*(B) (denoted by E say)
in A, and a natural transformation £  (B): A  .j-im y  (B)----~>B in
A - , such that (Def.15, Prop.1) for every morphism f: A  (A)----->B
there is a unique morphism f: A > j.im (B) satisfying f =
£ (B). A  (f). In the case of equalisers J is the category
represented by ®__ 0 , and a functor B:jJ >_A is an object B
in 4 “ . B can be represented by a pair of parallel arrows
U ^  s V in A. A morphism f: A  (A)---- ->B in _A—  can be
_  f
represented by a pair (f’,g) of morphisms in A, with f*:A- 
g:A >V, such that g ■= r.f' and g = s.f’. We have
V
->U,
f*
U
A
= rf’ = sf
commuting in Similarly the counit £  (B): A  .^ im .^ ( B) >B
can be represented by
U
A
ri = SI
E
commuting in A.
The adjunction means that for any object A in there is a unique
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morphism f:A >lim (B) with £_ (B). A. (f) = f. This situation
can be represented in ^  by
E U
A
g = r.f’ = sf
with f’ = i.f, since Â  (f) (= A  ___^E) can be represented by
f
f: A >E in A. Thus the task of finding a limit for B ( =
U V) reduces to finding a morphism i:E— -— >U in A such that
for any f’:A----- >U (with s f  = rf) then there is a unique
morphism f:A----- >E with i.f = f’.
(ii) In Set, finding an equaliser reduces to finding a set E =
{x 6 Uj r(x) = s(x)} with i:E >U the canonical inclusion of E
in Ü. First observe that ri = si. Suppose now that f’:A >U is
given with rf’ = sf’, then for every a <£ A we have r(f’(a)) = 
s(f’(a)), from which we can see that every f’(a) is an element of E 
for every a € A, so that the image of f’ is contained in E. Let
p:Im(f’ — — >U and qzlm(f’) ~>E be the canonical inclusions. If
f:A-~— — >Im(f’) be described by a |-----> f(a)=f’(a) and is the
surjection induced by f’ then we have i
f - q
A --------- > Im(f’)  > E 1
f’
\k
as a commutative diagram. So i.f = f’, where f = q.f. Since i is 
monic, f is the unique morphism with i.f = f’, which is what the 
adjunction requires.
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(3) Note to Chapter 6
Schanuel constructed a function g:D— -— >R as follows ([KK2] p.5) :
g(d) = 0  if d = 0, 
g(d) = 1  if d  ^ 0.
Note that the function is constructed so that g.g(d) = g(d).g(d) = 
g(d). Now we cannot be in Set as the Dedekind Reals would mean that 
D = {0} and there would be no unique b to meet the requirements of 
the axiom. However, by using the law of the excluded middle, we can 
postulate the existence of h G D, h 0, and we have g(h) = 1, with 
g.g(h) = 1. But according to Taylor’s formula, we must also have 
g.g(0 + h) = g.g(O) + (g.g)’(0).h.
Using Leibniz’ Rule, and by elementary calculations ([KK2] p.11) we 
see that (g.g)'(O) = g ’(0).g(0) + g(0).g’(0) = 0. So that we have 
the absurd (g.g(h) = 1) (g.g(O) + (g.g)’(0).h = 0). We can either
retain the law of the excluded middle and abandon the axiom, or 
retain the axiom and abandon the law of the excluded middle. There 
are good material reasons for retaining the axiom (and its 
derivations), as scientists use it all the time with spectacular 
results. So we conclude the differential calculus is a non- 
classical type theory , in which it is not provable that for all 
h ^ D ( h = 0 V  h ^ 0) ([KK2] p.6). In consequence, we must also
assume that
{0} U {h e D| h  ^0} c > D
is not an isomorphism ([LWP] p.385, Chap.6, Prop.12 ff.). From this 
perspective. Real Analysis is a different type theory 
(infinitesimals are abandoned) retaining the law of the excluded 
middle.
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